Mind and Reality

An Exploration of the Philosophy of Nagarjuna

 

Joseph Milne

May I begin by saying that I feel greatly honoured to be invited to speak here at the Nehru Centre because I have a deep love of Indian culture and wisdom, and I stand before it all with great reverence. But also I feel greatly honoured to be invited to speak in this series of talks on Buddhism as a non-Buddhist, and I do so with some trepidation. I am aware that it is a general rule of the Temenos Academy to invite speakers from inside their traditions, so I do hope that what I shall say in this talk will be worthy of breaking this general rule.

By way of justification, at least on my part, I should say that I love the Eastern religions as much as the Western and through my studies of them all I feel I have learned things which one alone would not have taught me. My interest in Nagarjuna in particular stems from my interest in the world religions and in certain fundamental and universal concerns of philosophy and theology: namely the question of the meaning of Being and the question of the meaning of Knowledge – what are technically called ontology and epistemology in Western thought. These two concerns converge in the thought of Nagarjuna.

As a non-Buddhist, as a non-Indian, and as a kind of outsider, simply as a member of the extended human family in all its diversity, I would therefore like to approach my discussion of Nagarjuna in the spirit of enquiry, as a person engaged in the questions that our human situation gives rise to. This enquiry is centred on the question: What is the relation of thought and reality? This is a huge question. It is indeed one of the great questions of philosophy in all traditions, wherever philosophy is still honestly pursued. Can thought touch reality? Can reality touch thought? Is all thought, in the end, nothing more than an overlay or projection upon reality? Would we be wiser to fall silent and simply hearken to reality? Or are we called by reality to think? Is there a mode of thought which leads us towards reality, towards truth itself, even though truth itself is ever-free and stands solely by itself and in itself? And are there modes of thought which lead us away from reality and truth and into illusion. How is truth to be distinguished from illusion? Why is there a problem of reality and illusion? Why do we not simply light upon reality without effort? After all, nothing else can be disclosing itself to us but reality itself, so why is there any problem of the relation of reality to thought?

Well, there certainly is a problem, and there seems no escape from facing this problem. As human beings, simply because we are human beings, we think. We cannot help but conceive reality. The root of the word man means mind. The human being is the thinking being, and the human being is the being who must understand the nature of thought. This has always been one of the central concerns of philosophy, and the great philosophers have found that thought is grounded in reality, although finding that ground is very difficult. It involves finding the ground of thought and the ground of reality at the same time, and then both reality and thought are known entirely differently. Thought ceases to be mere imposition upon reality, and reality ceases to be distinct from the knower of reality. This convergence of thought and reality is a common factor of the greatest Eastern and Western philosophy, even though they may be articulated very differently. If we study these philosophers in the spirit of enquiry, we see they point our gaze to a region that cannot be seen or grasped without a total transformation of thought. We cannot bring faulty or deluded thought to the gates of truth. But neither can we transform thought without understanding its nature. On the contrary, the process of understanding thought is itself the means of transforming it. This is a common factor between such great philosophers as Heraclitus, Plato, Shankara or Nagarjuna, different as they may be in a thousand other respects. Thought proceeds to reality through a transformation of thought itself through thought coming to a knowledge of its ground. The nature of the known, the knower and knowing have all to be known in a single act. That is the aim of the highest philosophy and of the highest mysticism. We may go further and say it is the aim of mind or intelligence itself. The mind has no resting place other than truth itself. How could it have a different resting place? What else could satisfy thought and intelligence than truth itself – not a concept of truth, but truth itself?

Not a concept of truth, but truth itself. Here lie all the difficulties of thought. Not a doctrine of truth, but truth itself. Not a belief, but truth itself. Not a theory, but truth itself. Not an interpretation, but truth itself. Not an ideology, but truth itself. Not a system, but truth itself. Truth itself, free of any distortions imposed by thought. Truth itself, so the greatest thinkers tell us, cannot be replicated by thought at a distance from itself. It cannot be taken out of its ground in itself. How, then, can thought possibly come to it?

Is that enough questions? These are profoundly interesting questions, are they not? They make us pause. So, how does Nagarjuna approach these questions? Let me first just say that Nagarjuna is probably the greatest Buddhist philosopher, if we can say such a thing in a Buddhist context. He was born in South India probably in the early second century AD. There are many legends about him, but I will not go into those here – save to remark that these legends attest to his greatness. At an early age he entered the Buddhist Order. The works attributed to him are now known to us only through Tibetan translations. Various good English translations are available of these works. They are very terse and difficult – so be warned before you embark on reading them, particularly if you have little familiarity with Buddhism.

Nagarjuna’s starting point is very simple. It is this: the unreflective mind attributes ultimacy to that which is not ultimate. That is to say, the unreflective mind takes as absolutely true that which is not absolute, and in doing this it misconceives the nature of everything. In this act of attributing ultimacy to what is not ultimate, the mind “clings” to an aspect of reality, a part of reality, which is not as it seems. This false “clinging” is a central notion of Buddhism. It is a very profound insight into the mind or human nature. The mind lights on something and says to itself “That is the real. I hold to that.” In saying “I hold to that” the mind enslaves itself to something that is not firm and dependable, and so begins the great cycle of suffering or dukha.

Well, that is straightforward and familiar enough, is it not? It is the tragic side of the human story. The mind allies itself to something as ultimate that is not ultimate and hopes or believes it will bring permanent happiness, but it does not. On the contrary, it brings distress and suffering. It is simple enough and we can all think of many examples. But two questions need to be asked of this. First, why is there this tendency of the mind to attribute ultimacy to that which is not ultimate, and second, what is the basic structure of this kind of mistaken thinking? The first of these questions I shall return to later. It is a very important question and requires careful philosophic examination. The second question – what is the basic structure of this type of mistaken thinking? – will lead us in the direction of an answer, so we shall see what Nagarjuna says about this first.

This brings us to a major part of Nagarjuna’s philosophy, to what are called the four extremes or kotis. The four extremes are what Nagarjuna regards as the four characteristic ways in which the mind posits absolutes which are not truly absolute. There are several ways in which these extremes may be briefly formulated, and they come as options between different extremes or absolutes. For example, take the concept of existence. If existence is taken as ultimate it raises the question of non-existence. The notion of non-existence raises the question as to whether the ultimate is both existence and non-existence together, or whether the ultimate is neither existence nor non-existence. Thus we have four koti or extremes: existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence. According to Nagarjuna all these views are wrong. This is because the Middle Way says reality is not to be reduced to any of these extremes but is a mixture of them all. They are all true at once, but none of them is true exclusively. But to see this requires a totally different order of thinking or understanding which transcends the dichotomies involved in the four extremes but which also negates nothing of the partial truth of them all. All the extreme views are either dualistic, or false unities, or false negations.

To illustrate this we make take this great city of London. Clearly it exists, yet also just as clearly it has come into existence and will one day go out of existence. So which of these two is true of London? Which is permanent or ultimate, its present existence, its previous or future non-existence? We surely cannot say that because it came into existence and will go out of existence that it is really non-existent, can we? We would not be here if it was non-existent. It exists now. But what is the non-existence of London? Does not the concept of the non-existence of London depend on the concept of the existence of London? We have to remember that the concept of the non-existence of something refers to the something that is said to be non-existent, so the concept of non-existence does not stand alone. Thus the two concepts of existence and non-existence belong with each other, and for the unreflective mind they simply remain in conflict with each other. So one person will go for existence as the real or ultimate, and another will go for non-existence as real or ultimate. But they are both wrong, according to Nagarjuna. So is London both existent and non-existent at once? That too is plainly absurd and an extreme. Superficially it may appear to resolve the dichotomy between existence and non-existence, but it remains only a theoretical concept and is not actually known. It is a false resolution of the duality of existence and non-existence. So what alternative is left? The remaining alternative is to conceive it as neither existent nor non-existent. This move attempts to overcome the dichotomy between existence and non-existence by negating both. It is the sister to the concept that it is both at once. This is the fourth extreme, or what is called nihilism. Nihilism refuses to account for existence and for non-existence. It does not answer the question but buries it out of sight.

Now, why is there such a problem in deciding if London exists, non-exists, exists and non-exists, or neither exists nor non-exists? Many modern Western analytic philosophers will say this is just a semantic problem, a mere play with words. But that reply is in fact the fourth extreme! It is to align oneself with one of the false answers. Another might say that, since truth is just a relative thing it is equally true to say that London both exists and non-exists for those for whom it seems so. But this is to adopt the position of the third koti or extreme. Modern relativism is one of the extremes, as old as ignorance itself. Just another extreme copout which does not address the question fully. To say that truth is relative is an absolute is extremist position, just like the others. Notice that, although the mind gets pulled between these various answers, as if it were obliged to settle for one or another of them, none of them can actually bring thought into contact with reality itself, but rather they lead it away into abstractions, into theories which the mind wishes to test. But what is it that can test a theory of truth? What measures truth?

So why this difficulty? Nagarjuna’s answer is simple. Existence and non-existence are not ultimate. The problem arises through attributing ultimacy to any of the combinations or relations of existence or non-existence, or ultimacy to their negation. Existence and non-existence both come and go. They are there, plainly, yet they are not ultimate. To put this in Nagarjuna’s words, they co-originate. That is to say, that which is and that which is not belong together and engender each other simultaneously. They are not actually mutually exclusive, just as waking and sleeping are not mutually exclusive, or day and night, or left and right. They arise in relation to one another.

Nevertheless this does not answer the question as to how the notion of ultimacy arises in thought. Nagarjuna is not saying there is no ultimate, and neither is Buddhism as a whole saying that. Buddhism most certainly does not deny an ultimate, and neither is Nagarjuna doing so. All he is saying is that we attribute ultimacy to things that are not ultimate. But there is that to which ultimacy truly belongs. To say there is no ultimate is just a further extreme position. The unreflective mind simply fails to distinguish between the relative and the absolute, or between the conditioned and the unconditioned. In the mundane realm of things, everything stands in relation to everything else. This means that the existent among observable things stands in relation to the non-existent and visa versa. They arise together. There could be no becoming if this were not so. For example, a child grows into an adult by ceasing to be a child. Being a child and an adult are both part of being human. But the human being could not pass through these stages without the whole of the rest of the world also coming into being and constantly changing and transforming. And the world could not come into being without the universe coming into being. So everything is interdependent and related. The mistake lies in taking some aspect of all this as ultimate or absolute.

This may be seen better from another angle. If we take the solitary being of the self as ultimate, then there arises other than self. If I take “I” as ultimate, then your self becomes other than my self. Linguistically we get “I” and “Thou”, “me” and “you”. I cannot use the word “I” in reference to you, and you cannot use “I” in reference to me. To whom then does the word “I” truly belong? In the realm of the conditioned we have to accept the difference, as language itself compels us to do. But which is ultimate: “I” or “Thou”? One answer is to say both. Another is to say neither. Another is to say neither – nor, meaning they are neither non-ultimate nor ultimate at the same time. But all these answers are extremes and therefore wrong according to Nagarjuna. Why? Because selfhood is being misconceived in all cases. This is the meaning of the Anatma-vada or no-self doctrine. The Anatma-vada or no-self doctrine says that to attribute independent selfhood to any being is to attribute self-origination to that being. Plainly, no being could exist without the rest of the universe. Plainly no being brings itself into being as a self-enclosed entity. If that were so every being would live in its own independent world, or live alone in no world at all. It implies an infinite number of originations, one for every being.

To put that another way. We see in modern science the search for the fundamental particle, the bit that stands alone and brings itself into being. This is atomism, the theory that there is some primary bit or particle that is prior to all the diversity of the universe of matter. From the Buddhist position this is the false assumption that there is one bit of matter that stands apart from the rest of matter, while in fact all matter comes forth together as a continuum in process. It is like mistaking an ingredient of a cake for its cause – while in fact the cause of the cake lies with the baker and the person who will eat the cake. If the cake has no independent existence from the baker and the final eater of the cake, how can it be considered that one of its ingredients is ultimate or primary? So likewise with every being. Each comes into being as part of the totality of the conditioned realm. This does not negate the integrity of each being, and it does not mean that nobody has selfhood, but it does mean that any notion of selfhood that regards the being as self-causing and independent from the rest of conditioned reality must be false. In short, ultimacy should not be attributed to anything that is just a part or element, or which is in process of change, or which comes into being or goes out of being.

The difficulty in all this is that the unreflective mind does not realise the implications of attributing ultimacy to the conditioned. That which is ultimate stands eternally by itself in relation to nothing else. The ultimate is non-relative. The ultimate has no opposite, and so the ultimate can never be one of a pair of things or the fusion of a pair of things. In Buddhist terms the ultimate does not belong to the realm of being or of non-being or of becoming. It does not stand in contrast to anything. That would make it relative. So how could these attributions belong to any entity or non-entity in the conditioned world? There is the realm of the relative and the realm of the non-relative. These have to be clearly distinguished. The problem Nagarjuna is addressing is the confusion of the two. So long as they are confused, then neither is understood properly. Ultimacy gets mixed up with the relative, and the relative gets mixed up with the ultimate.

Now – for the sake of our Western minds and for the sake of coming out of the hard considerations for a moment – I would suggest that what Nagarjuna is saying here is universally a problem of thinking. We are not merely discussing a Buddhist doctrine but principles that belong to proper thinking universally. What I have just said about maintaining a proper distinction between the ultimate and the relative applies equally in all genuine philosophical work and to all religions. Even though Buddhism is called by non-Buddhists a “non-theistic” religion, all that Nagarjuna says about the distinction between the ultimate and the relative applies to the Christian distinction between God and the creation. This is not a matter of attempting to reconcile Buddhism with Christianity – an enterprise which I regard as wholly pointless because it reduces both to mere doctrines or systems – but simply because as thinking beings we need to distinguish the ultimate from the non-ultimate, the relative from the non-relative, the absolute from the non-absolute. We belong to this problematic no matter whether we are Buddhists or Christians, or if we go by no named religion at all.

So I just want to point out that unreflective notions of God in our culture import relative ideas and impose them upon God. For example, God is often regarded as an entity or a being among beings. Or God is thought of as intervening in the created order. There is, if I may just make this observation, a lack of theological consideration of the transcendence of God in Christianity at the present time. And this is because the meaning of ultimacy is no longer generally considered, and because of this a confused relativism prevails almost everywhere, perhaps even to the point where relativism is regarded as ultimate or absolute, even though such a notion is rationally incoherent. This leads to confusion in every walk of life. Everyone wants their own private truth, and yet they want everyone else to subscribe to their private truth – which obviously is impossible, not to say absurd. But the root is the failure to consider the ultimate in proper terms, as completely discontinuous with the relative. Truth is not democratic, it is the measure of all things, the measure of every notion, yet not itself a notion.

My point here is that metaphysical confusion, such as prevails in most modern Western thought, leads to confusion of though in every realm. Metaphysics is not an optional extra in a culture. On the contrary, all thought and perception is grounded in metaphysics in the very obvious sense of what we take to be real or unreal, eternally true or temporally conditioned. It makes no difference whether we call ourselves believers, agnostics or atheists, this metaphysical distinction between real an unreal remains the ground of our thinking simply because it is the ground of mind, intelligence and consciousness themselves. Wittingly or unwittingly every human being attributes ultimacy to something or other – even to suppose there is no such thing as ultimacy is to do so.

This brings us to a matter that I believe needs to be cleared up in much that is commonly said of Buddhism. I said a moment ago that Buddhism is a non-theistic religion, and I suggested this was a meaningless distinction. It is obvious that Buddhism does not speak in terms of a theistic symbolism. But it is also obvious that those religions that do speak in theistic symbolism are quite aware that they speak symbolically. It is understood in the highest Christian theology, for example, that the appellation “God” is just an appellation and that all the theological attributes given to God do not capture God, because God is ineffable, wholly beyond that grasp of representative thought. Exactly the same holds for the Buddhist appellation Sunyata – “unconditioned”, “void”, “emptiness”. It is no different to make Sunyata an entity among entities as it is to make God an entity among entities. The two words “God” and “Sunyata” belong to two modes of discourse, the symbolic and the metaphysical. This distinction between symbolic and metaphysical discourse is a vast subject that merits much reflection in its own right, but we cannot pursue that now. All I wish to point out is that these two modes of thought should not be reduced to literal differences between religions and taken as a basis for doctrinal differences. Nor should they be reduced to mere psychological or cultural distinctions, a reduction I find quite abhorant. On the contrary, both discourses direct the mind to the same, to the ultimate, the non-relative, to that which is prior to temporal reality, prior to mind and thought, prior to being, becoming and non-being, prior to the seeds, essences or archetypes of existent things – prior in the sense of eternally real or absolute, prior in the sense of there in advance of everything, prior in the sense of that which everything stands forth from and is distinguishable from, the indistinguishable which makes distinction possible.

I am quite aware that Buddhist literature rarely states this explicitly. Its orientation is the practical overcoming of the clinging that arises through attributing ultimacy to that which is relative. But the question naturally arises – or so it seems to me – How does it come about that the mind attributes ultimacy at all? Or, in more directly Buddhist terms, How does it happen that the mind attributes the unconditioned to the conditioned? Why is there any notion of the ultimate at all?

The answer is that if there were only the relative and contingent, there could be no conception of the non-relative and non-contingent. Indeed there could be no conception of the relative or contingent either. That is to say, the conditioned is itself only conceivable and discernable by virtue of an inate prior knowledge of the unconditioned, because the conditioned stands out from the silent background, so to speak, of the unconditioned. Let me make this as clear as possible: Mind looks out from the unconditioned. The unconditioned is the vantage-point of mind or consciousness. That is why the unconditioned cannot be an object of perception or conception, just as the ear cannot hear the ear, or the eye perceive the eye. The rule is that whatever may be an object of perception belongs to the realm of the conditioned, and this includes all the contents and motions of the mind itself that are observable as objects. In short, the conditoned includes all that may be experienced, for experience means to go out, to savour difference and diversity, to attend to that which stands away from the seat of unconditioned Reality.

This is a very important matter to consider. Where does mind think and conceive from? Modern Western thought on this matter is almost non-existent. Thought is given over to inference from perception or from theory, but the ground of knowing itself is no longer considered in most modern philosophy. This is fine for the natural sciences, but it cannot deal with the question of the ground of mind itself, that is to say, metaphysical questions. From whence does mind gaze upon the things of sense? From whence does its gaze arise? Modern psychology is no help here either because it attempts to study only the contents of the mind as objects in the same way as the sciences do, as objects of sense. Thus it is preoccupied with images and personal history. It does not enquire into the nature of mind as such, or into the nature of knowing or epistemology. Indeed there is no psychology of Intellect which is the organ of knowledge. So where is the seat or ground of mind as such? From whence does it direct its gaze upon things, including the contents of the mind?

The answer is that mind gazes from the unconditioned itself, from truth itself. To put that more strongly, truth or reality bring mind into being. This is the metaphysical answer to this question. It is a straightforward fact, so to speak, which Nagarjuna takes for granted when he discusses in such detail the errors that arise in confusing the ultimate with the relative. He does not ask the foolish question “Is there such a thing as truth or reality absolute?” He asks, How can the mind be rescued from ignorance, from the confusion of the conditioned with the unconditioned? And his answer, which is utterly Buddhist, is to direct the intelligence to seeing the logical absurdity of the extreme views which confuse the conditioned and relative with the unconditioned and non-relative. The unconditioned and non-relative are taken as given. They are taken as given by Nagarjuna and they are taken as given by the ignorant. The difference lies in how they are understood in either case.

Its strikes our modern Western mind as curious that the seat of the gaze of the mind is from the unconditioned itself, from the ultimate itself, and that it is knowledge that looks outward to the objects of sense, to the conditioned. Since the Enlightenment our Western culture has become accustomed to supposing that all that may be known can be known only as objects, as external entities, sense-perceptions from which “knowledge” may be inferred empirically. We have become accustomed to supposing that knowledge is abstracted from perceptions, and that all such knowledge is subject to continuous revision. But prior to the Enlightenment the great philosophers and theologians understood the knowing act of the mind quite differently. They understood that it was knowledge that formed mind and brought mind into being, and that the Intellectual world and the Soul exist prior to the objects of sense, as their cause. Thus the essences of things are in mind, universal mind, not in the materiality of objects, and essence knows essence without mediation. Non-essence cannot know essence. This means that essence cannot be inferred from empirical investigation of objects. This is a very important principle which is found in every high philosophical tradition or religion. It is the essence of mind that knows the essence of things. Thus Plato, for example, says that before its descent into the body – into the material world – the soul knew the essences of all things directly without mediation, not as entities outside itself but through union with them. Likewise Parmenides says that thought and being are the same, and at the close of the Middle Ages Aquinas says that the first thought of the mind is Being. Union is the essential meaning of our word “knowledge” or the Greek “gnosis”.

Because such knowledge is of the nature of mind itself, the ground of all thought, it cannot be thought as mediated knowledge, as an object of knowledge distinct from the mind, such as psychological and material objects can be. Mind is knowledge present to itself as itself. It is knowledge that forms the mind, not mind that grasps knowledge. This is the highest level of the mind, of course. It was the realm of knowledge proper to the intellect, which knows from unity, as distinct from the reason, which infers from the senses and experiences. It is what Aquinas called Angelic Mind, or what Meister Eckhart calls the uncreated apex of the soul. It is mind participating in God’s knowledge, and thus it is where being and knowing are identical. In Buddhist terms, it is Sunyata knowing Sunyata.

This understanding of mind was lost in the Enlightenment, and so the thought of the previous ages, from the Presocratics to the Renaissance, has become largely unintelligible to us. But it can become intelligible to us again once we understand that the natural order of the universe and of being has been turned upside-down in modern Western thinking. That is to say, that Being, Truth, Reality, Essence and Knowledge are first in the order of things, not last, and that they are immediately present to themselves, not mediated, and that mind is the immediate reflection of these upon themselves as distinct from their identity in the mind of God. In God Being, Truth and Knowledge are at rest, while in mind they are creative and in motion.

In Buddhist thought – as in Eastern thought generally – the natural order has not been turned upside-down, and so we find it taken for granted that the subtlest and most ineffable comes first in the order of things, not last, and certainly not as an arbitrary extra. Therefore the thinking moves in quite a different way, and so the problem that Nagarjuna deals with is that of mixing the unmediated knowing of the ultimate with the mediated knowing of the conditioned. It is a problem of mixing absolute knowledge with inferred knowledge. This is essentially the same problem that Plato deals with in speaking of distinguishing Reality from appearances.

What, then, are the implications of all this when considering the relation of Reality to thought. Is Reality – reality in the true sense of that which is eternal, absolute and ultimate – beyond the scope and power of thought? Is Nagarjuna pointing us beyond all thought? Is he, through showing the errors of mixing the unconditioned with the conditioned, negating all thought? The answer to this question depends on what we understand thought to be. If by thought we mean only inference from objects of sense, then the answer is yes. If by thought we mean holding concepts distinct from Reality itself, then the answer is yes again.

However, that answer is not sufficient and is too simplistic. There is a mode of thought beyond and prior to inferential and conceptual thought. This higher mode of thought is the knowing that belongs to Reality as such, a mode of thought in which Reality is present to itself with conception un-separate from itself. If we might put it this way, Reality thinks its presence, or, Reality knows itself. This is the originary knowing that brings mind into being, mind in the universal sense, and it is also the ground of every particular mind, the ground in which mind can reflect upon itself and upon everything else, both the unconditioned and the conditioned, the non-relative and the relative. This is thought in the true sense, the thought prior to and underlying all inferential or discursive thinking. It is the thought that belongs to Intellect as it was understood in the Middle Ages in the West, or thought that was once called contemplation or speculation. To contemplate or to speculate is to come to know from things themselves, to apprehend what reality of itself discloses of itself to itself. In the Christian tradition this is sometimes called “participating in God’s knowledge of all things.” In that knowledge everything is present to God without any distinction or division. In Buddhism this is Sunyata. Liberated from the confusion of the ultimate with the non-ultimate, which is the root of clinging, the mind is free to be informed directly by the knowledge that resides in all things – not in order to “have” or “get” knowledge of things, but rather to be impressed or stamped with the knowledge that speaks things themselves into being. The word “informed” means to be “formed by”. In other words, true thought is the thought which comes out of reality itself as reality itself. It is this thought which occurs in the liberated or non-clinging mind, and so mind is not separate from Reality, but Reality beholding itself, or knowledge in knowledge of itself.

This may well sound strange in the context of modern Western thinking, where epistemology has become wholly preoccupied with the problems of empirical inference, as we have already observed. But consider this: do we really believe that Reality is unknown to itself? Do we really think that Truth does not know Truth, or that the ineffable is oblivious of itself? Is Reality to be relegated to unconscious oblivion? I think these question show the absurdity of such notions by themselves. It is therefore the responsibility of our intelligence to conform itself to the intelligence of Reality itself. That, I suggest, is the point of Nagarjuna’s pulling apart of all erroneous thinking. He intends to leave the mind free to participate in the unconditioned reality of Reality itself.

 

Joseph Milne 2001

 

Medieval Mystical Allegory

Joseph Milne

 

  • Abstract
    An exploration of Patristic and Medieval allegorical hermeneutics, drawing a distinction between a revelatory approach to the created order, where created things are understood as disclosing God, and the veiling approach to the created order, where created things are seen as concealing God. Although these two approaches appear to contradict one another, it is argued that both are mystically legitimate, and that work needs to be done to recover the allegorical reading of Scripture.

***

In his sermons Meister Eckhart calls us time and again to abandon all images, all conceptions, and withdraw entirely from all created things and abide in ‘nothing’ where alone God may enter the soul. The allegorical tradition, on the other hand, calls us to observe and marvel at the infinite wonders of the Creation, and to contemplate the inexhaustible multiplicity of meanings in the Scriptures. At first glance these two approaches, both deeply rooted in the early Church and sustained throughout the Middle Ages, appear wholly opposite and contrary to one another.

At the heart of the difference between them lie two different stances towards whatever is manifest, whether in Creation or in Scripture, and how the manifest is to be received. On the one side, all that is manifest veils or conceals the divine mystery, or the ineffable, that lies beyond all that is visible or can be manifest. Here the manifest ‘hides’ the unmanifest. On the other side, all that is manifest reveals or discloses the divine mystery, so that the infinite brightly shines in everything finite. Here the manifest is ‘theophanic’. In this second sense, the Creation, like Scripture, is ‘revelatory’, not merely by analogy or likeness, but in divine presence. The world is God’s wisdom disclosed in its infinite fullness, presenting to the human soul divine nourishment and a way home to God. It is the ‘glory’ of God, as spoken of in the Psalms and the Lord’s Prayer.[1]

Having stated their obvious opposition, may these two stances be reconciled? Or may one be subsumed into the other? For a number of reasons I believe we must hesitate from any reconciliation. One reason is that either approach involves its own spiritual disposition towards truth. For example, one is predominantly intellectual, and the other predominantly devotional – one seeks the transcendent truth of God, the other the manifest wisdom, glory and love of God. Eckhart, for example, invokes detachment and points the soul to participate in God’s own self-knowledge, wholly beyond all created things. St Bernard, on the other hand, teaches that all forms of love, including carnal love and self-love, are grounded or rooted in the love of God, and that love as such is ultimately nothing else than the love of God. The ‘metaphysical’ way and the ‘affective’ way, as we might distinguish them, each incline to God in completely distinct ways. And this is not the same as the distinction between the ‘apophatic’ and ‘kataphatic’ ways, since both culminate in mystical union.

Another reason for hesitating in reconciling them – and in a way the more important reason – is that our age has in general lost the allegorical way of seeing and of knowing. So when we read of the medieval scheme of four senses of Scripture it does not resonate with our culture and seems to be an arbitrary way of forcing words to signify things they cannot signify. It has been argued that the allegorical way of reading Scripture was motivated by a wish to overcome its crude or base meanings, or else to reconcile it with empirical branches of knowledge. At the same time there has always been a struggle between those who see Scripture as having many senses, and those who hold they must have only a single sense that all Christians can agree on.

But also, even within the allegorical tradition itself, there have been struggles between those who follow the tradition of allegorical reading and those who invent new senses – between those who ‘see’ the various meanings, and those who through pride of intellect wish to be originators of some subtle new meaning.

The allegorical tradition of ‘unveiling’ is no more straightforward than the metaphysical tradition of ‘transcending’ that runs alongside it. Nevertheless, until the thirteenth century, and within the monastic life, the allegorical reading of Scripture and of Creation was the principle approach to their study. The created world teemed with meaning. Every creature signified something sacred. Indeed, the world itself is seen as sacred, for it is God’s work. This is the ‘religious’ way of knowing the world in the Middle Ages. But this approach to Scripture, as Henri de Lubac observes, is gradually replaced by dialectical ‘questions’ addressed to Scripture, and by ‘summas’ gathering theology into systems. This movement began as early as the mid twelfth century with works such as The Sentences of Peter Lombard.[2]

The shift towards dialectical questions produced its own great riches – in Thomas Aquinas for example. With the discovery of the works of Aristotle, this also involved a shift towards ‘metaphysics’, or the attempt to reconcile revelation with philosophy or metaphysics. This manner of thinking gives no fertile ground for allegorical reading of Creation or Scripture. The four senses of Scripture tend to be merely repeated as formulas and meanings rattled off superficially. Beneath this, however, one senses a shift in the very idea of the meaning of allegory itself. Instead of it being a disclosure of a deeper meaning than the outer appearance, allegory is now conceived as a sign standing for something else. This is evident, for example, in the rise of the secular romances, such as the Romance of the Rose in about 1230. Although presented as a spiritual journey of love, in courtly fashion, the allegorical sense is not conveyed through literal things, but rather literal things are presented as standing for other things, especially psychological states of the lover and beloved. Natural phenomena is likewise presented as representing or signifying other things. In short, allegory has gradually transformed or declined into simile. There is no longer any real connection between ‘things’ and their innate meaning. Rather, meanings are attributed to things merely by convention.

This new tradition of allegory, rich and beautiful as it is, indicates a break with the ancient tradition which did not see allegory as ‘one thing standing for another’ but rather as the ‘inner sense’ embodied in and revealed through the visible sense. Or, to use the expression of Dionysius, the visible was a ‘veil’ through which the invisible could be discerned. The words of Scripture radiated with infinite meaning, depth upon depth, even as Creation itself did, which was also the Book of God, or a ‘second Scripture’. The allegorical tradition is grounded in the understanding that all things are full of meaning and that there is an art in searching out this meaning, an art which involves a spiritual transformation of the soul. It was this understanding of allegory – and therefore of the world – that receded in the late Middle Ages, and which, as Paul Ricoeur has shown in his Thinking Biblically and his hermeneutics in general, is lost in our age. The symbolic sense is no longer part of modern culture, and so the great stories of Scripture, or the myths of ancient Greece, no longer communicate with us. We have lost what Ricoeur calls the ‘first naivety’ of understanding which directly grasps the symbolic and the theophanic. Our modern critical and empirical engagement with reality has overwhelmed our original grasp of the symbolic narrative that once held Western culture together.

More than this, anything but the literal meaning of words has been banished from our thinking, as we read in John Locke. The very idea of ‘multiple’ levels of meaning in the Creation has been relegated either to ‘subjectivity’ or else to superstition. Our relation to the world is no longer as participants in its meaning or purpose. Rather it has become a mere object, knowable only through theoretical explanation. The Cartesian self, locked in its solitary self-knowing, cannot be part of the sacred unfolding of the universe. This situation accounts not only for the loss of the allegorical meaning of things, but also for the metaphysical. Our range of speech is narrowed to the propositional, and the modes of speech belonging to taking vows, of performing rituals, or offering prayer, so profuse in Shakespeare, have become strange to us. Our culture no longer speaks with the universe or has any real dialogue with reality. We now merely talk ‘about things’, not with them or to them or in response to them.

My point is not to censure our times, but rather to explain how our enquiry into mystical allegory is obscured by our contemporary comportment towards reality which passes over any meaning it expresses. Meaning has become something the human being attributes to or projects upon things which are held to have no inherent meaning in themselves. So this is as much a problem for scholars of literature as it is for theologians. Nevertheless, I would suggest that our ‘symbolic sense’, even our ‘sacred sense’, of reality is primordially grounded in consciousness and is open to realms of meaning that our analytical or critical faculties cannot penetrate. That is to say, human consciousness is ordered toward reality in a manner that first apprehends its presence symbolically and as a totality, and this in turn leads us to grant that human nature is essentially ‘religious’, insofar as we are compelled to call that apprehension ‘sacred’. In more philosophical terms it is what Aristotle describes in the opening of his Metaphysics as the initial orientation of the mind towards truth, because truth attracts the consciousness. The ancient understanding of ‘mind’, or the soul, is that it is already grounded in an apprehension of things that draws it towards deeper understanding. There is no isolated cogito closed in on itself. Mind is essentially open. And rather than Anthropos being the questioning master over things, it is sacred reality itself that calls for piety and for each soul to give account of itself before the truth of things. Religiously speaking, it is truth that reaches out to humankind. Thus its quality is revelatory or disclosive and comes as a gift, even as being itself is a gift.

To put that another way, the early Christian contemplation of Scripture begins in ‘piety’, in a reverence awakened by truth itself. Without piety, so Origen and St Augustine tell us repeatedly, the doors of the Scriptures will not open to us. Only the pure and pious soul can approach the threshold of Scripture.[3] This is the first sense in which its meaning is ‘veiled’. This initial veiling is its protection. In the Phaedrus Socrates says that any true writing, written with knowledge of the nature of the soul, will defend itself even though it is fixed and one cannot debate with it. We should not be astonished that this view should have been adopted by the Church Fathers with the Scriptures.

An initial step, then, into understanding the ancient meaning of allegorical apprehension is to grant to things their own disclosive power. This precedes Scripture and applies to Creation. All natural phenomena may then be seen as hierophanic. As Ricoeur says in his essay ‘Manifestation and Proclamation’:

  • That a stone or a tree may manifest the sacred means that this profane reality becomes something other than itself while still remaining itself. It is transformed into something supernatural.[4]

And later he writes:

  • In the sacred universe there are not a few living beings here and there, but life is a total and diffuse sacrality that may be seen in the cosmic rhythms, in the return of vegetation, and in the alternation of life and death. The symbol of the tree of life – or of knowledge, or immortality, or youth – in this respect is the highest figure of this fundamental sacrality of life.[5]

It is out of this sacred vision of the cosmos that the ancient myths are born, revealing an order and drama of existence that the ‘profane’ vision of reality veils. It is only when the cosmos, the sun, moon and stars, the animals and plants, the rivers and mountains, become hierophanies that the divine order of truth becomes visible. This hierophanic vision of reality runs through Greek philosophy and Stoicism like a golden thread. The universe is a living intelligence. When that vison is lost, Plato argues in Book X of the Laws, and inert matter is claimed to be the cause and origin of things, then the city, which is to say ‘society’, will fall through impiety.

Just as the cosmos is a living intelligence, so likewise, Origen argues, are the Scriptures:

  • Since, therefore, Scripture itself consists, as it were, of a body that is perceived, of a soul which is understood and conceived to be in the body, and of a spirit according to the shadow of the heavenly things, come, then, let us invoke him who made the body, soul, and spirit of Scripture, a body for those who have preceded us, a soul for us, and a spirit for those who are destined to possess eternal life in a future age and to arrive at the heavenly truth of the law. At this time, let us investigate the soul, not the letter. If we can do this much, let us make our ascent to the spirit, in the manner of the sacrifices that we have just been reading about.[6]

Here Scripture is taken not only as a living being, with body, soul, and spirit, but this threefold hierarchy of being also indicates the threefold meaning of Scripture. It is clear that this threefold sense is derived from the ‘letter’, which is the body, the ‘meaning’, which is the soul, and the mystical or moral sense, which is the ‘spirit’. Origen likens this threefold order to that of the human being, consisting of body, soul, and spirit. That later in the Middle Ages the Scriptures were given a fourfold sense – the literal, allegorical, moral, and mystical – is slightly anomalous because the ‘allegorical’ sense originally meant all the meanings beyond the literal sense.[7] The important point here is that Scripture is regarded as a living being corresponding with human nature. And Origen is bold enough to imply that Scripture is Christ incarnate. That is to say, the Scripture corresponds in every respect with the Incarnation of Christ, and that those who contemplate Scripture reverently receive from Christ the wisdom, consolation or instruction suited to their spiritual need. Christ works through the Scriptures according to the spiritual condition of each individual soul. This ‘work’ is performed by God, and so the disposition of piety in the reader mentioned earlier is essential for the soul’s receptivity to this divine transformative work.

Here it is helpful to recall that there are different orders of language, and that the mode of speech in Scripture belongs to a primordial language where nature speaks in her own vocabulary, in which ‘objects’ are themselves ‘words’. In his The Great Code Northrop Frye argues that there are three orders of language, or historical phases of language. The most ancient is the ‘poetic’, where no strong distinction exists between subject and object, and where physical things express divine things or inner states directly. The second mode of language Frye calls ‘hieratic’, meaning religious or priestly language, which is mainly allegorical. The third mode of language he calls ‘demotic’, meaning simply descriptive or factual language, such as the language of historians or of science. Frye observes that, beginning with Francis Bacon and consolidated by John Locke, demotic language forces out all metaphor and allegory. Indeed, Locke would have metaphor banished, and every word be confined to a single literal sense. According to Frye, it is owing to the fall into demotic language that the language of the Scriptures has become obscure, or is simply dismissed as mythological superstition. Paul Ricoeur likewise sees the purely descriptive mode of speech as presenting the greatest barrier to understanding symbol and metaphor in ancient literature, and therefore especially the Bible. Thus the poetry of Homer, from the standpoint of demotic language, has no ‘truth’ to tell, even though Aristotle argues that drama or poetry tells universal truths which purely descriptive history cannot. The second mode of language, hieratic, the language of ancient ritual and prophecy, can be discounted not merely as fiction, as Homer can, but as plain superstition. This mode of language includes oratorical speech or exhortation, yet without abstraction of logical argument. Its degenerate form is ‘propaganda’, which Josef Pieper associates with sophistry. We forget the kinds of language at our peril.

Having distinguished these three modes of language, Northrop Frye argues that the Bible does not quite correspond with any of them. He writes:

  • The linguistic idiom of the Bible does not really coincide with any of our three phases of language, important as those phases have been in the history of its influence. It is not metaphorical like poetry, though it is full of metaphor, and is as poetic as it can well be without actually being a work of literature. It does not use the transcendental language of abstraction and analogy, and its use of objective and descriptive language is incidental throughout. It is really a fourth form of expression, for which I adopt the now well-established term kerygma, proclamation. In general usage this term is largely restricted to the Gospels, but there is not enough difference between the Gospels and the rest of the Bible in the use of language to avoid extending it to the entire book.[8]

Frye’s insights into the three modes of language are valuable because they alert us to the different manners in which language may be heard – for it is clear that Origen and the medieval monks following him listened and attended to the Scriptures in a manner that opened the soul to the work of grace through the Word. Many times they invoke us to read Scripture prayerfully. In our modern concern for objectivity, it is easy to forget that language, of itself does and conveys nothing. It is active and at work only when listened to and engaged with, and according to how it is listened to. And we may also suggest that the manner in which a culture comports itself towards language corresponds with its comportment towards the cosmos and reality as a whole. The two books of ‘revelation’, Scripture and Creation, call to be brought into concord with one another, which is to say, to be seen as manifestations of the sacred – the hierophanic world Ricoeur reminds us of. This correlation between sacred Scripture and sacred cosmos runs through the Christianity of the middle ages, and is what is all too often unwittingly taken for ‘pre-scientific’ ignorance of the cosmos. The demotic language of the world, that is, purely factual descriptive language, has no religious significance, save that it is devoid of the sacred. With this in mind, here is a passage from Hugh of St Victor’s On Sacred Scripture and its Authors teaching how one ought to attend to Scripture:

“The diligent examiner of Sacred Scripture should never neglect the meanings of things. Just as our knowledge of primary things comes through words, so too through the meaning of these things we come to understand what is perceived in a spiritual way and our knowledge of these things is made complete. The philosopher, in other kinds of writings, comes to know only the meaning of words, but in Sacred Scripture the meaning of things is much more excellent than the meaning of words. The first is established by usage, but the second is dictated by nature. The first is the voice of human beings, but the second is the voice of God speaking to human beings. The meaning of words is established by human convention, but the meaning of things is determined by nature; and, by the will of the Creator, certain things are signified by other things. The meaning of things is much more manifold than the meaning of words. Few words have more than two or three meanings, but a thing can mean as many other things as it has visible or invisible properties in common with other things.”[9]

We notice straight away that it is the meaning of things that ought to be attended to, not simply the meaning of words. Hugh is understanding language in its most primary sense, as bringing before us the ‘things’ the words refer to or invoke. To dwell merely upon the words is to attend to the ‘sign’ rather than the signified. To attend to the signified is to hear the words of Scripture spiritually. It is ‘the philosopher’ who attends only to the meaning of words, not to ‘things’, and words have few meanings, and these only by convention. This is the ‘voice’ or language of human beings, while the meaning of ‘things’ is the voice or language of God addressing human beings. This meaning of things belongs to them by nature, and nature is itself a type of divine speech. But more than this, the meaning of ‘things’, according to the will of the Creator, is manifold, as things have visible and invisible properties shared in other things. By the ‘philosopher’ I take it that Hugh means the ‘natural philosopher’ who enquires into the nature of things according to human reason alone.

Nature, then, is a living vocabulary and speech addressing human beings. In Scripture this living speech or vocabulary ranges from the simple correlation of the ‘true vine’ with Christ to the vast correspondence of typology whereby the meaning of the Old Testament is revealed, or ‘unveiled’, in the New Testament. And on the eschatological level of meaning, the whole history of Israel is gathered into Christ. This typological meaning of Scripture is unique to the Bible, and this is a further reason why Northrop Frye places the Bible in an order of language on its own. It is kerygmatic, not only in the sense of the spoken word, but in the proclamation of ‘things’ themselves. The rivers and the mountains ‘declare’ the name of the Lord, as we read in the Psalms.

And the ‘manifold’ meanings of things in the Old Testament correlate with the events and meanings in the New Testament. For example, ‘stone’, ‘water’, and ‘wine’ have symbolic meanings that resonate throughout the Bible, stone signifying the ‘law’, water signifying ‘purification’, and wine the ‘living water of eternal life’. Thus stone is equated with the ‘old law’, water with baptism, and wine with the ‘new law’. This correlation of senses is evident in the first miracle of Jesus in the Gospel of John, where the six stone jars filled with water are turned into wine. The medieval reader acquainted with the typology of Scripture would instantly see this connection, and how all the references to stone, water and wine in the Old Testament are now disclosed in Jesus revealing himself in this first miracle, or first ‘sign’, as it is more strictly called in the Gospel of John. His coming into the world is what the Old Testament signified through these things. And so we might say that all visible things of Creation ultimately signify Christ, through whom they came into being. This is really the basis of the Bible concordances we used to consult years ago in our Bible studies. The correspondences between objects, places and actions across the Bible opens up the special or unique holy vocabulary of the Scriptures. Every leaf, fruit, herb, river, valley, city, is, as it were, the ‘voice of God’ addressing human beings, as Hugh of St Victor says.

With these observations in mind we may look at the commentary On The Apocalypse of John by Richard of St Victor, where he describes the “four modes of vision, two of which are internal and two external”.[10] The first mode is bodily sense, in which we perceive the external visibility of things. This mode is limited, seeing neither what is large or far off, or small and close. Because it does not penetrate things it “does not contain anything of mystic significance”, he says. For the second bodily sense Richard writes:

  • The other bodily mode occurs when an appearance or action is shown outwardly to the sense of sight, but contains within a great power of deeper, mystical meaning. Such was Moses’ vision of the burning bush, which appeared to him visibly and externally, but was filled with figurative significance. For what do we understand in the flame if not the grace of the Holy Spirit. What by the bush – a small tree that is rough, green, and flowering – if not the blessed Virgin Mary, humble in her self-contempt, rough against weakness by practicing virtues, green through her faith, and flowering in her chastity? When the Lord appeared in the bush, the flame did not damage it, and when the Son of God took on the flesh in the Virgin, when the grace of the Holy Spirit overwhelmed her, her virginal chastity remained inviolate. This second mode of vision is, therefore, by far more sublime and more excellent than the first, for the first lacked all mystery, while the second overflows with virtue and heavenly mysteries.[11]

In this passage we see what Hugh of St Victor meant when he spoke of the meaning of ‘things’, where here, for Richard, a simple, small, green and flowering tree is “filled with figurative significance” by the appearance of the flame that did not consume it. The bodily sense here grasps the ‘meaning’ of the bush, what it signified by way of a miracle. But then Richard goes further and interprets the passage typologically, seeing in it the virgin birth of Christ in the New Testament. As Richard says, “And it was indeed a great vision, which all at once presented the miracle then taking place and also denoted the Incarnation of the Word and the perpetual chastity of the Virgin Mother”.[12]  Here we may also observe that a ‘miracle’ is not a mere intrusion into the laws of nature, but a sign of a meaning embodied in the appearance of things by an act of grace.

Richard next describes the third and fourth modes of vision. His description is brief and succinct, and therefore worth quoting:

  • The third mode of vision does not concern the eyes of the flesh, but rather the eyes of the heart – when, that is, the soul, illumined by the Holy Spirit, is led to an understanding of invisible things by the formal similitudes of visible things, and by the images presented as though by figures or signs. The fourth mode of vision is when the human spirit, touched subtly and sweetly by internal inspirations, with no mediating figures or qualities of visible things, is raised spiritually to the contemplation of heavenly things.[13]

The third mode of vision is a mode of understanding of the heart, in which ‘invisible things’ are seen through the ‘formal similitudes of visible things’. These are ‘understandings’ rather than things seen. The fourth mode of vision, unaided by any ‘mediating figures or qualities’ is “raised spiritually to the contemplation of heavenly things”, which is to say, purely spiritual or mystical meditation with no ‘object’ of perception at all.

Richard supports the third and fourth modes of vision by referring to The Celestial Hierarchies of Dionysius the Areopagite. He observes that spiritual things “have been revealed to us symbolically and analogically”. He remarks that a “symbol is an assemblage of visible forms bespeaking invisible things. Analogy is the ascent or elevation of the mind to the contemplation of heavenly things”. He says that invisible things are “demonstrated by signs similar to sensible things”, which the Greeks called theophanies.[14]

Here we may observe a shift in the way Richard presents the way things disclose spiritual truth from that which we discussed earlier following Origen. With Dionysius the Areopagite comes a Platonizing influence, where reality is divided into ‘real’ and ‘less real’ ontological levels, or where the manifest, temporal realm is a mere shadow to be displaced by the truly real. This dualistic way of interpreting reality is foreign to early Christian exegesis, which does not dispose of the manifest forms of things in perceiving their meaning. As Paul Ricoeur observes, Scripture does not imply two ontological levels, but rather two historical economies – that of temporal and sacred time. Thus the ‘sacred’ meaning requires the reality of ‘temporal’, “without any reduction of it to appearance or illusion, at least if the “type” is really to function as the basis of meaning. Hence the spiritual sense is not substituted for the carnal sense”.[15]

Here we perhaps should recall that Plato’s division of reality into two distinct ontological levels is itself a symbolic way of speaking of reality and ought not to be understood literally. It stands in contrast with the biblical ‘concrete’ vocabulary and its conveyance of spiritual truth as ‘events’ and ‘signs’ rather than as ‘metaphysical orders’. It is primarily through events that the visible realm of nature and place disclose their significance, as for example with the episode of Moses and the burning bush. Meaning – here typological meaning – bursts forth from the bush, yet the fire does not destroy the bush. The spiritual does not consume the carnal. Richard of St Victor recalls that “nothing that exists is wholly deprived of participation in goodness, as Scripture attests: God saw all the things he had made, and they were very good”.[16]

From what we have said so far it follows that there is a correspondence between the ways the manifest world is seen and the kinds of language spoken of it. The reductionist perception of the world corresponds with a ‘demotic’ use of language. The kinds of language are not merely theories of language but types of orientation towards existence. It would be more correct to say that the type of language arises from the orientation towards existence than that any language is something in itself. By this I mean that our hearing and speaking are the activities where we live in language. We cannot make language an object of external investigation as though there were no listeners or speakers. This activity of ‘being in language’ is raised to the greatest intensity with biblical language, which as Northrop Frye and Ricoeur both suggest is best described as kerygmatic. It is divine speech addressed to the essence of the soul, calling it home to God. But such speech can only be heard through a corresponding openness of the soul to divine things. For Meister Eckhart this is the birth of Christ in the soul, where God speaks Himself. We should never overlook that, for all Eckhart’s insistence on noughting the Creation in the soul, ultimately his mysticism is incarnational.

Yet every word of Scripture refers to the created world and its events. But the world and its events are now presented as embodying and disclosing divine things, even uncreated things. Events now disclose a ‘sacred history’ within or illuminating the temporal history. The ultimate meaning of things is disclosed – of time, of place, of mountain, of stream and ocean. For the medieval tradition of biblical interpretation it is this ultimate meaning of things that is the allegorical sense, the ‘other’ meaning besides the plain or literal meaning. Yet the literal sense is not discarded. The eternal is manifest in the temporal, the timeless in time, and the infinite in the finite. Thus the dignity and sanctity of the created is affirmed. Seen in this way, as the Psalmist puts it, everything declares the name of God. In this sense the world is the second book of revelation. And, although this is the sacred or religious way of seeing the created world, it must surely inform the vision of the poets too.

There is an aspect of all this which we should say more. Exegesis involves a transformation in the soul of the contemplator. It is a spiritual exercise. To illustrate this, here are two passage from Origen on the threefold meaning of Scripture. The first says:

  • We have often pointed out that there is a threefold mode of understanding in the Holy Scripture: a historical, a moral and a mystical. We understand from this that there is in scripture a body, a soul and a spirit.

The first glimpse of the letter is bitter enough: it prescribes the circumcision of the flesh; it gives the laws of sacrifice and all the rest that is designated by the letter that kills (cf. 2 Cor 3:6). Cast all this aside like the bitter rind of a nut. You then, secondly, come to the protective covering of the shell in which the moral doctrine or counsel of continence is designated. These are of course necessary to protect what is contained inside, but they too are doubtless to be smashed and broken through. We would say, for example, that abstinence from food and chastisement of the body is necessary as long as we are in this body, corruptible as it is and susceptible to passion. But when it is broken and dissolved and, in the time of its resurrection, gone over from corruption into incorruption and from animal to spiritual, then it will be dominated no longer by the labor of affliction or the punishment of abstinence, but rather by its own quality and not by any bodily corruption. This is why abstinence seems necessary now and afterwards will have no point. Thirdly you will find hidden and concealed in these the sense of the mysteries of the wisdom and knowledge of God (cf. Col 2:3) in which the souls of the saints are nourished and fed not only in the present life but also in the future. This then is that priestly fruit about which the promise is given to those “who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied” (Mt 5:6). In this way, therefore, the gradation of this threefold mystery runs through all the scripture.[17]

The second passage says:

  • Therefore just as “the seen and the unseen” (cf. 2 Cor 4:18), earth and heaven, soul and flesh, body and spirit are related to each other, and this world is made up of these relationships, so too must it be believed that holy scripture is made up of seen and unseen things. It consists of a body, namely, the visible letter, and of a soul which is the meaning found within it, and of a spirit by which it also has something of the heavenly in it, as the Apostle says: “They serve as a copy and shadow of the heavenly sanctuary” (Heb 8:5). Since this is so, calling upon God who made the soul and the body and the spirit of scripture — the body for those who came before us, the soul for us, and the spirit for those who “in the age to come will receive the inheritance of eternal life” (Lk 18:18, 31) by which they will come to the heavenly things and the truth of the law —let us seek out not the letter but the soul. . . . If we can do this, we will also ascend to the spirit.[18]

Can we recover something of this way of reading Scripture? That is certainly the question de Lubac raises in his seminal study Medieval Exegesis. Yet if something of this is to be restored, it must involve a restoration of the religious or mystical way of seeing the world. In this regard perhaps modern theologians are seeking a way forward. So I close with a passage seeking this end from David Bentley Hart’s The Beauty of the Infinite:

  • This also means that the things of the senses cannot of themselves distract from God. All things of the earth, in being very good, declare God. And it is only by the mediation of their boundless display that the declaration of God may be heard and seen. In themselves they have no essence apart from the divine delight that crafts them: they are an array or proportions, and ordering or felicitous parataxis of semeia, and so have nothing in themselves by which they might divert attention from the God who gives them, no specific gravity, no weight apart from the weight of glory. Only a corrupt desire that longs to possess the things of the world as inert property, for violent or egoistic ends, so disorders the sensible world as to draw it away from God that sensible reality properly declares; such a desire has not fallen prey to a lesser or impure beauty, but has rather lost sight of corporeal, material, and temporal beauty as beauty, and so placed it in bondage.[19]

 

Bibliography

Boersma, Hans. Scripture as Real Presence. Baker Academic, 2017

Bentley Hart, David. The Beauty of the Infinite. William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004

De Lubac, Henri. Medieval Exegesis. William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000

Frye, Northrop. The Great Code. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983

Interpretation of Scripture, edited and translated by Franklin Harkins and Frans van Lier. New City Press, New York, 2013

Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, edited by Hans Urs von Balthasar. Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1984

Ricoeur, Paul. Figuring the Sacred. Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1955

Ricoeur, Paul, and LaCocque, André. Thinking Biblically. The University of Chicago Press, 1998

Schnabel, Eckhard J. Law and Wisdom. Wipf and Stock Publishers, Oregon, 1985

 

Notes

[1] See for example Eckhard J. Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, p. 16 – 20

[2] See Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis Volume 2.

[3] For an excellent discussion of the place of piety and virtue in Patristic hermeneutic theory see Hans Boersma, Scripture as Real Presence.

[4] Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, p. 49

[5] Ibid. p. 52

[6] Quoted from Origen by Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, Volume. 1. p. 143

[7] For a full discussion of the three or fourfold senses of Scripture see De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis Vol. 1, p. 90 ff.

[8] Northrop Frye, The Great Code (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983) p. 29

[9] Interpretation of Scripture, edited and translated by Franklin Harkins and Frans van Lier, p. 225

[10] Ibid. p. 344

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid. 345

[15] Paul Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically, p. 283

[16] Interpretation of Scripture, edited and translated by Franklin Harkins and Frans van Lier, p. 346

[17] Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, edited by Hans Urs von Balthasar, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1984, p. 103

[18] Ibid. p. 105

[19] David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite (William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004) p. 255