Beauty Beyond Time: A Meditation on Shakespear’s Sonnets

Beauty Beyond Time:

A Meditation on Shakespeare’s Sonnets

Joseph Milne

 

There is a difference between poetic vision and ordinary vision.  Ordinary vision sees the world in its transient aspect, while poetic vision sees the eternal embodied in or shining through the transient.  Poetic vision goes under many names, yet it is an actual seeing, though of another kind and discontinuous with ordinary vision.  It is for this reason that it requires a special use of language, so that something of that poetic vision is conveyed through the saying itself and the listener is drawn into a mode of reflection consonant with poetic vision.

I have chosen three Sonnets of Shakespeare to illustrate this poetic vision:

 

                      101

O truant Muse what shall be thy amends,
For thy neglect of truth in beauty dyed?
Both truth and beauty on my love depends:
So dost thou too, and therein dignified:
Make answer Muse, wilt thou not haply say,
‘Truth needs no colour with his colour fixed,
Beauty no pencil, beauty’s truth to lay:
But best is best, if never intermixed’?
Because he needs no praise, wilt thou be dumb?
Excuse not silence so, for’t lies in thee,
To make him much outlive a gilded tomb:
And to be praised of ages yet to be.
Then do thy office Muse, I teach thee how,
To make him seem long hence, as he shows now.

 

                     113

Since I left you, mine eye is in my mind,
And that which governs me to go about,
Doth part his function, and is partly blind,
Seems seeing, but effectually is out:
For it no form delivers to the heart
Of bird, of flower, or shape which it doth latch,
Of his quick objects hath the mind no part,
Nor his own vision holds what it doth catch:
For if it see the rud’st or gentlest sight,
The most sweet favour or deformed’st creature,
The mountain, or the sea, the day, or night:
The crow, or dove, it shapes them to your feature.
Incapable of more, replete with you,
My most true mind thus maketh mine untrue.

 

                     116

Let me not to the marriage of true minds
Admit impediments, love is not love
Which alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends with the remover to remove.
O no, it is an ever-fixed mark
That looks on tempests and is never shaken;
It is the star to every wand’ring bark,
Whose worth’s unknown, although his height be taken.
Love’s not Time’s fool, though rosy lips and cheeks
Within his bending sickle’s compass come,
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out even to the edge of doom:
If this be error and upon me proved,
I never writ, nor no man ever loved.

 

The first of these sonnets chides the Muse for being silent, the second describes the transformation of vision brought about by the sight of beauty, and the third describes the immortality of love.  This is a helpful sequence.  If the poet is to speak as a poet, then his speaking itself must come from the immortal realm he will speak of.  The poetic vision cannot be translated into ordinary vision, and so the Muse is called upon to speak through the poet.  This is the work and meaning of the Muses, to convey something of the immortal realm in a manner belonging to that realm.  To call upon the Muse is at once a call to see and to say.  But also, to see requires a response in saying, since saying, in the form of praise, causes beauty to remain visible and endure beyond its mortal appearance.

This may seem an exalted way of reading the Sonnet.  In a sense this is so.  It is a universal feature of love to utter itself in praise of the beloved.  Love, by nature, demands to be declared.  Love is communion between lover and beloved, and so it cannot remain itself by being dumb.  Praise, as a mode of human speech, is already and always a form of exalted speaking, even in ordinary things.  To praise something has no practical purpose but is an end in itself.  It is inseparable from apprehension of the good or the beautiful.  It is the response that the good or the beautiful causes, and wherever these are seen they are always remarked in this way or else are not seen.

To know that the good is good or the beautiful is beautiful is also to acknowledge them, so knowing and acknowledging belong together since acknowledgement is assent to the known.  Without this assent knowing does not come into reflection.  And if the nature of the good or beautiful do not come into reflection, that nature remains unknown.  Beauty can be known only in terms of itself because it has no comparison or analogy.  Like all ultimate things, it is singular and measurable only by itself.  Hence beauty has no dependencies.  It “needs no praise”, yet without praise it remains unseen.  Praise, then, is the order of speaking evoked by the beautiful itself.  It is what the beholder says to beauty in the presence of beauty, and so it is the birth of the Muse, for the Muse depends on truth and beauty and comes into being by virtue of them alone.  Therefore if the Muse is silent before truth shining forth in beauty, “in beauty dyed”, it is negligent of truth itself.  If the Muse is silent before truth, then the vision of truth passes away.

It is no excuse that there are no adequate ways of representing truth or beauty.  Even though “truth needs no colour” since entire in itself, and even though beauty needs no pencil to give it shape since it is itself the imparter of all shapes. yet they demand praise if they are to endure and be known.  That such praise must remain unequal and inadequate, and knowingly so, in itself marks them for what they are in themselves.  That which can be adequately drawn belongs to the realm of ordinary vision.  That which is “best” draws itself.  Nevertheless, praise is an order of seeing that springs from love.  We might even say it is the essential discourse of love.

Love and praise apprehend the true and beautiful, but in a manner of seeing that outruns ordinary perception.  This is the theme of Sonnet 113.

Since I left you, mine eye is in my mind,

This line shows how the perception of the beautiful transforms the mind itself.  The eye is now “in the mind” in several senses.  First, the impress of the beautiful infuses the mind so fully that it would not want to behold anything else.  So ordinary perception, through the outer senses, is now a kind of blindness, since what is seen there now “seems seeing” but is not true seeing.  Seeing is raised by the beautiful to a new pitch.  Secondly, this new seeing belongs to the realm of the beautiful itself, which is not of the outer shapes of things but in the realm of mind itself.  Beauty is an intellectual object, not a sensory one, and so it stands in a wholly different relation to perception.  The mind is infused by the beautiful and transfigured by it, and its natural relation with it is to desire union with it.  This desire for union is love.

The transfigured vision now sees all other things in a new light, and so the shapes of things, which formerly the mind took to be its natural objects, no longer seem substantial in themselves but are shaped “to your feature”.  That is to say, all things now bear the feature of the beauty beheld in mind.  The outer seeing “no form delivers to the heart” but the form of the beautiful.  So it is the heart within the mind that now perceives through the power of love.  The beloved is seen now in all things.  The Platonic resonance here is obvious.  The senses perceive the shapes or shadows of things, while the mind infused with love of the beautiful perceives the essence or “forms” of things.

And this is because the beautiful, through the power of love, is the origin of all things and that which brings them into being.  The entire universe is the shining forth of divine beauty through love, the first-born of the gods.  As Castiglioni says, “the fount of Beauty is not the form in which it shines.”  It is the mind infused with beauty and fired by love that beholds the distinction between the object and the beauty that informs the object.  Formerly, in ordinary vision, it seemed that objects possessed beauty of themselves, each its particular beauty, as with bird or flower, but now the new vision perceives that the beauty in objects comes from beyond them and prior to them, and that it is the same beauty that shines in all since “it shapes them to your feature”.  There is, so to speak, nothing more to behold than that beauty as such, and the mind in such vision is “incapable of more, replete with you”.

Beauty is that which satiates the mind, is that which the mind was born to behold, its proper object.  Other is less, not simply different.  Beauty, for the mind, is not simply another object among objects, but that which gives to every object its form.  And so the former mind, which took each bird or flower, mountain or sea, night or day, as true objects in themselves now seems an “untrue” mind.  It once “seemed seeing” but now is known to be a kind of blindness.  To see, yet not see the beautiful in all things, is not to see at all, or not to see that by virtue of which seeing comes into being.  It is the beautiful that causes sight, just as it is knowledge or truth that causes mind.  Through the transfigured perception of the beautiful the mind has come home to itself and hence it is replete.  And because it has come to itself in the beautiful it addresses itself solely to the beautiful.  The beautiful is rightly spoken when spoken to the beautiful itself, as thou.  It is told itself.  This is “my most true mind” that makes the former mind “untrue”, since the mind untransformed by beauty “no form delivers to the heart” but comprehends only the outer shapes and colours of things.  The “most true mind” is universal in relation to the former particular mind and comprehends the universal, and so it alone perceives the same universal feature in all things.

If the mind so transfigured dwells with the universal beauty, so it dwells with the immortal, that which never changes.  To dwell and to remain with beauty is brought about by the love that beauty causes in the lover.  This is the theme of Sonnet 116.  Two lovers become one true mind through love.  Love is the principle of unity itself, generating all things, yet holding them all in a unified diversity or harmony.  There is no other or lesser principle of unity than love, and again the realm of unity is that of universal mind in which beauty is in communion with itself.  Thus there can only be a marriage of “true minds”, of minds both transformed by beauty so that they are made one mind.  If such a marriage of minds admits difference in, then love departs, since love has only one true object, unity in the beautiful.  If love is immortal, then it cannot fall to the mortal, to the changeable.  Thus “love is not love which alters when it alteration finds”.  The principle of unity cannot be moved from itself, even though all else may move or change.  It is “an ever-fixed mark that looks on tempests and is never shaken”.

It is often thought that love is changeable or that it comes and goes.  But Shakespeare is showing us that it is not love that ever changes, nor can be changed by anything.  Time is lord of change, not love, and love is not ruled by time but by itself alone.  Love is a law unto itself since it is the first-born of the gods.  Love is the constant eye that beholds all change, the “fixed-mark” against which all change is evident, the “star to every wand’ring bark”.  Love is the constant against which time moves, so that time itself navigates by love and so is ultimately ruled by love.  And so the hours and weeks of time are brief in the eye of immortal love which holds to itself “even to the edge of doom”.

Love is therefore the principle of constancy and hence the progenitor of every virtue.  Without constancy no virtue is possible.  To keep faith, to be honest, to be courageous, loyal, prudent, just or temperate all depend on constancy, both in holding to themselves and in never being deflected from their ends.  They hold through time but are never subject to time, since time cannot change their nature.  Love is therefore lord of all right action, and though unmoved in itself, is the mover and navigator of all things to their proper ends.

The worth of love is immeasurable and so his worth remains forever unknown because it is inexhaustible.  All that ever might be said in praise of love and the beautiful is therefore likewise inexhaustible.  Yet every lover, no matter that all can never be said, in praise of love bears witness to this inestimable worth, and that witness, which is the birth of speech itself, is in some sense also immortal.  If that witness is false, then it never was, “nor no man ever loved”.  This is so because love is witness of itself and no other testimony can be made of it save by itself.  The same holds for truth and beauty.  They measure all things and may be measured by none but themselves.  The lover, whose mind is infused with immortal beauty and transformed by love, may make testimony of these things, and such testimony is the substance and end of poetic vision.  So any poet who does not bear witness to immortal beauty, and is not moved to utterance by love, neglects the Muse and does not sing from his true mind.  And his hearers will know in their hearts that he never sang that which song was made by love to sing.

Ownership in Early Christianity and the Natural Law Tradition

A talk given at Henry George Foundation, London 2018

Joseph Milne

Charles Avila’s book, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching, shows us that the Church Fathers addressed the question of land ownership and its exploitation very strongly. For example, Avila quotes from Saint Ambrose, Bishop of Milan in the fourth century, who wrote:

  • The elements have been granted to all for their use. Rich and poor alike enjoy the splendid ornaments of the universe. . . The house of God is common to all. (p. 72)

In another passage Ambrose says:

  • Thus God has created everything in such a way that all things be possessed in common. Nature therefore is the mother of common right, usurpation of private right. (p. 74)

Ambrose’s assertion that the earth and all the elements belong to all in common is to be found in the other Church Fathers. It was an essential part of early Christian thought. From the Christian perspective all nature belongs to the Creator who has given it, simply as a gift, to all the creatures to share in common. Just as God has created each being, so likewise he has created their dwelling place, where all may flourish with each other. With the human race this is even more so, since through intelligent cooperation the community may enhance the gifts of nature in mutual benefit, so there is no need for want or poverty. This is the true ‘state of nature’ contrary to the atomistic doctrine of Hobbes.

According to Ambrose, the cause of poverty is avarice. Very simply, it is the desire to possess for oneself what by nature is to be shared amongst all. Here he accuses the wealthy landlords as avaricious who exploit their tenant farmers who barely survive while they themselves live in luxurious palaces, gathering riches for their own sake. Their defence, according to Avila, is the Roman law of property.

But to Ambrose, and from a Christian perspective, gathering wealth as an end in itself is to live for the wrong reason, out of accord with nature, and to wilfully inflict harm on others. Like the other Church Fathers, Ambrose pleads with the landed rich to give their excess to the poor. This would be no more than to return what they have stolen from them. On being elected Bishop of Milan by popular demand, Ambrose gave most of his property to the poor.

Needless to say, beyond a few rich Christians who heeded these pleas from the Fathers, the exploitation of the land remained. And since the wealth of the Roman Empire derived primarily from agriculture, the direct abuse of land monopoly was a plainly evident wrong. Now it is worth asking why this teaching of the early Church went largely unheeded. Christianity, we should remember, became the official religion of Rome, and these teachings widely known, especially the idea of the community holding all in common and giving any excess wealth to the poor.

We are faced with the same question today. Why, after such great popularity, have the insights of Henry George into the proper use of land also gone unheeded? After all, as Charles Avila points out, George was only saying in economic terms what the early church was saying in ethical terms. The Fathers called upon the justice of divine providence, George upon empirical economic justice. Both arrive at the same evident truth: that if the gifts of nature are misappropriated, then exploitation will arise between citizens, poverty will increase while wealth increases and, if this is not remedied, a society will eventually destroy itself – as did the Roman Empire.

Now Avila wonders why the slaves or tenants did not rise up against the powerful landowners. It seems there were small rebellions, but these were easily put down with force. If we look around the world today, it is clear that the oppressed have no chance of remedying their condition themselves. It is precisely because they are at a disadvantage that they are oppressed. But if we turn to what we may call the modern free democracies, it is equally clear that the disadvantaged or exploited there are also the least likely to rise up and bring about justice. A more likely result of any rebellion is that the oppressed will become the oppressors – just as those fleeing to America from the Irish potato famine have done through taking land-ownership with them. Avarice and injustice seem to take root even from the best intentions.

Why is it, then, that the more educated and influential cannot bring about a remedy to this most basic injustice of misappropriating the earth? Even those politicians who understand the land question cannot bring about any change. All they can do is try to mitigate the consequences of injustice.

Here is where I believe the Church Fathers and the classical philosophers had an insight which our own age lacks. They understood the human situation at a far deeper level than either the poor or the rich and powerful of their day. They could see that neither the rich nor the poor understood human nature or the laws of nature – what we may call, along with Henry George, the ‘social laws’ of nature.

From the Christian perspective, the question is: why does avarice arise? Indeed, why does ‘possessiveness’ arise? Why do human beings desire to take things as their own property, even when it obviously harms others? Is humanity selfish and brutal by nature as Thomas Hobbes proposed in his Leviathan? Or, further, is there no such thing as ‘justice’ in the order of nature, but merely brute force, survival of the fittest, and the ‘war of all against all’? Is divine justice no more than a fiction invented by the powerful in order to impose their rule on the weak, as the Sophists argued in Plato’s time?

The early Christians, like the classical philosophers before them, asked these questions, and they rejected the idea that human nature is essentially selfish. Christianity sees human nature as fallen from its original natural or ‘innocent’ state. It has always been concerned with restoring human nature to its natural condition – its condition before the Fall. This meant that the political or social teaching of the early Church, and in the Middle Ages, recognised that there cannot be a truly just society in the fallen human condition. What is required is a transformation of the soul, so that the providential order of nature can again be perceived.

The earliest Christian communities did attempt to live in common and share all property. And this became the basis of monastic life – to live without any possessions. Yet even the monasteries tended to accumulate wealth and every now and then needed great reform, as with the birth of the Cistercians, Franciscans and Dominicans. But it was recognised that the majority cannot live this way. We will come back to how this was answered in a moment.

The philosophers had a different explanation. They saw the problem lay in errors of judgement, of mistaking for true what was not true. This is how Plato and Aristotle saw the human situation. According to them we do not know how to judge correctly between the true and the false, or between the just and the unjust. They understand that the faculties of the mind are naturally directed towards truth, just as the eye is directed towards light, or the ear towards sound, but that this capacity needs to be developed through careful education. This meant strengthening the rational faculties, but also the body, and the cultivation of the virtues – primarily justice, courage, prudence, and temperance. For Plato and Aristotle, the understanding of the truth of things is directly connected with understanding justice. For them enquiry into the true and the good cannot be separated.

Book I of Plato’s Republic is all about misconceptions of justice. These take several forms. First, that justice is only an external convention in a society. Second, that justice is the rule of the strong over the weak. Third, that it is doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies. Fourth, that it is giving to each what they are owed. Each of these positions are shown by Socrates to be flawed in one way or another. They belong to the realm of uninformed opinion. The remaining books of the Republic seek to overcome these false conceptions of justice and to find its true nature.

This is not the time to explore that in detail. But one thing ought to be noted. Plato’s dialogue arrives at an understanding that, through erroneous thinking, Nature and Law have become separated. The Greek words are physis and nomos. For Plato the law of anything is its nature, or its nature is its law. This law belonging to each thing is also its natural connection with all other things. The whole cosmos is a harmony between all its parts, and this harmony is the coincidence of physis and nomos, Nature and Law.

The Greek word kosmos means ‘order’. Everything has a part to play within the great whole, and through performing that part each fulfils its own being. It becomes harmonious with itself and with the whole cosmos. This harmonious order of things is true justice. Justice is not imposed upon things from outside but belongs to their essence and their proper mode of being. It means each thing acts according to its own true nature when it acts according to the order of the whole. It also means that each human being who lives justly has a harmonious order in their own being or soul, so that thought, action and virtue all work together. Most important of all, living justly becomes the primary aim of human life, both within and without. Next after that is the health of the body, and lastly the right use of wealth.

For Plato and for Aristotle, a life devoted to gathering money or wealth is quite simply an ignoble life. This is especially clear in Aristotle. In his Politics he argues that nature is ordered in such a way that the needs of all creatures are fully met. The land naturally supplies enough for a human community, and there is a natural limit in what it provides. Seeking in excess of this natural limit is harmful. True economics is an economics of sufficiency, in accord with what nature provides in due measure.

This means that trading solely for monetary profit is not only an ignoble way of life, it also goes beyond the natural limits of nature’s provisions. To seek to acquire unlimited wealth distorts the harmony of nature. It is unjust. The fact that such acquisition has no natural limit indicates it is unjust, since justice is always proportionate. But also, for both Plato and Aristotle, trading merely for the sake of money corrodes the civil order of the community. Markets in this sense are a threat to the social stability of the polis. They corrupt natural human relationships. For Aristotle economics is the study of a society becoming self-sufficient in necessities, within the limits of nature. It is more a study of ‘good management’ rather than of ‘commerce’. The aim is health and peace rather than wealth.

These two perspectives – the Christian and the philosophic – are quite different to each other, yet together they embody the highest aims of a just society in Western civilisation, which has absorbed aspects of each. One seeks a way of life based on goodness and mercy, on the love of God and neighbour. The parable of the Good Samaritan still strikes a note. The other seeks a way of life through reason and discriminating between reality and appearance. It seeks an understanding of the unity of physis and nomos, Nature and Law, or the real and the good, the truthful and the ethical. Yet both see the quest for the just life as an ongoing journey. For the Christian tradition it lies in overcoming the avaricious desires that come with the Fall, while for the philosophic tradition it is a way of bringing human nature and society into harmony with the cosmic order.

These are the leading responses in our Western civilisation to the injustices that afflict human society. Yet they both aim at a condition of justice that seems beyond the capacity of the majority of people. The Church Fathers and the philosophers were perfectly aware of this. Those who are wealthy through misappropriating the labour of others are not that keen on having a just society. They can console themselves with the belief that justice is an impossible utopian dream. Those who protest on behalf of the poor are too often driven by envy of the rich, and so they bring no remedy. Complacency and anger are two common responses to the question of justice.

Given the fact that few are likely to become saints or philosophers, is there a kind of justice that can be established which removes the worst ills that arise from the misappropriation of the land, and which opens a way towards the possibility of a truly just society? Well, obviously at least to us, Henry George opens the door to such a possibility, by removing the means of misappropriating the land and stealing the value created by the community and the wages of those who produce wealth. There are elements of the generous Christian ethic in George’s work as well as elements from the noble philosophic tradition, especially that of the Natural Law and the understanding of justice as a universal principle. There is a tendency nowadays, unfortunately, to reduce the scope of George’s insights merely to his fiscal proposals, and to seeking ways of implementing a land tax, forgetting that it is the love of justice that informs all his social and economic analysis.

We are confronted with the simple fact that modern society is as far from achieving this today as George was a hundred years ago – or the Church Fathers were in persuading the people that the land belongs to all in common sixteen hundred years ago, or Plato 2,500 years ago. For as far back as we can go in recorded history it has always been proclaimed by the poets, the prophets and the philosophers that the earth belongs to all in common. Virgil, for example, writes of a Golden Age when:

  • No tenants mastered holdings,
    Even to mark the land with private bounds
    Was wrong: men worked for the common store, and earth
    herself, unbidden, yielded more fully. (Georgics I/126-29)

And the great Roman poet Ovid writes:

  • The earth itself, which before had been, like air and sunshine,
    A treasure for all to share, was now crisscrossed with lines
    Men measured and marked with boundary posts and fences.
    (Metamorphosis I/134-36)

The Stoic philosopher Seneca also writes of the Golden Age:

  • The social virtues had remained pure and inviolate before covetousness distracted society and introduced poverty, for men ceased to possess all things when they began to call anything their own. . . . How happy was the primitive age when the bounties of nature lay in common and were used freely; nor had avarice and luxury disunited mortals and made them prey upon one another. They enjoyed all nature in common, which thus gave them secure possession of public wealth. Why should I not think them the richest of all people, among whom was not to be found one poor man? (The Epistles)

Not only are we far from such visions, we have an added difficulty in our time, the implications of which were only hinted at in George’s time: the separation of the economic realm from the social realm. This is something Karl Polanyi has observed very clearly in his The Great Transformation. With the growth of a market economy, aimed at exchange for profit, the creation of wealth has gradually divorced itself from the social realm, and come to exist independently of society. Not only is land monopoly misappropriating the natural community revenue and diminishing the wages of labour, the economy as a whole is becoming parasitic upon society, making human life serve the economy, rather than the economy serve human life. This separation, now so plainly evident, especially in the great cities where land monopoly is rife, is precisely what Aristotle warned against, and what the Church Fathers struggled against.

This separation of the economic from the social is reinforced by the modern reduction of economic analysis to mathematical models. The tendency to reduce economics to mathematical calculation was already present in the early economic thinking of the seventeenth century. And this in turn came from a previous shift in the conception of the ‘laws of nature’. The new conception of the laws of nature was based upon a purely mechanistic observation of the laws of motion, to which all phenomena could be reduced. This new view was hailed as superseding the religious and philosophical approaches to nature. These, it was argued, belonged to a more primitive stage of society, preparing the way for the empirical method of mechanical science. This idea is expressed in Turgot, for example, one of the pioneers of economics in the eighteenth century. The Physiocrats were not immune to the mechanistic thinking of their age through which they sought to express their insights.

The expression ‘laws of nature’ was directly opposed to the tradition of ‘natural law’ which extended back to Plato, the Stoics and early Christians such as St Augustine, and was greatly refined through the Middle Ages, producing in the twelfth century the Decretum Gratiani, and culminating in the thirteenth century in Aquinas’s great treatise on law in the Summa Theologica.

Natural law refers to what we spoke of earlier, the harmonious order of the cosmos in which everything plays its part for the sake of the whole. It is the cosmic justice which brings community into being. It is essentially ‘cooperative’ as opposed to ‘competitive’, communitarian as opposed to individualistic. Natural law expresses the common good. According to natural law the land belongs to all in common, or simply to the Creator as St Ambrose and St Augustine argued. The new mechanical conception of the ‘laws of nature’ cannot account for just possession or ownership. It cannot encompass commutative or distributive justice. There is no ethical dimension to the mechanistic conception of nature.

The new mechanistic conception of nature gets transferred to jurisprudence with the rise of ‘positive law’, which is no longer rooted in the natural law or a conception of universal justice, but rather in the will of the legislator. Law became divorced from ethics in the same way as economics became divorced from community.

It is therefore no surprise that the expansion of positive law since the seventeenth century has been primarily in property law. Legally speaking, ‘ownership’ becomes the new way of conceiving human nature and society. Locke’s famous theory that the ownership of land springs from extending self-ownership through labour to land is the obvious development of this new kind of ‘law of nature’ absorbed into positive law. The ‘self-owning person’ has no precedent in history. It is rooted in a new conception of human nature and our relation to the world and society. Out of it springs a new branch of law called ‘human rights’, which are claims made upon the state, more or less replacing earlier ‘natural rights’, which are natural liberties, as formulated in the American constitution, which in turn replaced the natural law tradition extending back into the Middle Ages. This is a mode of law for the self-owning person, whose claims stand in opposition to the state.

The modern conception of the state has arisen through the loss of the communal understanding of society, in which each citizen, through their specific talents or vocations, serves the good whole. Once society is conceived in terms of proprietorial individuals, each seeking their own private ends, then ‘the state’ in some form or other has to be imposed to regulate the conflicting desires and actions of individuals. And this includes the market.

These are problems that George does not tackle. In his time for most ordinary people the vision of freedom was still framed within the context and language of the common good and natural justice, and had not yet declined into the notion private freedom and individual rights in opposition to the state or community. It was only the ‘intellectuals’ who propagated these ideas, while the majority of people still lived in the shadow of Christian morality.

George’s eye is on the just society and on how to remedy the injustices that arose with the market society based on land monopoly. It may well be, with the full implementation of the land tax world-wide, that the separation of the economic realm from the social realm would be repaired. It may well be that then the pursuit of wealth for its own sake would be replaced by higher cultural aims, as George envisioned, including due care for the environment.

All that may well be so. But the implementation of the land tax will not come about without first overcoming the prevailing mechanistic interpretation of economics, which reinforces its separation from the social realm, and which suits land monopoly by abstracting the earth into capital or reduces it to mere ‘resources’. Nor can the ‘social’ good be restored without a return to understanding the communal nature of the human person. This communal nature is something that the Church Fathers could call upon when prompting the rich to share their wealth with the poor. And it was something that was gradually developed throughout the Middle Ages through the formulations of civil and canon law, including English common law.

There is a growing body of scholarly study of the communal nature of society, and it is from this perspective that the limited nature of the sphere of economic theory is clearly brought to light. The study of economics in relation to other disciplines would be of enormous value. For example, the very good work being done in environmental studies and ecology would be greatly enhanced by a good knowledge of economic and social laws. Environmental destruction and economic injustice have a common cause. They occur through misconceptions of the nature of society rooted in the proprietorial conception of our human relation to the land or nature.

From the perspective of the Church Fathers and the Greek philosophers, these are manifestations of the separation of physis from nomos, of Nature from Law. Where George and the Church Fathers meet is in their common call for justice in conformity with the order of nature, and in their recognition of the essential goodness of human nature.

Given the Christian interpretation of the fallen human condition, or the classical philosophical interpretation of our misperception or ignorance of the true nature of things, how does each tradition conceive a remedy to the injustice that arises through the proprietorial relation with the land or nature?

Here the early philosophers and theologians gave a common answer: that, allowing for possession by convention, all property ought to be put to right use. It is not the claim to ownership as such that matters since, as Avila demonstrates, ownership can only ever be a legal claim on property. It is how property is used that ultimately matters. As John Chrysostom says ‘For it is not wealth that is evil, but the evil use of wealth’ (p.87).

Locke’s famous argument that we come to own things by extension of our self-ownership through labour is clearly flawed since we obviously derive our existence from nature or from the Creator. And why should Locke’s principle apply only to human beings? What of the bird who builds its nest or the squirrel that buries its nuts? From the perspective of nature there is nothing unowned remaining for Lockean man to extend ownership to. St Augustine likewise discounts Locke’s argument: ‘Whence does anyone possess what he or she has? Is it not from human law? For by divine law, the earth and its fullness are the Lord’s (Psalm 23:1)’. (p. 111)

If, then, it is only flawed thinking or a legal fiction that makes ownership seem to be so, and yet through weakness or through ignorance our society cannot give up the notion of ownership, is there then a compromise that remedies the injustices that spring from it?

There is indeed. The compromise proposed by the philosophers and theologians is to permit ownership but demand right or beneficial use. Whatever a person possesses ought to be used in such ways as serve the common good. That was the ethical solution proposed by St Thomas Aquinas, and he draws it from Aristotle. Nothing in nature comes into being to be ill-used. Legal possession does not override that natural law. Good laws, then, are framed to ensure the beneficial use of things. This is not so strange, as is clear in the modern regulation of drugs and medicines, or food safety standards. And if this is right for the use of manufactured things, then how much more so for the right use of the land itself, the home of all living beings?

When Henry George suddenly saw how wealth and poverty arose together through the private monopoly of land he also saw how it could be remedied through a simple fiscal measure which struck a compromise between allowing the ownership of land to continue and ensuring its future beneficial use. This is precisely what a land tax ensures. Its implementation requires a general grasp of natural justice, but not that all citizens should become saints or philosophers. While it would not make citizens virtuous, it would remove practices which invited vice. It would change the ethos of society from that of citizens grasping whatever they can through fear of want, to a general contentment in a visibly just distribution of wealth. The ‘proprietorial-self’ would vanish from the conception of human nature.

 

The Land Question and Community

Joseph Milne

  • A talk exploring how the privatisation of land, the rise of modern industry, and the evolutionary ideologies of progress in the nineteenth century, destroyed the self-sufficiency of communities and turned free people into a wage labourers. Given at the Henry George Foundation in 2021

One of the effects of the privatisation of land is the erosion of community. The history of land enclosure in England and Scotland shows this to be the primary effect. Communities that were originally more or less self-sufficient were broken up and families were driven from the land to the towns or cities to seek work. In this way the natural relations between people and the land were permanently broken, and gradually the poorest were driven into the slums. We hardly need to repeat this history as it is well known. The village dweller ceased to be his own master, owner of his own capital and the works of his hands, and was compelled to become a wage labourer. We have long forgotten that in the high Middle Ages a wage labourer was considered equal to a pauper and in need of charity. He was unable to support himself. The Church and the ordinary people would seek to support him.

But perhaps what has not been so well known is the long-term effects of this on community generally. There is something of a forgotten history here. With the land enclosures and the rise of modern industry, creating the wage labourer, the conception of society completely changed. This became very evident to me in my researches into the background of Henry George’s A perplexed Philosopher in preparation for Volume VI of the Annotated Works. My usual areas of study are ancient Greece and the Middle Ages. The conception of society in those times was radically different than our modern conception. For example, in the Greek city state, or polis, every citizen was understood to be responsible for the good of the whole. Or in medieval times a town was likened to a living organism, just like the universe itself, with each member enjoying a specific station according to their abilities to contribute to the well-being of all. The various trades, institutions and customs were all understood as serving the common good. Nobody was excluded, and those unable to support themselves were simply looked after by the whole community.

So it came as a shock to me to read the social theories of the nineteenth century – the theories of Herbert Spencer, Thomas Huxley and Charles Darwin, for example. While these three differed in certain respects about evolution, they held two basic ideas in common: the idea of biological progress and radial Individualism. That is to say, they each saw the present rise of industry as an advance on all previous history, and they each saw the ‘individual’ as the centre of society, in particular those individuals who commanded the great expansion of industry and of the British Empire. They saw this progress not only as material progress, but also as moral progress. In fact, for Herbert Spencer in particular, material progress and moral progress were one and the same thing. They were expressions of the synthesis arising from the original factors of matter and motion – his materialist theory of evolution. Matter and motion had culminated in the English captains of industry, the envy of the French.

If one reads the opponents of Henry George in his own time, their cry is ‘liberty’ and ‘individual freedom’. Their enemy was not merely Henry George and the various socialist reformers, it was ‘the state’ or government itself. Their conception of individualism held that, as higher individuals evolved, the need for the state would eventually wither away. Government and the state belonged to an earlier and lower stage of evolution, such as in classical Greece. Likewise, the poor – which is to say the ‘morally inferior’ – would wither away too if left to their proper evolutionary fate under the law of survival of the fittest. Incidentally, it was Spencer who coined the expression ‘survival of the fittest’, not Darwin, although Darwin happily adopted it. It corresponded with the theory that the great law of nature was competition within and between species, an idea now projected onto society and the market economy.

It is not difficult to see how these ideas were amenable to extreme reformers on either side – to the Marxists and to the Libertarians. On the one side, all property and all means of production should be owned by the State. On the other side, all property and all means of production should be owned by private individuals. Yet both sides had the conception of the state eventually disappearing through evolution. In one the individual would be subsumed into an amorphous community. In the other, solitary evolved individuals would be practically self-sufficient in mastery of the world’s resources. On one side the ‘proletariat’ was supreme. On the other the ‘individual industrialist’ was supreme. Yet both positions were equally materialist, determinist, and atheist. And both were equally opposed by George.

These are the kind ideas that were at war with each other in George’s time, and which he was in part dealing with in his critique of the social theory of Spencer in his A Perplexed Philosopher. My point, however, is that these ideas, at both extremes, were consequent on the privatisation of the land. The conception of human community was radically changed, or rather, radically distorted and deformed. Given that only a few individuals have possession of the land, and that they determine its uses, whatever may be ‘natural’ in the human community is necessarily distorted. Traditions and customs, institutions, functions and specific gifts, which arise only through continuous community, are all gradually lost or degraded. Society loses any distinct form and the people no longer experience themselves as members of specific communities or as fellow dwellers on Mother Earth. There is a law of consequences at work here. If the natural human relation with the land is broken, then natural human relations are broken or lost. As Tolstoy put it in his book on art: ‘If farming is wrong, then everything is wrong’.

These ideas of the nineteenth century remain powerful influences in our time, even though Herbert Spencer is all but forgotten. Yet he remains, along with Auguste Comte, a founder of the new science of sociology. His influence extends to Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marx saw Spencer’s theory of ‘survival of the fittest’ as confirming his theory of ‘class struggle’. And I think it is true to say that our understanding of society has been in continual crisis since that time. In particular, the civil realm has been in conflict with the economic realm. For while civil rights have grown, economic rights have diminished. And this disconnection between the civil and the economic has itself contributed to a profound distortion in the very idea of ‘natural rights’. For example, the freedoms that properly belong to the economic realm are now sought in the civil realm – such as the minimum wage. And in the civil realm itself, the quest for equality has turned into demands for recognition of difference and so-called ‘identity politics’. Paradoxically, the rise of modern individualism, and the quest for equal rights, has turned into a loss of a sense of personal identity, especially among younger people. There is no longer any sense of belonging in community where rights may be exercised.

All these distortions lie at the door of the general failure to understand that the land cannot be made private property. They are all consequent upon the misappropriation of the land. George himself listed a host of social ills that arise through this failure. For example, criminality and alcoholism. I think we can now count drug addiction as a necessary consequence too. We can also count the erosion of the family and responsible parenthood as a consequence. Natural social relations are destroyed as a consequence of a wrong relation with the land. These in turn place huge costs upon the welfare state, which itself is a necessary and inevitable consequence of the misappropriation of land.

And here is where one of the most monstrous ideas of Herbert Spencer is still at work. We condemn the criminal, the broken family and the drug addict in the same way that Spencer condemned the Victorian slums. It was from this condemnation of the poor, regarded as responsible for their own fate, that eugenics became widely discussed in England and other parts of Europe. The disintegration of the family, criminality, and drug-trafficking and addiction are all ‘unnatural’ social phenomena, but they are not due to the degeneracy of the individuals, and therefore to be remedied by any form of eugenics or ‘social cleansing’ through natural selection. Such solutions were seriously proposed in the nineteenth century. Such ideas have the devastating effect of concealing the real causes of deprivation, the breaking of the natural connection with the land.

Herbert Spencer had once seen the injustices that arose through the privatisation of the land. As I am sure you know, Spencer wrote a magnificent chapter arguing that land cannot be private property in his first book, Social Statics, published in 1850. George had made Spencer well known through quoting from that chapter in Progress and Poverty. Until then Social Statics had remained relatively unknown. But George quoting it extensively put Spencer in an awkward position in relation to the ruling class in England – the landed class. To protect his name and to remain in the right circles he needed to extricate himself from what he knew to be true and just. In modern terms, his opposition to private property in land had become for him ‘politically incorrect’ and would lead to social exclusion.

So he joined with the Radical Individualism of his time in opposing any kind of amelioration of poverty, whether from charity or from Gladstone’s reforms. His idea of justice was now ‘each gets the consequences of their own actions’. The rich entrepreneur deserves his wealth, the poor chimney sweep deserves his poverty. The destitute deserve their destitution. It is a law of social evolution. The fact that it was through the labour of the poor that the rich became wealthy was quietly overlooked. According to evolutionary theory, the strong survive and the weak are eliminated. That is the new justice. And one can see its roots going back to Thomas Hobbes’ notion of nature as a state of ‘war of all against all’. While for Hobbes it was a static condition of things, for Spencer and his wide following it had become an evolutionary principle. In fairness to Hobbes, he saw government as necessary to curb the natural brutality of individuals.

It may not be very comfortable to admit it, but these ideas are still at play in our time. But for us they have become normalised. For example, business is regarded as necessarily driven by competition for the highest profit. And under the notion of the ‘freedom of the individual’, and a host of arbitrary claims that spring from it, the underlying economic injustices remain invisible, or are taken to be inevitable. Yet they corrode the life and culture of community.

Perhaps the tragedy in all this is that it was foreseeable. Not only had George pointed to the consequences of privatisation of land, but many others in his time and slightly earlier had also pointed it out. For example Robert Owen, who in founded the cooperative movement in 1826, along with several communities and schools for children, here in the UK and the USA. Also Patrick Dove, who George praises in The Science of Political Economy, had proposed a land tax in1851 as the way to justice in a truly Christian society.

But even acquaintances of Darwin, Huxley and Spencer proposed the introduction of a land tax. The most significant of these was the evolutionist Alfred Russel Wallace, who had first formulated the theory of natural selection, usually attributed to Darwin. He was the first president of the Land Nationalisation Society formed in 1881, where he arranged for Henry George to speak when in England. In 1882 Wallace published a remarkable book entitled Land Nationalisation: Its Necessity and its Aims in which he notes that he had come across Progress and Poverty when he had almost finished his book. He fully endorses George’s analysis of the land question.

As a widely travelled naturalist, Wallace had seen how well so-called ‘primitive’ societies live, remarking that they had far higher moral standards than Victorian England, where poverty and inequality were tolerated. This observation was contrary to the claims of Spencer, who describes primitive societies as cannibals. But one observation of Wallace that I find especially striking is that our large cities are unnatural. He observes that this is indicated in the necessity of sewer systems. Where people live without privatisation of land, they are naturally dispersed into small communities, and in these communities all wastage is returned to cultivate the land. There is no wastage, no need for refuse collection. Wallace’s observations of evolution are now gaining regard among scientists, for example in An Elusive Victorian by Martin Fichman, and he is regarded as the earliest environmentalist. He saw the obvious link between the privatisation of the land and the destruction of the environment, including all the ailments and diseases that come with large cities.

Thus a link is made between the natural social proportion of communities, morality, environment, and the land question. The privatisation of land creates a rift between the civic and economic realms as an inevitable consequence of an unnatural relation with the earth. And to some extent modern Georgists inadvertently contribute to this wrong relation, if I might say so, by abstracting land into ‘location’. Location and locomotion are the words Herbert Spencer used in his abdication from his earlier philosophy. He speaks a great deal of nonsense about our rights to ‘natural media’, such as air, water and light, and where ‘land’ now becomes just another ‘natural media’ where we have ‘locomotion’. In neoclassical economics ‘land’ has been abstracted out of existence through intensifying it as either capital or location. This follows from Herbert Spencer and is contrary to Henry George. Consider what happens if we turn the primary elements of production – land, labour and capital – into location, energy and assets. Economics is then no longer part of nature or society. It is no longer human. Orwell observed that, if you wish to deceive and confuse the public, use Latin abstracts and avoid concrete Anglo-Saxon words. As an example he gave ‘extending borders’ as a substitute for ‘war’. This tendency to abstraction now deceives and confuses modern students of economics, removing it from ethics and an activity of community. There is a belief that if you translate concrete observed reality into abstract formulas you get nearer to the truth of things and make them ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’.

Wallace, himself a natural scientist, also gave a warning about this, noting that William Jevons and Alfred Marshal were turning economics into an abstract mathematical science and breaking the link between the natural activities of labour on land as understood by Adam Smith, Robert Owen and Henry George. This move has, so to speak, ‘privatised’ the academic study of economics. Marshal’s famous attack on George when he had given a lecture at Oxford was to accuse him of having no academic expertise and therefore no knowledge of economics or any right to speak on the subject. The move to appropriate economics for academic experts alone was one of the tactics used to undermine George. My point is that abstract words such as ‘location’ instead of ‘land’ dislocate the study of economics from the natural world as experienced in actual life. We must be careful not to speak the language of pseudo-science, especially when speaking of society and its relation to the natural world. As Edmund Burke pointed out to Thomas Paine, the knowledge of society is not derived from abstract metaphysics, but from the study of history and taking prudent action according to given circumstances.

Just as we have become accustomed to the privatisation of land, so likewise we have become accustomed to the privatisation of the individual. It is no accident that Georg’s opponents hit upon the ‘individual liberty’ as a defence of private property in land. Surely every individual should be free to make up his own mind on the question of property!

This argument conceals the obvious truth that all people have an equal right to dwell upon the land – to a ‘location’ if you insist! It is a self-evident truth utterly obvious to the Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert, the North American Indians, and the Australian Aborigines. They do not speak of ‘location’, but rather they acknowledge the land as the sacred Mother of all living beings. It is obvious that nature intends her gifts to be shared by all creatures, and she grants no contracts, deeds, titles or charters of private possession to any being. Sharing is the natural and equitable relation to the land. This ‘sharing’, which is still practiced in some parts of the world, even in farming communities in modern Europe, is the natural basis of society and community. It is at once economic and civic. Everyone is a participant rather than a private autonomous individual. All genuine human rights spring from sharing the land and participating in communal life together. They are simply given in the natural order of things and do not require proclamations or bills to exist. To turn natural rights into legal claims, although necessary in the present state of things, actually turns the human person into a private commodity, or into a ‘legal entity’ as Simone Veil argued. This is what the Radical Individualism and Libertarianism of the nineteenth century has given us under the invisible hand of Herbert Spencer’s social evolution.

I am not attacking our modern civil liberties. These are a great achievement of judicial development in the face of great odds. Human community strives to continue to exist even when uprooted from the land. I only wish to bring attention to the fact that these are in large part delusory if not founded in economic justice. The acceptance of privatisation of land has accustomed us to a perpetual conflict between civic and economic justice. And the more we attempt to resolve this conflict through civil freedoms alone, the more deeply we become enmeshed in economic injustices, not only of land speculation but also of the vast commercial monopolies and widespread destructive banking practices. By an extraordinary turning of things backwards, land speculation, the vast commercial monopolies and modern banking, are all defended under the rubric of ‘civil liberties’.

One final thought. I have argued that we need to see the social and civic consequences of the privatisation of the land and the artificial economy of land speculation. It is not enough to study this issue within the economic sphere alone, since the historical separation of the economic and civic spheres are a direct consequence of private land ownership. In George’s time the connection between the civil and economic was still obvious and seen by all. Social reformers, such as Robert Owen and the Quakers, were economic reformers at the same time as social reformers. It is the modern disconnection of the two spheres that leads some reformers to seek means of taking from the rich to give to the poor. But no amount of economic redistribution remedies the social consequences of land speculation. Likewise with those who demand ‘changing the system’. These kinds of mechanical changes really change nothing. They are ideologies rather than practical policies.

What is really needed is an understanding among a sufficient majority of the population of the real causes of poverty, crime, broken families and drug addiction – not to mention climate change and destructive modern farming methods. And in this regard, it is of little use merely campaigning for the implementation of a land tax. The Georgist movement needs to widen its range and study the nature of society and its institutions. That wider approach was present to some degree in the early movement but has now faded away. To a very large extent, the materialist, individualist, atheist, and deterministic social theories of the nineteenth century are still with us and shape how we regard the world. They have created a cloud obscuring the natural relations between the land and human citizenship.

 

Natural Law, Economics and the Common Good

Joseph Milne

 

  • According to Natural Law everything has a proper end in harmony with nature as a whole. In a society this means that wealth has a proper end in serving the common good. This talk will explore the implications of this principle in relation to the concepts of ‘property’ and ‘right use’.

 

My theme is natural law, economics and the common good, and I would like to begin with a definition of natural law: The natural law is the harmonious ordering of Nature to its proper end, which is justice and the good. It is the inherent moral order of the universe. I draw this definition from the long tradition of natural law which can be traced back to ancient Egypt, through Greek Presocratic philosophy, through Plato and Aristotle, through Roman law and through medieval theology up to the fifteenth century. Throughout that long history there was an understanding that the universe was ordered to the good and in harmony with the whole. Justice and wisdom permeated Nature, ordering it from within. This was expressed in various ways. In ancient Egypt it was through the goddess Maat, who embodied truth, justice and wisdom. Maat is present everywhere. It is the unwritten law everyone knows they are called to follow if they are to live auspiciously and in friendship with Nature and the gods. Maat is very like the ancient Sanskrit Rta, the ordering principle of the universe. It is also like the ancient Chinese principle of the Dao. It is the unwritten law, the law before any codes of law.

The same meaning is found in the Greek word for law, nomos. Heraclitus speaks of this law in the Fragments where he says:

  • Wisdom is the foremost virtue, and wisdom consists in speaking the truth, and in lending an ear to nature and acting according to her.
  • Wisdom is common to all. . . . They who would speak with intelligence must hold fast to the [wisdom that is] common to all, as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by one divine law, which prevails as far as it listeth and suffices for all things and excels all things.[1]

Here the wisdom common to all is the wisdom pervading in the universe and common to human intelligence. It is the ‘divine law’ which guides all human laws. It provides for all things. It is providential, caring for things according to their place in nature. It is this divine law that is heard by ‘lending an ear to nature and acting according to her’. This law foresees all things and provides for all human wants.

In his Rhetoric Aristotle speaks of the ‘unwritten laws’ sanctioned by heaven:

  • The unwritten laws are the great fundamental conceptions of morality, derived and having their sanction from heaven, antecedent and superior to all the conventional enactments of human societies, and common alike to all mankind. [2]

In more mythic terms, it is the law of the Greek god Cronus, the law of the Age of Gold that Hesiod records in his Works and Days. In that Age Nature gave to all freely. It is an Age free from avarice, the vice in Greek philosophy that corrupts society. Avarice forgets the law and becomes the mark of the Age of Iron, where few hold to their word.

In Plato’s Laws the Age of Gold is symbolised by the golden cord in the soul, where the Athenian Stranger says “this cord is the golden and sacred pull of calculation, and is called the common law of the city” [3] The word ‘calculation’ is a translation of the Greek logismos which more accurately in this context means ‘right judgement’. The ‘common law of the city’ is the universal unwritten law shared by all humanity. It is known directly by the intellect in the soul that is open to the guidance of the gods or divine reason.

Two ideas are transmitted and developed from Plato’s understanding of a knowledge of this ‘common law’ within the soul. First, that every being has an innate knowledge of the law that guides its mode of life within the greater order of nature. Hence the idea that all should act in accord with nature. Second, that human reason is informed by eternal principles that guide action towards the true and the good.

Aristotle divides the intellect into two aspects which he calls the ‘theoretical reason’ and the ‘practical reason’. The theoretical reason discerns eternal principles of truth, such as in the law of non-contradiction where, for example, something cannot exist and not exist. The practical reason, on the other hand, has an inherent knowledge of the good from which it makes practical ethical judgements. While the theoretical reason is concerned with eternal truths and is contemplative, the practical reason is concerned with contingent actions and decisions in the moment. The practical reason is the ground of ethical knowledge. It has a capacity to foresee the consequences of actions. It is the knowledge that one should always act justly and never unjustly. But since it has a capacity of foresight, the practical reason also knows that a good action is one that serves the common good. Right action is at once being true to oneself and acting according to nature. We recall what Heraclitus said:

…wisdom consists in speaking the truth, and in lending an ear to nature and acting according to her.

In a highly compressed way he is saying the same as Aristotle says of the two aspects of reason, the theoretical and the practical.

In a variety of different ways, these essential ideas passed through the early Stoic philosophers and through Cicero and then into medieval theology. Law was considered in three aspects: the eternal law in the mind of God, the universal law shared by all mankind, and the positive or human law that each society codifies for itself. The universal law is also called the common law or the natural law. The codified law should be in accord with the universal law, otherwise it cannot be called law.

How might all this apply to the study of economics? Well, since it apples to everything it necessarily must apply to economics. I began with a short definition of natural law:

The natural law is the harmonious ordering of Nature to its proper end, which is justice and the good.

Apart from the ethical aspect, the important aspect here is the understanding that everything has a proper end. This refers to what is called the telos of things, which is their purpose within nature. This law governs the development and growth of things and their function as part of nature as a whole. This is readily observable in living things. They grow according to their nature into maturity. According to this understanding, the nature of a growing thing is known only when it is fully formed or mature. Aristotle was the first to elaborate this view of nature, although it is present in Plato. Thus Aristotle says we can discern human nature properly only in the mature adult. He goes further, saying that the truly mature adult is a virtuous adult. This is because only the virtuous person has fulfilled their telos, or come to completion. The telos of things is also called their final cause, the end for which they come into being. The same is said in a different way by Plato. For Plato the telos and the ethical converge. Hence the great emphasis in Greek education on the cultivation of the virtues. Without the virtues of prudence, justice, courage and temperance a person cannot be fully rational. I think everyone understands this to some degree. Virtues are not moral principles but capacities, or what the Greeks called ‘habits’ or ‘skills’. They involve self-mastery. That is the Greek idea of the mature person. The virtuous person can live by the natural law whether or not it is reflected in positive laws of a society.

If everything has a proper end in the order of nature, we may ask about the proper end of the economy. The first thing that the natural law indicates is that wealth must have a proper end, and this end must lie beyond itself. Plato ranks wealth as necessary for the health of the body, and the health of the body as necessary for the sake of the soul. The aim or purpose of society is the cultivation of the soul. But if wealth becomes an end in itself, then it distorts the natural order of the society. In the Laws the Athenian Stranger says:

  • The noblest and best thing of all for every city is that the truth be told about wealth, namely, that it is for the sake of the body, and the body is for the sake of the soul. Since, therefore, there are goods for the sake of which wealth by nature exists, it would come third after virtue of the body and of the soul. [4]

The pursuit of wealth as an end in itself is to miss its proper purpose.

Thomas Aquinas has much to say about this. The aim of life for the individual ought to correspond with the aim of society as a whole. There is therefore a correspondent ranking of goods for the individual and for society. For example, he says in his treatise On the Governance of Rulers:

  • Now the same judgement is to be formed about the end of society as a whole as about the end of one man. If, therefore, the ultimate end of man were some good that existed in himself, then the ultimate end of the multitude to be governed would likewise be for the multitude to acquire such good, and persevere in its possession. If such an ultimate end either of an individual man or a multitude were a corporeal one, namely, life and health of body, to govern would then be a physician’s charge. If that ultimate end were an abundance of wealth, then knowledge of economics would have the last word in the community’s government. If the good of the knowledge of truth were of such a kind that the multitude might attain to it, the king would have to be a teacher. [5]

For Aquinas the final good to be aimed at is beatitude, or mystical union with God. So both man and society have an aim beyond themselves. Nevertheless, there is an order that belongs to each individual and to society which belongs to the social and political life. The spiritual life cannot be fulfilled without properly ordering society. And the principle of the proper ordering of society is the common good. The individual good cannot be secured without aiming at the common good. Thus Aquinas says: “Man cannot possibly be good unless he stands in the right relation to the common good”. [6]

Without wealth the body will not be healthy, and without a healthy body the soul will not flourish. This is the same for the individual and for society. The natural law serves the good of each through serving the good of the whole. If every individual strives only for their own good, it will not be attained without harming the common good. The inner life and the outer life cannot be separated.

This established a principle that was lost in the seventeenth century debates about law and society: namely the principle that man is by nature a social and political being. Aquinas summarises this traditional understanding rather beautifully in the following way:

  • It is, however, clear that the end of a multitude gathered together is to live virtuously. For men form a group for the purpose of living well together, a thing which the individual man living alone could not attain, and good life is virtuous life. Therefore, virtuous life is the end for which men gather together. The evidence for this lies in the fact that only those who render mutual assistance to one another in living well form a genuine part of an assembled multitude. If men assembled merely to live, then animals and slaves would form a part of the civil community. Or, if men assembled only to accrue wealth, then all those who traded together would belong to one city. Yet we see that only such are regarded as forming one multitude as are directed by the same laws and the same government to live well. [7]

The expression ‘living well’ comes straight from Aristotle. To live well is the final end society aims at. And living well is possible only in community, and good community is possible only with good laws and virtuous citizens. Man is at once the political being and the ethical being.

There are two obvious ways in which we can see that political community is natural to man. The first is that the human species has language and speech. In the Timaeus Plato says speech was given to man by the gods in order that he may speak the truth of things. It is part of the human calling to bear witness to truth. Aristotle says man is the only species with speech so that there can be discourse on justice and injustice. Such discourse belongs to man as the social and political being. The second way in which it can be seen that political community is natural to man is that each individual has particular talents through which they may make a unique contribution to the community. There is a natural division of talents ordained by nature for the ends they serve. The corollary to this is that no individual is sufficient unto himself. What one lacks, another provides. Hence mutual exchange is natural to the human species, grounded first in speech, then in tradition or custom, then in economics. But the natural principle of exchange is generosity, giving birth to justice. In this most essential sense, ordained by nature, the most perfect expression of society is friendship. In considering the ends that the lawgiver should seek, Plato says in the Laws:

  • One should reason as follows: when we asserted one should look toward moderation, or toward prudence, or friendship, these goals are not different but the same. Even if many other words of this sort crop up, let’s not let it disturb us.[8]

But true friendship is through the practice of the virtues, and in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes clear that only the virtuous may become friends in the true sense. This is because true friendship is beyond pleasure or utility. It is the love of virtue in the soul of the friend. Between friends all things are held in common.

This is the first principle of property. Nature gives freely to all and in right proportion, and in friendship founded in virtue there is no need for property laws. This is the highest ideal. Yet the philosophers and lawmakers have always understood that this highest ideal has to be moderated according to the quality of virtue in a society. For Plato a society of wholly virtuous citizens would be a city of ‘sons of gods’. Hesiod had seen it as the Age of Gold. Aquinas saw such a society as Eden before the Fall.

So, where there is not perfect virtue and perfect friendship, there must be human or positive laws regarding property. Aquinas says this is because if all things were held in common they would not be duly cared for. Fallen man cares for what is his own. Therefore laws need to be made for the most equitable division of property, especially land and the gifts of nature, where their right use would continue to serve the common good. Thus it is established that all property laws are a modification of the natural law, yet which seeks to attain the same end as the natural law, which is common benefit. We might say that property law is the birth of positive law. In primitive societies customs dealt with the question of property without the need of codes of law. Even today the Maori people in New Zealand see themselves as belonging to the land, rather than as owning land. And that would seem the right way round. But in societies greater than the village or town, it would seem that codes of law are required.

For Aquinas the purpose of ownership of property is to establish its right use. There is no inherent ‘right to property’ in the modern sense, not even through one’s labour. Labour does not create or establish ownership. The natural law works on the basis of duties rather than entitlements. The right use of things, especially the land which is given by nature, is to serve the common good. Land has a right use, and this right use is clearly absent if it is put to a use that deprives any individual or society at large of its benefit. That is simply theft.

I appreciate that we all understand the common use of the land. But there is an aspect which is often overlooked when thinking of land possession purely in terms of society. The wrong use of land harms the land itself. For example, we recognise the dreadful social conditions that arose with the dissolution of the monasteries and later with the enclosures. We also see the decline in social conditions during the industrial revolution, with the slum tenements in the cities. But it is easy to overlook that both the enclosures and the industrial revolution brought about abuse of the land itself, or even originate in the abuse of land. Modern mining and farming methods are an abuse of the land, just as were the building of the city slums. The land itself has a proper end, which is to nurture all living beings, including human society. The first duty of society according to natural law is the duty to preserve the land for the common good. This duty is prior to the law of rent, and the law of rent rests upon it.

If serving the common good is the right use of the land or of nature more widely, then according to natural law it is not theft if a destitute person takes from private possessions what they need. Aquinas says that in the case of dire need properly laws are suspended and common ownership is resumed.

But even in our private possessions, apart from land, ownership is qualified by the principle of right use. For example, ownership does not give a right to destroy one’s own property, as claimed by some. (Adam Smith, for example.) That would make ownership absolute while in fact it is only according to positive law. And positive law cannot overrule that natural law. But the right use of ones possessions means they should be used for the common good, not merely for oneself. Even eating a meal can be done for the common good. The right use of wealth is for the body so that the body may serve the soul, and the soul may serve the highest good. Used in this manner all things may serve the good of society and preserve nature and the land. To use things solely for oneself is theft. All things have a right use. For example, using money for gambling is a misuse of money and contrary to the nature of money. That is not a use it is intended for. And the modern gambling industry is both an abuse of money and of work. Any work that does not bring about a common benefit is not real work.

This brings us to perhaps one of the hardest questions of all for economic enquiry: What is the true purpose of work? We have become so accustomed to thinking of work as labour for production, and production for profit, that the real meaning of human work has become obscured. That manner of thinking dehumanises the economic realm and separates it from the social realm. It is what Karl Polanyi calls the ‘disembedding of the economy’ from the social realm. And so we have come to regard social justice and economic justice as two different things while in fact they are interdependent. At their heart lies the question of the true meaning and purpose of work.

Is there a model that can illustrate the true meaning of human work? This question is so obscured by the land question that we need to step outside that for a model. When discussing how, according to the natural law, all things are held in common Aquinas remarks that this is perhaps possible only in the monastic life. The monk has no possessions because his work can be dedicated to the spiritual life and the welfare of society. Labouring in the fields can be a form of prayer. That is to say, work may be transformed through being dedicated to God. Work transformed in this way becomes a benefit so society as a whole.

I am not suggesting we should join a monastery! But the question of the dedication of work illuminates work itself at the deepest level. Earlier we saw how the natural law distributes the different human talents for the common good. What one lacks, another provides. This, I suggested, is the real root of economic exchange. It means that every exchange both fulfils a vocational calling and is mutually beneficial. That is the true spirit of work. Those fortunate in finding and following their natural vocations are fulfilled in their work and do not grudge putting all their effort into it. The question of dedication lies at the heart of the question of economic justice. What a society is dedicated to reveals its nature. Any economic exchange that is not equally beneficial to either party is an unjust exchange and a distortion of the true nature of exchange. It harms society as a whole. Most injustices in the modern economy are due to unequal exchanges, whether in employment, selling, or any use of land.

Unjust exchanges are also abuses of work. If dedicated to justice and the common good, then work would find its right use and nothing in nature would be abused or spoiled. Here the questions of economic justice and the environment converge. They are not really separate questions. That is why I noted earlier that the question of property in land is bound up with the right use of land. Property rights obscure the question of right use. Modern environmentalism seeks to find a compromise between preservation and exploitation. It is assumed that there is a necessary conflict between human wants and the provision of nature. This false notion is present in classical economics built on the notion of scarcity. But any human wants that involve the abuse of nature are false wants. This situation arises, as Plato says, when the pursuit of wealth takes precedence over health and the cultivation of the soul. There cannot be economic justice when the acquisition of wealth becomes the principle aim of a society. This aim necessarily leads to wealth inequality because one person’s excess is another’s loss as Aristotle observes. Wealth equality is possible if proportioned with the natural providence of nature, where real equality is according to need. The idea that there is a competition for scarce recourses is a false and pernicious idea. We recall what Heraclitus said: “For all human laws are fed by one divine law, which prevails as far as it listeth and suffices for all things and excels all things”.

Let me close with a simple observation. From the perspective of natural law it is the highest ends of things that orders nature and which indicates the just order of society. Modern thinking supposes we must build from the bottom up, but the natural law says we should build from the top down. In philosophical language this means seeing the telos or ‘final causes’ of things, the true ends for which they come into being. Everything in nature has a final end which means its completion of itself in harmony with nature as a whole. Every living being desires the fulness of being. But to attain this it must live in accordance with nature. Man is liable to seek the fulness of being in wrong ends. Yet knowledge of the natural law is implanted in the practical reason and everyone knows that justice and the common good are the ends that should guide desire and also inform the positive laws of a society. Law in this sense should be a reminder of what we already know. It is not an external imposition laid upon us. It is that to which we are naturally inclined.

 

[1] Charles M. Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient Philosophy (Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1907) p. 34

[2] Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse translated by George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1368bf.

[3] Plato, The Laws of Plato, translated by Thomas Pangle (Basic Books, New York, 1980) 644d-645a

[4] Plato, Laws 870b

[5] Thomas Aquinas, De Regno translated by Gerald B. Phelan (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949) 1.15. 106

[6] Josef Pieper, The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas: A Breviary of Philosophy from the Works of St Thomas Aquinas, quotation 335.

[7] Thomas Aquinas, De Regno translated by Gerald B. Phelan (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949) 1.15. 106

[8] Plato, The Laws of Plato, translated by Thomas Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980) 693b-693c.

 

This talk was given to the SPES Symposium “Spirit in Economics and Law” 2024

Economics and the Common Good

Joseph Milne

  • A review some of the classical and medieval ideas of social order and justice and an exploration of how they might suggest remedies to the economic and social crisis of our times. Lecture delivered to the Henry George Foundation London 2024

The idea of the ‘common good’ has a long history, going back to ancient Greece and developed in the Middle Ages. Behind it lies a conception of an order to society which in some way is part of the greater order of nature. The idea that there was a natural order of society and that all its functions and institutions worked together in harmony to serve the good of the whole was lost by the fifteenth century. From that time onwards society was regarded as an artificial construct, with government imposed upon citizens to curb violence or anarchy. Thus, from the birth of the modernity, the individual and the state were seen as opposed to one another. It is an idea that endures into our times, and it hovers over practically all political debates.

An opposition has in fact occurred, not between the citizen and the state, but between the economy and the state. The modern industrial economy has become divorced from the social and civic life of society and from the well-being of the whole. With few exceptions, the wage earner has become an anonymous part of the industrial machine, while the industrial machine itself has become an anonymous mechanism dictating international relations. Put simply, the economic realm has separated itself from civic society. As Karl Polanyi put it, the economy is no longer embedded in community. The result is that land, labour and money have all become commodified and no longer serve the social good. They have each lost their real nature.

One of the difficulties we face in economic theory as that classical ‘political economy’ was born when this divorce was already well underway and the traditional understanding of society had all but disappeared. Economic distortions have become so normalised they are now hard to see.

In the face of this situation I think it worthwhile asking how an exploration of pre-modern conceptions of society might throw light on our modern crisis. If we look at Aristotle, for example, the first thing he observes is that human nature is naturally social or political. Nobody can live a proper human life outside society. It is the social nature of mankind that distinguishes it from the other species. For Aristotle, this distinction is marked by the faculty of speech or logos. The Greek word logos means both reason and speech. Through speech discourse on the nature of justice and injustice becomes possible, giving rise politics and philosophy. Man is the being who reflects on the order of things, and this reflection is made possible through dialogue.

According to Aristotle, human society is also part of the larger order of nature. Everything in nature has its natural function and end. This teleological view shows how everything in nature seeks it proper actualisation. This is obvious in the biosphere, where all living things grow towards their completion, and where everything has its part in the biosphere as a whole. Modern ecology is rediscovering something of this order in nature which was once universally understood.

Human society likewise was understood to have a proper end. First, human nature shares in the ends that all substances seek: the preservation of their own being. Second, human nature shares in the ends that animals seek: reproduction and education of offspring. Third, human nature seeks to know truth and goodness through reason.

These are shared ends of the individual and the community. Together they lead to happiness. A correspondence was understood to exists between the individual and society, or as Plato puts it, between the soul and the city, psyche and polis. There is likewise a correspondence between the cosmos and the city (polis). The same rational order is to be discerned in all things. This rational order was part of justice, and so a society can flourish so far as it lives in accord with universal justice.

For the Greeks this was attained through arete, which has two aspects. First, it means excellence, and that any action should aim at the excellence that belongs to it.

Second, arete means virtue. This is its ethical aspect. According to Aristotle, who summarises the Greek view generally, no one can be happy who is not virtuous. So a major part of Greek education was dedicated to the cultivation of the virtues of prudence, courage, justice and temperance. Prudence, or phronesis, means ‘right judgment’ in practical action. Prudence grounds the other virtues.

The purpose of cultivating the virtues was to enable command over oneself. This was essential to the Greek idea of democracy. Only those able to govern themselves are free and can contribute to governing society. Aristotle observes, of course, that the inherent weakness of democracy is that the citizens may not be able to govern themselves well. Without virtuous citizens democracy is unstable. But Aristotle also observes that other forms of government can work well if the citizens are virtuous. It is not the system that matters but the character of the people. Good laws are necessary to the flourishing of society. Good laws have regard to the common good and commend what is virtuous or forbid the opposite. Aristotle draws a distinction between the law-abiding citizen and the truly just citizen. Good laws derive from the nature itself.

The fruit of society considered in this way is justice or equity, which in turn flourishes in friendship. Plato argues that the whole purpose of the art of law-making is to bring about friendship. And a society that lived in true friendship would hardly need codified laws. According to Aristotle, true friendship exists only between virtuous people. To live virtuously is to live in accordance with human nature. Here virtue and freedom belong together. Freedom is the capacity to excel in aret? or excellence, to be in command of oneself and to develop ones full capacities in accordance with the common good.

The defining feature of the Greek city-state is self-sufficiency. It can provide for all its needs. Self-sufficiency imposes a natural limit on economic activity. The acquisition of wealth is not an end in itself. If put first, it leads to degeneration. According to Aristotle, nature does nothing unnecessary. Therefore it provides sufficient and a little above to sustain life. Anyone who takes more than they need takes what is provided for another. The proper end or purpose of wealth is the health of the body. Maintaining bodily health was itself regarded as a virtue. But health of the body is for the sake of the health of the mind or soul. Health of the soul is for the sake of living justly, and living justly is ultimately for the sake of theoria or contemplation of truth. Thus each part of society serves its higher parts and higher aims. The higher aims inform the lower functions. Things go amiss when this natural order of priorities is lost, especially if acquiring wealth becomes the main pursuit of a society, because it will tend to exceed the natural limits of the provision of nature.

The Greek understanding of a natural order to society was developed by the Stoic philosopher Zeno of Citium around 300 BC. With the Stoics came the expression ‘to live in accordance with nature’. Its emphasis was on the cosmic order, conceived as a universal reason. Human reason was seen as participating in the universal reason.

The Stoic view of cosmic order established the tradition of natural law, which influenced the development of Roman law, as in the codes of Justinian and Ulpian. The emphasis of Roman law was to serve the common good of Rome. On this Cicero is clear. Any citizen who acts in their own interest before the good of Rome is not a Roman citizen. He is hardly even a human being. Roman law developed the conception of universal law, a law shared by all mankind and applicable in any state at any time. This universal law, which reason knows intuitively, is adapted in various ways by different peoples or states. It cannot be broken. It is universal justice. It brings its own retribution without the need of human law. In this sense it is like the ancient Greek goddess Díki, at once cosmic justice and retribution.

This conception of universal law, later known simply as Natural Law, is the law in the order of nature which guides all things to their proper ends and fulfilment. It is a teleological law. It is almost indistinguishable from Providence as described by Boethius and the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus. As providence it means that all things are seen and provided for in advance of necessity. Hence ‘pro-vision’. For example, nature provides food, shelter and all that the different creatures need. Providence also remedies injustices by restoring balance. In other words, the universe is understood to be guided by foresight. It is imbued with intelligence. That foresight extends down to the smallest things, such as the right herb to remedy an illness. Everything in nature has its proper ends and contributes to the wellbeing of all creatures. It is the original ‘ecology’.

From this comes the concept of ‘right use’, already present in Aristotle. The gifts of nature are to be used in accordance with their proper purpose. This applies to human works, where skills and talents are given by nature for beneficial ends. The right use of anything always takes into account its benefit to the community at large. For this reason there developed a medieval law laying down that no private property could be destroyed by its owner. Property law does not confer absolute ownership. The right use of private property must always regard the common good.

This understanding of ownership brings us to the medieval Christian conception of society. Here Roman law, natural law, and biblical law are all combined. The Greek cardinal virtues were also adopted, to which were added the Christian virtues of compassion and charity.

In 1088 the University of Bologna was founded by a guild of students for the study of law. It became a major influence in all law-making for centuries to come. It gave birth to the notion of ‘the rule of law’ over and above any prince of king. All are subject to the law, while the law itself was rooted in the order of nature and the eternal law in the mind of God. Human ethics springs from participation in the teleological order of nature.

Here an idea found in ancient times comes to light in law. According to natural law all property is common property, or simply not property at all. There is no natural right to property. In the biblical sense, all belongs to the Creator. This meant that private property can exist only as a legal concept, according to human law but not natural law. It existed only through legal agreement, and this agreement was valid so long as it disadvantaged nobody. All private property must still be used with regard for the common good. The purpose of manmade property law is to assure its just use and regard for the common good. It is more a ‘right of use’ than a right of ownership.

It is in terms of the common good that all men are equal in society under natural law. All share in the mutual benefit of society, which is a benefit greater than which each has individually. It is a participatory equality. This medieval notion of equality is not our modern one. It was rooted in the understanding that all are made in the image of God and human dignity lies in the divine image being imprinted in each soul. From this conception of human dignity comes the concept of human freedom – freedom being the capacity to act according to truth and for the good. With Christianity the dignity of the human person becomes central to the understanding of society.

Medieval Christianity had another most important influence. The virtues of compassion and charity led to providing help for the poor and the founding of hospitals for the sick. It also gradually provided education for many. The idea of the common good extended into the idea of service to society. The Church not only worked to save the souls of citizens, but also to enhance the earthly life. The theologians held the world to be a supreme good, not something to be detached from or resigned to as mere fate, as happened in later Stoicism. On the contrary, the world and the whole of nature was regarded as a manifestation of the infinite goodness and wisdom of the Creator. In short, the world was sacred. In the light of this sacred understanding of the world, medieval sciences began to be developed. Enquiry into nature was ultimately enquiry into divine law and wisdom. This attitude further reinforced the idea that nature should never be abused.

Understanding the created world as ‘good’ and ‘providential’ meant that participating in society was parallel with participating in the sacred order of the created world. This in turn led to a special understanding of education. The purpose of education was to integrate the individual into society. This meant gradual integration into its various spheres, from that of the family member, the local community, the various professions, up to responsibility for society – the skill of rulership. Thus education was inductive, ascending through a hierarchy of orders of knowledge and capacities. Hence the famous Quadrivium and Trivium as seven stages of education.

This led to founding the cathedral cities. All the professions and trades had their roles surrounding the cathedral. The cathedral city was likened to a small cosmos reflecting the greater cosmos. Within the cathedral itself all aspects of the created world were represented, from every kind of plant and animal to every kind of human craft. Thus the sum of all things were gathered into the cathedral, rendering them all sacred. The cathedral, at the centre of the city, radiated its holistic influence into the society gathered about it. This cosmic and communal aspect of architecture has been all but forgotten in our time.

Community with a common end is the key to the medieval city. Every trade and profession served the greater good of the whole. From this aim arose the guilds of the various trades, which ensured equitable trade among them and prevention of monopoly. Insofar as they might compete with one another, it was on the basis of competition in excellence. No trader could cut prices at a loss to take trade from another. Nor could usury be established. The guilds ensured equality and fostered friendship and mutual support. Through learning a trade one progressed through apprenticeship, to journeyman, and finally to becoming a self-employed master. Apprenticeship into a trade or profession was induction into society. Needless to say, every kind of craft and trade was involved in the building of the cathedrals. The cathedral united the economy through a single common aim. The cathedral also united the city of man with the heavenly city, symbolised as Jerusalem, linking human law with eternal law.

One of the criticisms laid at the door of the Greek and medieval holistic visions of society is that they deny the uniqueness and freedom of the individual. Karl Popper is one such critic. What the Greek philosophers and medieval scholars observed, as I noted earlier, was a correspondence between the individual and society. This correspondence lay in the fact that the proper end of the individual was the same as the proper end of society. On this principle Thomas Aquinas says:

  • …the same judgment is to be formed about the end of society as a whole as about the end of one man.

The question then is, in what sense do the ends of the individual and of society correspond? Aquinas replies:

  • If such an ultimate end either of an individual man or a multitude were a corporeal one, namely, life and health of body, to govern would then be a physician’s charge. If that ultimate end were an abundance of wealth, then knowledge of economics would have the last word in the community’s government. If the good of the knowledge of truth were of such a kind that the multitude might attain to it, the king would have to be a teacher. It is, however, clear that the end of a multitude gathered together is to live virtuously. For men form a group for the purpose of living well together, a thing which the individual man living alone could not attain, and good life is virtuous life. Therefore, virtuous life is the end for which men gather together.

Aquinas here follows Aristotle. The aim of both the individual and society is not merely to live, but to live well, and to live well requires living together, and living together requires living virtuously. In particular this means that both the individual and society should live justly. Justice is at once an individual virtue and the ordering principle of society. Individual liberty without virtue is not an adequate measure of society.

Virtue is clearly an ethical quality. But there is another meaning to virtue, as when we speak of the medicinal virtues of herbs or the good properties of things. Virtue in this wider sense includes the human gifts and talents. Talents are uniquely individual, yet can be realised only in society. They are clearly grounded in the social nature of man. They fulfil the individual and benefit society at the same time. Hence they are also called gifts. Of these gifts and talents Plato suggests that they are naturally distributed among a community. Cicero likewise remarks that what one lacks another provides. The gifts and talents of individuals are the real basis of an economy which embraces society as a whole. Without society talents are stillborn. Yet without aiming at the common good talents may be abused. The understanding that things have a right use applies to human talents as much as it does to the gifts of the earth. Here the ethical and the natural clearly correspond.

According to Aquinas the common good is the final cause of society. As we saw with Aristotle, everything in nature comes into being for a definite purpose or end, its ultimate cause. Everything in existence seeks its own completion. This is an inherent tendency of things. The good of anything rests in its completeness or full actualisation. The completeness of society lies in its actualisation in the common good. The common good is its wholeness. Only through participation in the common good can the individual citizen enjoy fulfilment of their own nature.

Seen in this way, the common good is not simply the sum of every individual good, but the active contribution of each towards the good of all. It involves justice both from each individual to each, and from each to the whole. Only through acting justly in both senses is the individual truly a member of the community. This does not mean the individual is subsumed into the community, since each is consciously and willingly just. Each becomes most fully themselves in community. To put that another way, “The distinctly human good, can be properly possessed only as given and received in community with others.”

Clearly this has economic implications. It implies that any economic enterprise must act justly within itself as well as towards the whole community. The acts of justice at the economic level are grounded in the primacy of the good of the whole. Justice, according to ancient philosophy, is the universal principle that makes a community. It governs all relations. This is why Aristotle and Plato argue that it comes first in understanding the nature of society. Society arises out of justice, aims towards justice, and is fulfilled in justice.

Needless to say, this holistic vision of society was lost.

We can trace precise historical causes. In the fourteenth century two new ideas about the nature of things arose. The first was nominalism, the doctrine that universals exist in name only. The second was voluntarism, the doctrine that the will precedes reason. According to nominalist theory, each particular existent thing comes into being independently, directly created by God. There is no common nature which they share in, or from which they emerge. Thus universals such as ‘humanity’ or ‘species’, or even ‘being’, exist only as names or classifications, not as realities. Nominalism gradually broke down any conception of integrated order and gave rise to a purely atomist view of nature and society.

Nominalism was reinforced by voluntarism, the doctrine claiming that the divine will precedes the divine intellect, and that it is absolutely free. Each thing is what it is by divine will. And since the divine will is free, it can determine anything and is not bound by any previously determination. God could change the ten commandments if he so wished. The ‘good’ was simply what God willed.

These two ideas caused great confusion in philosophy. For example, Descartes, in adopting both ideas, says that the reason the triangle has three sides is simply because God wills it so. He could have willed differently, and potentially may do so. Hence Descartes famously could find no ground for intellectual certainty. No relation existed between mind, perception and knowledge of things.

The voluntarist conception of the divine will soon became attributed to the human will. It can choose truth or untruth, good or evil, simply as decisions of will without consulting reason. Hence arose the modern conception of ‘free will’, where freedom is simply ‘freedom from restraint’. It is a negative notion of freedom, with no guiding principle outside the free will. The ancient understanding of freedom, as we saw earlier, was freedom for excellence, where the will is informed by reason.

Nominalism and voluntarism were further reinforced by the denial of teleology in nature, that is, any principle of final ends. In an atomistic and voluntarist view of nature an inherent orientation towards ends becomes inconceivable. ‘Purpose’ is relegated to human intentions alone.

These ideas eventually changed the conception of human nature and society. With each individual now possessing arbitrary free will, no ground existed for a consensus of wills. In fact, the idea of free will quickly degenerated into a conception of anarchic passions. If consequent social chaos is to be averted, government must be imposed by those with a more powerful will. This is the thesis of Thomas Hobbes and the basis of his doctrine of nature as ‘war of all against all’. It combines nominalism, voluntarism and elimination of final causality at a stroke. It conceives society is an ‘artificial construct’, imposed upon an imagined pre-social ‘state of nature’. The ancient understanding of human nature as naturally social is refuted and replaced by the voluntarist theory of ‘social contract’. Consent of will replaced the ancient conception of a rational inclination towards justice.

Hobbes was not alone in propounding these ideas. They were shared by the natural law theorists Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and Francis Bacon. Law was now ‘the will of the ruler’, a totally voluntarist conception of law. From that idea arose the tyrannical notion of the ‘divine right of kings’. The ancient understanding of law as founded in reason and universal justice was cast aside. These philosophers and lawyers were perfectly aware of the ancient theories of society and chose to refute them as impracticable in the present times.

From these theories emerged the concept of the competitive society, a kind of regulated war between citizens where the strong survive and the weak are weeded out. It took full force in the nineteenth century in the social theory of Herbert Spencer, but now cast in the guise of ‘evolution’ and ‘survival of the fittest’ – an expression Darwin adopted from Spencer. The ideology of endless progress, transformed into social evolution, served to justify all ills on the way to Utopia and the final dissolution of the state – a position shared by Marx as well as Spencer. Marx equated Spencer’s doctrine of ‘survival of the fittest’ with his own doctrine of ‘class struggle’. Social evolution, as either understood it, was not a work of nature but of human will. It is an ideology rooted in Hobbesian voluntarism.

Striving for power and wealth became the acknowledged general aim of society. And since nothing in nature had an intrinsic value or purpose, it could be set at human disposal and exploited or abused at will. Nature ceased being ‘nature’ and became ‘resources’. The private possession of land became normalised, along with the commodification of labour and money. Man’s relation to the earth became essentially proprietorial and consequently exploitative.

From this it followed that the economic realm became entirely dissociated from the civic and cultural realms of society as Polanyi traces in his The Great Transformation, mentioned earlier. The general welfare of society is now conceived as a cost to industry rather than its natural purpose. The selling of transitory luxury products takes precedence over health or care for the environment. The things of higher and enduring worth take second place. It is thus an inversion of the ancient understanding of the just order of society and the common good.

The ancient Greek and medieval understanding of society is, in my view, a more natural and empirical view of society. It is not an ideology. It is what would occur if not obstructed. It is founded in a better understanding of human nature, which acknowledges that everyone has a natural inclination towards justice and goodness. As Henry George observed, man is by nature a cooperative species where mutual exchange distinguishes it from the other species. Aristotle observed that the first exchange is through discourse on justice. So the quality of any right exchange is that it should be just. In this view, society is formed from the top down, according to its final purpose, not from the bottom up, as has been assumed since Hobbes and Locke. But a society crippled at the economic level, as is our present industrial society, which has inverted the natural order, can barely attain any higher aims that fulfil natural human aspirations.

Seen from this ancient perspective, George’s proposal of a land value tax takes on a greater significance than it is usually given. The land value is in fact an expression of the common good which spontaneously nurtures society. The common good, as we have seen, exists in those things shared by the community, such as government, defence, law, the arts, education and civil institutions, all which serve the community at large. It is because the land value arising from community naturally belongs to these higher common functions that it cannot be taken as anyone’s private income, or used for any commercial enterprise.

George describes how, after the functions of government, it is most wisely used for communal uses, such as public libraries, parks, sports facilities, meeting places for the arts etc. In short, for the cultural life of man, the aims which the economy is meant to enable.

Henry George comes closest to the ancient philosophers on the questions of property and distribution of wealth. He observes that from Adam Smith onwards all economists have failed to recognise that land cannot be private property according to natural law. In his own words:

  • …they all have been from the really great Adam Smith to the most recent purveyors of economic nonsense in Anglo German jargon accustomed to regard property in land as the most certain, most permanent, most tangible.

In other words, property in land defines the very idea of property for all these economists.

And on the distribution of wealth George says in The Science of Political Economy:

  • All consideration of distribution involves the ethical principle; is necessarily a consideration of ought or duty – a consideration in which the idea of right or justice is from the very first involved.

On both these questions George would have found agreement with Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Thomas Aquinas. In The Science of Political Economy there are passages on justice and natural law that clearly paraphrase Cicero, while in The Condition of Labour George quotes from Aquinas’s treatise on law:

  • Human law is law only in virtue of its accordance with right reason and it is thus manifest that it flows from the eternal law. And in so far as it deviates from right reason it is called an unjust law. In such case it is not law at all, but rather a species of violence.

George’s thinking has a greater affinity with ancient philosophers than it does with the political economists of his time, which he generally critiques. His ethics, as with Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, always aim at the common good grounded in acknowledgement of universal law and justice.

 

The Classical Vision of Man’s Place in Nature

Joseph Milne

Lecture given at Temenos Academy 2013

To speak of man’s place in nature has become very difficult in our age, and some contemporary thinkers would suggest it is even absurd. Philosophers are saying we are past the age of ‘grand questions’ and should confine ourselves to more modest ones. Physicists are asserting that the universe is nothing more than a complex system of entities and laws, and there is no specific reason for man to exist in such a universe. Ethicists are claiming there is no ground in Nature for ‘moral values’ and that any kind of ethics is at best pragmatic and relative, and so each individual must devise an ethic based on their own private values and ‘life-style’. Religion is now openly dismissed as mere ‘personal belief’ and so has no further place in the public realm.

These ideas we hear all the time. They are largely taken as given truths in the popular media. They are spoken in bland complacency by leading intellectuals and artists, as though they had the certainly of Euclidean axioms.

Nevertheless, and despite this easy complacency, there remains an underlying perplexity before the ‘grand questions’ the philosophers once asked. To live in a mathematically abstracted universe, as much modern physics proposes, no matter how sophisticated such thought may be, throws no light anywhere, even though we are meant to stand in stupid amazement before such incomprehensible theory. The latest theories and claims of the physicists do not touch the place where our human questions of existence arise from. It is as if the physicists are trying to change the subject, or to replace the question of meaning with the question of mechanical history.

It is the same with the dismissal of the grand questions. The most intricate postmodern torture of words that make everything substantial seem to disappear also do not touch on the place where our human philosophical questions arise. All the noise of such convoluted thought has no real concern for anything. Reality and truth are regarded as indifferent, or merely material to manipulate in intellectual entertainment. Thought about things is no longer connected with things, and things no longer prompt thought. We can trace this position back to the first pages of Hobbes’ Leviathan, where he describes nature and man as nothing else than artificial automata with strings and wheels and joints signifying nothing else than mere motion. (Leviathan, Introduction)

So it is also with ethics. It is claimed that all moral values are relative and that each of us is free to elect our own moral position, and that nobody has the right to say how others ought to conduct themselves. Yet at the same time we hear the endless contentious demands for ‘human rights’, under the name of which we may make any kind of arbitrary claims upon society and our fellow citizens. Even so, amid this moral confusion that especially characterises our time, there remains an intuitive knowledge that justice and goodness are not relative or arbitrary or merely rights to be claimed. So, again, the climate of ethical debate does not touch the place where our ethical concern really arises from.

My point here is not to condemn our modern situation. Plenty of people are busy enough doing that. My point is to bring to the fore the profound disconnect between the prevailing ways of thinking and our actual sense of being and truth. For example, we naturally desire to know the meaning of existence. We sense there is an underlying meaning, yet we cannot quite get to it. The prevailing view of physics keeps us disconnected from any meaning that is there. And so it is with the prevailing moral relativism, and the dismissal of any religious significance to the universe or the life of man. The only ‘grand vision’ acceptable is that of reductive mechanism, such as Hobbes proposes in his Leviathan, and this lies at the opposite pole of any sense of connection with the life, truth, goodness or meaning of things. Western thought seems to have got stuck here for the last three hundred years, despite the many claims for new discoveries and advancement.

This situation sets us apart from the ancient Greek philosophers in a very profound way. This is why we find it hard to read them on their own terms. A good example is the persistent misreading of Plato’s political thought. It is assumed the Republic is a manifesto for an ideal society. Almost every philosophy undergraduate is introduced to Plato in this way. Not only is his Republic presented as a manifesto for an ideal society, it is also presented as a model of absolute authoritarian tyranny. At the same time, Plato’s Laws, which is in a certain sense a practical politics, is hardly read at all. Yet the Republic is not a manifesto. It is a gradual probing into the question of the nature of justice, not in order to arrive at a definition, but in order to praise it rightly and to see why it offers the best path for man to his natural place in Nature, where alone human nature itself may be fulfilled. In short, Plato’s Republic arises from a searching perplexity about whether the just life is the best life. And it asks this in terms of whether the just society is the best society for man. It is not, in any postmodern sense, perplexed about whether there is such a thing as justice. Rather, it asks if justice is to be praised above anything else as the proper way of life for man.

Plato, and also Aristotle, ask: what is the best life for man to live, or for society to live. They both find this question is essentially a moral question. The best life for man is the virtuous life. Only the virtuous life is the life of freedom, and only the free person can be virtuous. To be free is to be a citizen, a participant in the life that is human and belongs to man, and which distinguishes man from the other species. Yet this life, which is the proper life of man, is not simply given by nature to man. Nature gives to man a body and senses and faculties and the potential to become fully human, but this potential may be actualized only through man taking responsibility for his existence. Here is where man is distinct from the other creatures in nature, which actualize spontaneously, as the acorn grows into the oak. For the Greek philosophers ‘nature’, or physis, is the spontaneous birth and growth of things to their fullness, each according to its proper place within the whole order of things. This whole order of things is itself a manifestation of justice. It is ‘cosmos’ rather than ‘chaos’. Nature and justice are seen to belong inextricably together.

But man does not find his place in nature spontaneously, or indeed know his own nature spontaneously. Unlike the other animals, who live by natural instinct and fit into their natural environments, man does not live by natural instinct and fit into his natural environment. Rather man must live through his intelligence and build his habitat within the world. The human organism is defenceless before the elements and is compelled to clothe itself and make a shelter for itself. In this sense man is obliged to distinguish himself from the ‘womb of nature’ and to call upon his own resources or capacities in order to live within nature. For the Greek philosophers this peculiar circumstance of being compelled to discover resources within himself is the key both to man’s imprisonment in necessity and to his call to freedom. So long as man must labour to maintain his physical existence, or so long as he lets himself be ruled by mere necessity, he is not yet human but rather still living as an animal.

Yet it is possible to conceive of human life and the life of society as entirely ruled by necessity, which is to say, ruled entirely by the physical needs that arise because of man’s defencelessness and vulnerability before nature. The greater part of modern economic theory is based upon this view of man which goes back to Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. From this has arisen the acceptance of the consumer society, where nature is no longer seen as a just and harmonious order, but merely as ‘natural resources’ for man to set at his disposal and use up. The consumer society, a society governed entirely by trade and commerce, is not regarded as a society at all in the view of Plato or Aristotle. At best it is a kind of pre-society, a society ruled only by material necessity and material appetites, and therefore not yet properly human. Plato and Aristotle see the tendency towards commerce and money-making as signs of the decline or degeneracy.

This dismissal of wealth creation and exchange of goods for money that we find in Plato and Aristotle is probably one of the most unexpected things the modern reader comes upon. Yet Aristotle dismisses wealth creation early in his Politics, regarding traders as mere slaves, and usurers as the lowest type of human beings. Likewise in Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger proposes that when founding their new city, Magnesia, it should be situated far from the coast because dwelling by the sea will encourage ship building and foreign trade, or invite invasions. Plato was quite aware of the Persian trading empire and the vast wealth that could be made through commerce. Yet he sees these as harmful to the proper life of man and as threats to the survival of a city state founded on justice and the virtuous life.

Neither Plato nor Aristotle are admirers of wealth. This is not because they regard gathering wealth as wicked in itself, but rather because it distracts from the proper life of man and binds him to necessity, to the mere sustaining of life for no end beyond sustaining it. To them such a life is that of animals. The animals live as a species, and therefore sustain their life for the sake of the species. But the human being is not subsumed to the necessity of the species. Rather each person has a life of their own, and therefore a life proper to a free being. That is to say, each man may perfect himself and his own life, and indeed is responsible for his own life before nature and the gods.

Here is a key to the Greek understanding of the proper life of man, and therefore his place within the natural order. Man is responsible for himself, and therefore responsible before the truth of things, or before the gods. This responsibility does not lie in commanding nature, in drawing wealth from nature, or in subduing it to his will. The Baconian idea of man as the master of nature, as the exploiter and thief of her secrets, is, from the Greek perspective, the embodiment of human slavery, of man chained to his desires and to physical necessity. It leaves human nature itself unperfected, unreflective and barren, a mere instrument of the exploitation of nature. In the modern sense, as expanded through the industrial revolution, it reduces man to a mere consumer of goods, as wholly bound to things external to himself, trapped in an endless chain of remaking consumables. Man as master of nature, as the age of reason imagined him, is still man as bound to necessity. The free man, for Plato and Aristotle, is neither a slave nor a master. Rather he is able to act according to truth and justice.

Living as we do in the modern industrial society it is quite challenging to see the proper life of society from the Greek perspective. We can see, at the very least, that man as mere consumer abuses the earth, by treating it as a mere resource to be called upon at will, with no life belonging to itself. The conception of the earth as nothing more than a resource for man is perhaps as far from the Greek classical understanding of nature as could be, and indeed from any ancient or pre-modern view of nature. In the Laws, Plato sees those who live in this ignoble manner as having a brief moment of glory to be followed by natures’ justice in wiping them out (Laws 716c onwards). A city state founded on merchandising and the gathering wealth cannot endure. The reason it will not endure is because the way of life it establishes for its citizens leaves them defenceless against the vices that will eventually poison the concord of the citizens. This manifests through partisan laws being enacted, dividing one part of the state against another. According to Plato the greatest danger for any society arises from it being divided against itself, a danger far greater than any external threat, but which also leaves it vulnerable to external threat. The typical way in which it divides against itself is through one party’s interests being placed above another’s and enacted through law. The legalisation of vice, or in modern language, of legalization self-interest, is the surest sign of a state in decline, because it sets private desire at variance with the public good.

A question Plato pursues in the Laws is, which laws should a state enact which will enable it to endure a long time. This question is quite foreign to how our modern age thinks about law. Our age gets endlessly entangled in legal complexities or debates over human rights behind which it is very hard to see any clear conception of law itself, or of law grounded in a justice beyond various conflicting interests. So our age asks what laws might best serve our immediate interests. It is becoming regarded as a kind of legal pragmatism. This means it is endlessly confronted with new questions for which it is not prepared. This is especially the case with the laws enacted by the European Community. Strictly speaking, these are ‘rules’ rather than laws in the classical sense, and rules arise from a different place than real laws.

So Plato’s question, which laws should a state enact which will enable it to endure for a long time, over many generations, springs from a ground hard for our age to stand in. It asks, what is the proper aim or purpose of law making? To answer such a question requires a quality or ability specific only to man, the capacity of foresight. To see which laws are needed and what consequences any law may have over a long time is the capacity that Aristotle names as the essential capacity of the politician. Indeed, it is the capacity that distinguishes the free citizen from what Aristotle calls the ‘natural slave’, the person lacking foresight. Only a mind free from the ties of necessity, or the endless stream of appetites, and fearless before truth and justice can have such foresight. In other words, only the virtuous man can see the true nature of law, its proper end, and know the art of law-making. Such a person is a human being in the real sense of being human.

If there are laws which, if enacted, would enable a society to flourish and endure for generations, this suggests that there is a correspondence of some kind between the nature of human society and law, or between human nature itself and law. Plato often likens the law-maker to the physician, one bringing health to the body and one to the state, and this suggests that human society is in some sense part of nature, even though of human devising. Aristotle is explicit in seeing the city state as natural, as part of nature, an insight forcefully opposed by the economists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For Aristotle man is the ‘political being’. If the laws that would enable a society to endure are in some sense natural to society, just as healthy living is natural to the body, it is but a small step to suppose that human society is natural to Mother Earth herself and has a place in the order of the whole universe, just as every other part of nature does.

There is an obvious connection between Aristotle’s understanding of human foresight and Plato’s concern for laws that would enable a city state to endure for a long time. The least that could be said of any such laws, if they were enacted, is that there would be nothing in them likely to produce a bad effect, or have a seed of future corruption in them – like the unwelcome side-effects of some medicines. A good law will be conducive only of a good end. Such a good end must be for the good of the whole society and for the individual simultaneously. Its goodness or rightness or justice must be perceived to be good on all grounds, by lawmakers and citizens alike.

Plato asks, what is the good end that all laws should seek? His answer is very Greek: it is friendship between all citizens. It is an answer far from the demands that our age makes upon law. In our times law is increasingly being regarded as a means of redress of wrongs, or even of retribution. In Plato’s view laws are not for the sake of overcoming wrongs or injustices, but rather for the sake of fostering individual virtue and the common good, and in such a way that citizens grow up to love the law as something beautiful and pure and good in itself. A good society is a society that loves good law. Indeed, the love of good law is a characteristic quality that makes man a citizen, a political being, a human being, as distinct from an animal or a slave. Likewise, only the virtuous person can know friendship, which springs from the common love of the true and the good and the capacity to reflect and discourse upon them.

We find friendship highly praised by the Greeks and also by the Romans, for example by Cicero who regarded it as a greater gift than wisdom. It is clear that friendship was understood to be more than the delights of companionship or comradeship. To the classical mind friendship is a good in itself, an end in itself, beyond any mutual advantage or utility. Friendship lies above the realm of necessity. It is good precisely because it is not useful. Friendship, as the aim of law-making, gives us an example of the civilized life proper to man that transcends necessity. As a mark of true citizenship it belongs to man’s public life, his life in the world at large beyond the confines of the home, which is man’s private life. Friendship springs from no ties or uses, but from the common nature of man as man in the noblest sense.

It perhaps seems curious that friendship should be regarded as part of man’s public life. But it may be, as C S Lewis suggests, that modern man has forgotten the nature of friendship. But for Plato it is perfectly clear why it belongs to the public realm, because in friendship the defining feature of human nature is most manifest and most abundantly flourishes: man as the being of language. Aristotle likewise defines man as the speaking being, above being a rational or social species. It is through speech that man reveals himself to the world and participates in the world. Speech, or language, connects the inner life of the soul with the world at large, situating man within the cosmos. Speech articulates man’s reflection upon the truth of things, and so discourse upon the truth of things is the most natural occupation of man as man. It is precisely for this reason that Plato regards philosophy as the highest occupation of man, and the calling to philosophical reflection proper to his nature. Poetry likewise arises from this reflection on the truth of things and in affirming what is praiseworthy.

Yet, no matter how many ways Plato asserts that the virtuous and the philosophical life is the best and most human life, there remains a huge difficulty in establishing it, not only for the individual but even more so for a society. One might see all of Plato’s dialogues as ways of confronting this great difficulty. Each dialogue attempts to find a way of passing over from one kind of understanding to another. And this is precisely what Plato does in his dialogues about politics and law or justice. In each instance there is a ‘common sense’ given solution to questions which have to be overturned in order to pass over to a new understanding. Each dialogues presents us with a ‘threshold’ into a transformation of understanding. In terms of how a city state should be established that will endure, the Laws demands that human concern be lifted from the mere meeting of necessity – of concern for wealth and property and comfort and security – to the life of virtue and philosophical reflection. Or, in other words, from temporal things to eternal things. It is because extremes of wealth and poverty prevent or obstruct the cultivation of the virtuous and philosophical life that they are harmful.

This demand to pass over the threshold from temporal to eternal things springs from human nature itself. For Plato man is the mortal being who is open to the vision of the eternal. Unique among creatures, his faculties are open to everything that is. Thus Aristotle understands the mind as oriented towards the truth of things. It need not go there, but nevertheless it is by nature open and tends in that direction, and so is potentially the knowledge of all things. Although an individual need not go there, for Aristotle a man fails himself by not going there, or not aspiring to go there. Likewise with a society in Plato’s view. If it does not aspire to the highest it will inevitably adopt some lesser aim and eventually decline through division within itself.

One very obvious way in which this threshold situation of man may be seen is where the different parts of human nature are in conflict with one another. In the Laws Plato portrays man as at war within himself between the three elements of reason, desire and spiritedness. Therefore the first aim of education is to establish peace and friendship within the individual between these aspects. It is only then that he becomes an ‘individual’, or ‘undivided’. This is accomplished primarily through the cultivation of the virtues of courage and prudence, which for Plato is the purpose of education. The cardinal virtues are, in Greek philosophy, the ordering actions of the soul. They are not moral codes or rules, but capacities or skills, like musicianship or oratory. Only the virtuous person has rule over himself. The virtues bring concord between the different aspects of human nature, and the attainment of this concord is possible only through deliberate cultivation and skill. It is the same with the city state. A society ruled by the endless stream of desires for pleasures or possessions is essentially unstable and at variance with itself, or the individual is at variance with the state. The sum of conflicting self-interests does not add up to a common concord as Adam Smith proposes, or the happiness of the greatest number as Bentham proposes.

This concord of the soul, or the life of the individual, may then reach out to the apprehension of the concord of the cosmos, of the heavens, or of the gods. Or it may happen in reverse. The apprehension of cosmic concord, or the order of the heavens, or of the justice of the gods brings about concord of the soul, as Plato suggests in the Timaeus. Here is the greatest threshold of all, where mortal human nature conforms itself to the eternal order of the heavens and dwells, as it were, in the realm of the gods. It is in this sense that the Stoics, much later, understood the cosmos as the ‘city of man and the gods’. The proper dwelling place of mortal man is in the whole of nature or the universe. In this way of dwelling he transcends not only necessity but also the limit of his mortality. He becomes the mortal who abides with the immortals.

Here the frailty or weakness of the human species is balanced by its relation to the great order of the universe. Although frail and defenceless compared to many other species, and without a natural environment such as other species have which sustains and protects them, the human being alone builds a dwelling from the gifts of nature which is at once fabricated and yet natural, and his dwelling places man within the cosmos as a whole. Man builds his home consciously under the stars and the sanctity of the gods.

For man to situate himself thus within nature, through building his dwelling place under the stars and before the gods, is to pass the first threshold that makes man human. As has often been noted by the philosophers, through building his dwelling out of his thought and craft, man adopts the ‘world’ as his home, as distinct from the other species who dwell only in an environment. Building in this sense does not treat nature as a mere resource. Rather man adapts himself to nature and cultivates it. We recall that in Genesis man is set in Eden to tend the garden, not master or subdue it.

The making of the human dwelling place has two aspects: setting on land and laws. Thus when Plato considers the building of Magnesia in the Laws, he addresses the question of location and lawmaking simultaneously. The city state thus has two kinds of boundaries, one in stone and one in speech. The physical setting aims to secure physical benefits and protection, while the law aims to secure the harmony of the community and the soul. For Plato the architect and the lawmaker are both ‘craftsman’, builders of the city, and both set the city under the heavens and under the gods. The city forms itself around two centres, the temple and the agora – the temple where the gods are honoured, and the agora where speech is honoured. For Plato it is in these two centres that the way of life most proper to man takes place. The city exists in order that the gods be praised and honoured and that true speech may manifest or articulate enquiry into the truth of things. It is in order that the citizen might pass over the threshold of necessity that the temple and the agora are founded and the laws are instituted. The city state has a purpose beyond its material benefits or utility, yet this purpose can never be assured, either by the architect or the lawmaker. It can arise only when the citizens desire and strive for what is good, true or beautiful for its own sake.

Paradoxically, for Plato and Aristotle man is free to be free only if he elects to be free. His freedom is not a given, and is even less is it a right in the modern sense. This is because his freedom lies not in arbitrary acts of will or self-determination, but in the love of the good, the true and the beautiful – in the ‘divine’ attributes of the eternal. To put that another way, it belongs to man to contemplate the eternal wisdom manifest in the order of the universe, and this is possible only so far as man brings about order in his own soul and actions. Man is, as it were, open to the truth of things only so far as his being is harmonious and his actions just and prudent. Man attains his full stature through transcending himself and becoming a mirror in which the truth of things is reflected and brought into speech. From this all the arts arise and have their proper place.

Yet in order to receive and to be witness to the order and truth of things, he must himself manifest his own being through speech and virtuous action before his fellow citizens (see Arendt, The Human Condition (1998) p. 199). It is through making himself visible and admirable to men that the ancient virtues of glory and fame have their origin. We still see glimpses of this view of citizenship in Shakespeare’s Greek and Roman plays, where immortal fame is the highest achievement, and its contrary, shame and loss of reputation the greatest tragedy.

A distinguishing feature of the life that is proper to man is that it consists of acts that are meaningful in themselves, and which have no end beyond themselves. Thus Aristotle asks, what is the work proper to man as man (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b). He observes that there are different works that belong to different individuals, such as carpentry or leather working, yet he wonders what is the work that belongs to the human being as such. It seems that this is the work of reason and virtue, the life of the soul. But more than this, for man there is a choice between doing action, and doing action well. For example, it is the work of the harpist to play the harp, but of the serious harpist to play well and beautifully. This distinguishes the life proper to man, to live well and beautifully, so that the work done and the manner in which it is done are both final ends in themselves. So again we find a threshold that human living must pass over for it to become properly human, and to transcend any utilitarian usefulness.

If the life of the soul is the proper life of man, as Plato and Aristotle both agree, how then does this place human life within nature as a whole? How does this place the polis within nature as a whole?

For Plato this question can be answered only if the nature and origin of the gods is understood correctly. In Book X of the Laws the Athenian stranger argues that man goes astray most dangerously, not through disbelief in the gods or atheism, but in the belief that the gods and the divine intelligence in things come into being after the bodily or physical existence of things. In other words, the opinion that the physical elements are the causes of the cosmos. On the contrary, Plato argues that the nature of the universe is perceived rightly only when ‘soul’ or ‘divinity’ or ‘intelligence’ are seen to be the cause and origin of the cosmos, and that the cosmic order remains governed by intelligence or soul.

The same is said of the human being: the soul exists prior to the body as its cause and ruler. Without seeing in this way, man can neither know the universe nor himself as they really are. But once the highest is seen to exist prior to the lowest, or the rational prior to the irrational, then the realm from which good laws may be apprehended which will bring human life into harmony with nature may be recognised and articulated. This is where the lawmaker draws his art from. And this is why the polis, or a society, is founded first in law, in speech, in intelligence, in reason, prior to being built from stone.

 

Mind and Reality

An Exploration of the Philosophy of Nagarjuna

 

Joseph Milne

May I begin by saying that I feel greatly honoured to be invited to speak here at the Nehru Centre because I have a deep love of Indian culture and wisdom, and I stand before it all with great reverence. But also I feel greatly honoured to be invited to speak in this series of talks on Buddhism as a non-Buddhist, and I do so with some trepidation. I am aware that it is a general rule of the Temenos Academy to invite speakers from inside their traditions, so I do hope that what I shall say in this talk will be worthy of breaking this general rule.

By way of justification, at least on my part, I should say that I love the Eastern religions as much as the Western and through my studies of them all I feel I have learned things which one alone would not have taught me. My interest in Nagarjuna in particular stems from my interest in the world religions and in certain fundamental and universal concerns of philosophy and theology: namely the question of the meaning of Being and the question of the meaning of Knowledge – what are technically called ontology and epistemology in Western thought. These two concerns converge in the thought of Nagarjuna.

As a non-Buddhist, as a non-Indian, and as a kind of outsider, simply as a member of the extended human family in all its diversity, I would therefore like to approach my discussion of Nagarjuna in the spirit of enquiry, as a person engaged in the questions that our human situation gives rise to. This enquiry is centred on the question: What is the relation of thought and reality? This is a huge question. It is indeed one of the great questions of philosophy in all traditions, wherever philosophy is still honestly pursued. Can thought touch reality? Can reality touch thought? Is all thought, in the end, nothing more than an overlay or projection upon reality? Would we be wiser to fall silent and simply hearken to reality? Or are we called by reality to think? Is there a mode of thought which leads us towards reality, towards truth itself, even though truth itself is ever-free and stands solely by itself and in itself? And are there modes of thought which lead us away from reality and truth and into illusion. How is truth to be distinguished from illusion? Why is there a problem of reality and illusion? Why do we not simply light upon reality without effort? After all, nothing else can be disclosing itself to us but reality itself, so why is there any problem of the relation of reality to thought?

Well, there certainly is a problem, and there seems no escape from facing this problem. As human beings, simply because we are human beings, we think. We cannot help but conceive reality. The root of the word man means mind. The human being is the thinking being, and the human being is the being who must understand the nature of thought. This has always been one of the central concerns of philosophy, and the great philosophers have found that thought is grounded in reality, although finding that ground is very difficult. It involves finding the ground of thought and the ground of reality at the same time, and then both reality and thought are known entirely differently. Thought ceases to be mere imposition upon reality, and reality ceases to be distinct from the knower of reality. This convergence of thought and reality is a common factor of the greatest Eastern and Western philosophy, even though they may be articulated very differently. If we study these philosophers in the spirit of enquiry, we see they point our gaze to a region that cannot be seen or grasped without a total transformation of thought. We cannot bring faulty or deluded thought to the gates of truth. But neither can we transform thought without understanding its nature. On the contrary, the process of understanding thought is itself the means of transforming it. This is a common factor between such great philosophers as Heraclitus, Plato, Shankara or Nagarjuna, different as they may be in a thousand other respects. Thought proceeds to reality through a transformation of thought itself through thought coming to a knowledge of its ground. The nature of the known, the knower and knowing have all to be known in a single act. That is the aim of the highest philosophy and of the highest mysticism. We may go further and say it is the aim of mind or intelligence itself. The mind has no resting place other than truth itself. How could it have a different resting place? What else could satisfy thought and intelligence than truth itself – not a concept of truth, but truth itself?

Not a concept of truth, but truth itself. Here lie all the difficulties of thought. Not a doctrine of truth, but truth itself. Not a belief, but truth itself. Not a theory, but truth itself. Not an interpretation, but truth itself. Not an ideology, but truth itself. Not a system, but truth itself. Truth itself, free of any distortions imposed by thought. Truth itself, so the greatest thinkers tell us, cannot be replicated by thought at a distance from itself. It cannot be taken out of its ground in itself. How, then, can thought possibly come to it?

Is that enough questions? These are profoundly interesting questions, are they not? They make us pause. So, how does Nagarjuna approach these questions? Let me first just say that Nagarjuna is probably the greatest Buddhist philosopher, if we can say such a thing in a Buddhist context. He was born in South India probably in the early second century AD. There are many legends about him, but I will not go into those here – save to remark that these legends attest to his greatness. At an early age he entered the Buddhist Order. The works attributed to him are now known to us only through Tibetan translations. Various good English translations are available of these works. They are very terse and difficult – so be warned before you embark on reading them, particularly if you have little familiarity with Buddhism.

Nagarjuna’s starting point is very simple. It is this: the unreflective mind attributes ultimacy to that which is not ultimate. That is to say, the unreflective mind takes as absolutely true that which is not absolute, and in doing this it misconceives the nature of everything. In this act of attributing ultimacy to what is not ultimate, the mind “clings” to an aspect of reality, a part of reality, which is not as it seems. This false “clinging” is a central notion of Buddhism. It is a very profound insight into the mind or human nature. The mind lights on something and says to itself “That is the real. I hold to that.” In saying “I hold to that” the mind enslaves itself to something that is not firm and dependable, and so begins the great cycle of suffering or dukha.

Well, that is straightforward and familiar enough, is it not? It is the tragic side of the human story. The mind allies itself to something as ultimate that is not ultimate and hopes or believes it will bring permanent happiness, but it does not. On the contrary, it brings distress and suffering. It is simple enough and we can all think of many examples. But two questions need to be asked of this. First, why is there this tendency of the mind to attribute ultimacy to that which is not ultimate, and second, what is the basic structure of this kind of mistaken thinking? The first of these questions I shall return to later. It is a very important question and requires careful philosophic examination. The second question – what is the basic structure of this type of mistaken thinking? – will lead us in the direction of an answer, so we shall see what Nagarjuna says about this first.

This brings us to a major part of Nagarjuna’s philosophy, to what are called the four extremes or kotis. The four extremes are what Nagarjuna regards as the four characteristic ways in which the mind posits absolutes which are not truly absolute. There are several ways in which these extremes may be briefly formulated, and they come as options between different extremes or absolutes. For example, take the concept of existence. If existence is taken as ultimate it raises the question of non-existence. The notion of non-existence raises the question as to whether the ultimate is both existence and non-existence together, or whether the ultimate is neither existence nor non-existence. Thus we have four koti or extremes: existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence. According to Nagarjuna all these views are wrong. This is because the Middle Way says reality is not to be reduced to any of these extremes but is a mixture of them all. They are all true at once, but none of them is true exclusively. But to see this requires a totally different order of thinking or understanding which transcends the dichotomies involved in the four extremes but which also negates nothing of the partial truth of them all. All the extreme views are either dualistic, or false unities, or false negations.

To illustrate this we make take this great city of London. Clearly it exists, yet also just as clearly it has come into existence and will one day go out of existence. So which of these two is true of London? Which is permanent or ultimate, its present existence, its previous or future non-existence? We surely cannot say that because it came into existence and will go out of existence that it is really non-existent, can we? We would not be here if it was non-existent. It exists now. But what is the non-existence of London? Does not the concept of the non-existence of London depend on the concept of the existence of London? We have to remember that the concept of the non-existence of something refers to the something that is said to be non-existent, so the concept of non-existence does not stand alone. Thus the two concepts of existence and non-existence belong with each other, and for the unreflective mind they simply remain in conflict with each other. So one person will go for existence as the real or ultimate, and another will go for non-existence as real or ultimate. But they are both wrong, according to Nagarjuna. So is London both existent and non-existent at once? That too is plainly absurd and an extreme. Superficially it may appear to resolve the dichotomy between existence and non-existence, but it remains only a theoretical concept and is not actually known. It is a false resolution of the duality of existence and non-existence. So what alternative is left? The remaining alternative is to conceive it as neither existent nor non-existent. This move attempts to overcome the dichotomy between existence and non-existence by negating both. It is the sister to the concept that it is both at once. This is the fourth extreme, or what is called nihilism. Nihilism refuses to account for existence and for non-existence. It does not answer the question but buries it out of sight.

Now, why is there such a problem in deciding if London exists, non-exists, exists and non-exists, or neither exists nor non-exists? Many modern Western analytic philosophers will say this is just a semantic problem, a mere play with words. But that reply is in fact the fourth extreme! It is to align oneself with one of the false answers. Another might say that, since truth is just a relative thing it is equally true to say that London both exists and non-exists for those for whom it seems so. But this is to adopt the position of the third koti or extreme. Modern relativism is one of the extremes, as old as ignorance itself. Just another extreme copout which does not address the question fully. To say that truth is relative is an absolute is extremist position, just like the others. Notice that, although the mind gets pulled between these various answers, as if it were obliged to settle for one or another of them, none of them can actually bring thought into contact with reality itself, but rather they lead it away into abstractions, into theories which the mind wishes to test. But what is it that can test a theory of truth? What measures truth?

So why this difficulty? Nagarjuna’s answer is simple. Existence and non-existence are not ultimate. The problem arises through attributing ultimacy to any of the combinations or relations of existence or non-existence, or ultimacy to their negation. Existence and non-existence both come and go. They are there, plainly, yet they are not ultimate. To put this in Nagarjuna’s words, they co-originate. That is to say, that which is and that which is not belong together and engender each other simultaneously. They are not actually mutually exclusive, just as waking and sleeping are not mutually exclusive, or day and night, or left and right. They arise in relation to one another.

Nevertheless this does not answer the question as to how the notion of ultimacy arises in thought. Nagarjuna is not saying there is no ultimate, and neither is Buddhism as a whole saying that. Buddhism most certainly does not deny an ultimate, and neither is Nagarjuna doing so. All he is saying is that we attribute ultimacy to things that are not ultimate. But there is that to which ultimacy truly belongs. To say there is no ultimate is just a further extreme position. The unreflective mind simply fails to distinguish between the relative and the absolute, or between the conditioned and the unconditioned. In the mundane realm of things, everything stands in relation to everything else. This means that the existent among observable things stands in relation to the non-existent and visa versa. They arise together. There could be no becoming if this were not so. For example, a child grows into an adult by ceasing to be a child. Being a child and an adult are both part of being human. But the human being could not pass through these stages without the whole of the rest of the world also coming into being and constantly changing and transforming. And the world could not come into being without the universe coming into being. So everything is interdependent and related. The mistake lies in taking some aspect of all this as ultimate or absolute.

This may be seen better from another angle. If we take the solitary being of the self as ultimate, then there arises other than self. If I take “I” as ultimate, then your self becomes other than my self. Linguistically we get “I” and “Thou”, “me” and “you”. I cannot use the word “I” in reference to you, and you cannot use “I” in reference to me. To whom then does the word “I” truly belong? In the realm of the conditioned we have to accept the difference, as language itself compels us to do. But which is ultimate: “I” or “Thou”? One answer is to say both. Another is to say neither. Another is to say neither – nor, meaning they are neither non-ultimate nor ultimate at the same time. But all these answers are extremes and therefore wrong according to Nagarjuna. Why? Because selfhood is being misconceived in all cases. This is the meaning of the Anatma-vada or no-self doctrine. The Anatma-vada or no-self doctrine says that to attribute independent selfhood to any being is to attribute self-origination to that being. Plainly, no being could exist without the rest of the universe. Plainly no being brings itself into being as a self-enclosed entity. If that were so every being would live in its own independent world, or live alone in no world at all. It implies an infinite number of originations, one for every being.

To put that another way. We see in modern science the search for the fundamental particle, the bit that stands alone and brings itself into being. This is atomism, the theory that there is some primary bit or particle that is prior to all the diversity of the universe of matter. From the Buddhist position this is the false assumption that there is one bit of matter that stands apart from the rest of matter, while in fact all matter comes forth together as a continuum in process. It is like mistaking an ingredient of a cake for its cause – while in fact the cause of the cake lies with the baker and the person who will eat the cake. If the cake has no independent existence from the baker and the final eater of the cake, how can it be considered that one of its ingredients is ultimate or primary? So likewise with every being. Each comes into being as part of the totality of the conditioned realm. This does not negate the integrity of each being, and it does not mean that nobody has selfhood, but it does mean that any notion of selfhood that regards the being as self-causing and independent from the rest of conditioned reality must be false. In short, ultimacy should not be attributed to anything that is just a part or element, or which is in process of change, or which comes into being or goes out of being.

The difficulty in all this is that the unreflective mind does not realise the implications of attributing ultimacy to the conditioned. That which is ultimate stands eternally by itself in relation to nothing else. The ultimate is non-relative. The ultimate has no opposite, and so the ultimate can never be one of a pair of things or the fusion of a pair of things. In Buddhist terms the ultimate does not belong to the realm of being or of non-being or of becoming. It does not stand in contrast to anything. That would make it relative. So how could these attributions belong to any entity or non-entity in the conditioned world? There is the realm of the relative and the realm of the non-relative. These have to be clearly distinguished. The problem Nagarjuna is addressing is the confusion of the two. So long as they are confused, then neither is understood properly. Ultimacy gets mixed up with the relative, and the relative gets mixed up with the ultimate.

Now – for the sake of our Western minds and for the sake of coming out of the hard considerations for a moment – I would suggest that what Nagarjuna is saying here is universally a problem of thinking. We are not merely discussing a Buddhist doctrine but principles that belong to proper thinking universally. What I have just said about maintaining a proper distinction between the ultimate and the relative applies equally in all genuine philosophical work and to all religions. Even though Buddhism is called by non-Buddhists a “non-theistic” religion, all that Nagarjuna says about the distinction between the ultimate and the relative applies to the Christian distinction between God and the creation. This is not a matter of attempting to reconcile Buddhism with Christianity – an enterprise which I regard as wholly pointless because it reduces both to mere doctrines or systems – but simply because as thinking beings we need to distinguish the ultimate from the non-ultimate, the relative from the non-relative, the absolute from the non-absolute. We belong to this problematic no matter whether we are Buddhists or Christians, or if we go by no named religion at all.

So I just want to point out that unreflective notions of God in our culture import relative ideas and impose them upon God. For example, God is often regarded as an entity or a being among beings. Or God is thought of as intervening in the created order. There is, if I may just make this observation, a lack of theological consideration of the transcendence of God in Christianity at the present time. And this is because the meaning of ultimacy is no longer generally considered, and because of this a confused relativism prevails almost everywhere, perhaps even to the point where relativism is regarded as ultimate or absolute, even though such a notion is rationally incoherent. This leads to confusion in every walk of life. Everyone wants their own private truth, and yet they want everyone else to subscribe to their private truth – which obviously is impossible, not to say absurd. But the root is the failure to consider the ultimate in proper terms, as completely discontinuous with the relative. Truth is not democratic, it is the measure of all things, the measure of every notion, yet not itself a notion.

My point here is that metaphysical confusion, such as prevails in most modern Western thought, leads to confusion of though in every realm. Metaphysics is not an optional extra in a culture. On the contrary, all thought and perception is grounded in metaphysics in the very obvious sense of what we take to be real or unreal, eternally true or temporally conditioned. It makes no difference whether we call ourselves believers, agnostics or atheists, this metaphysical distinction between real an unreal remains the ground of our thinking simply because it is the ground of mind, intelligence and consciousness themselves. Wittingly or unwittingly every human being attributes ultimacy to something or other – even to suppose there is no such thing as ultimacy is to do so.

This brings us to a matter that I believe needs to be cleared up in much that is commonly said of Buddhism. I said a moment ago that Buddhism is a non-theistic religion, and I suggested this was a meaningless distinction. It is obvious that Buddhism does not speak in terms of a theistic symbolism. But it is also obvious that those religions that do speak in theistic symbolism are quite aware that they speak symbolically. It is understood in the highest Christian theology, for example, that the appellation “God” is just an appellation and that all the theological attributes given to God do not capture God, because God is ineffable, wholly beyond that grasp of representative thought. Exactly the same holds for the Buddhist appellation Sunyata – “unconditioned”, “void”, “emptiness”. It is no different to make Sunyata an entity among entities as it is to make God an entity among entities. The two words “God” and “Sunyata” belong to two modes of discourse, the symbolic and the metaphysical. This distinction between symbolic and metaphysical discourse is a vast subject that merits much reflection in its own right, but we cannot pursue that now. All I wish to point out is that these two modes of thought should not be reduced to literal differences between religions and taken as a basis for doctrinal differences. Nor should they be reduced to mere psychological or cultural distinctions, a reduction I find quite abhorant. On the contrary, both discourses direct the mind to the same, to the ultimate, the non-relative, to that which is prior to temporal reality, prior to mind and thought, prior to being, becoming and non-being, prior to the seeds, essences or archetypes of existent things – prior in the sense of eternally real or absolute, prior in the sense of there in advance of everything, prior in the sense of that which everything stands forth from and is distinguishable from, the indistinguishable which makes distinction possible.

I am quite aware that Buddhist literature rarely states this explicitly. Its orientation is the practical overcoming of the clinging that arises through attributing ultimacy to that which is relative. But the question naturally arises – or so it seems to me – How does it come about that the mind attributes ultimacy at all? Or, in more directly Buddhist terms, How does it happen that the mind attributes the unconditioned to the conditioned? Why is there any notion of the ultimate at all?

The answer is that if there were only the relative and contingent, there could be no conception of the non-relative and non-contingent. Indeed there could be no conception of the relative or contingent either. That is to say, the conditioned is itself only conceivable and discernable by virtue of an inate prior knowledge of the unconditioned, because the conditioned stands out from the silent background, so to speak, of the unconditioned. Let me make this as clear as possible: Mind looks out from the unconditioned. The unconditioned is the vantage-point of mind or consciousness. That is why the unconditioned cannot be an object of perception or conception, just as the ear cannot hear the ear, or the eye perceive the eye. The rule is that whatever may be an object of perception belongs to the realm of the conditioned, and this includes all the contents and motions of the mind itself that are observable as objects. In short, the conditoned includes all that may be experienced, for experience means to go out, to savour difference and diversity, to attend to that which stands away from the seat of unconditioned Reality.

This is a very important matter to consider. Where does mind think and conceive from? Modern Western thought on this matter is almost non-existent. Thought is given over to inference from perception or from theory, but the ground of knowing itself is no longer considered in most modern philosophy. This is fine for the natural sciences, but it cannot deal with the question of the ground of mind itself, that is to say, metaphysical questions. From whence does mind gaze upon the things of sense? From whence does its gaze arise? Modern psychology is no help here either because it attempts to study only the contents of the mind as objects in the same way as the sciences do, as objects of sense. Thus it is preoccupied with images and personal history. It does not enquire into the nature of mind as such, or into the nature of knowing or epistemology. Indeed there is no psychology of Intellect which is the organ of knowledge. So where is the seat or ground of mind as such? From whence does it direct its gaze upon things, including the contents of the mind?

The answer is that mind gazes from the unconditioned itself, from truth itself. To put that more strongly, truth or reality bring mind into being. This is the metaphysical answer to this question. It is a straightforward fact, so to speak, which Nagarjuna takes for granted when he discusses in such detail the errors that arise in confusing the ultimate with the relative. He does not ask the foolish question “Is there such a thing as truth or reality absolute?” He asks, How can the mind be rescued from ignorance, from the confusion of the conditioned with the unconditioned? And his answer, which is utterly Buddhist, is to direct the intelligence to seeing the logical absurdity of the extreme views which confuse the conditioned and relative with the unconditioned and non-relative. The unconditioned and non-relative are taken as given. They are taken as given by Nagarjuna and they are taken as given by the ignorant. The difference lies in how they are understood in either case.

Its strikes our modern Western mind as curious that the seat of the gaze of the mind is from the unconditioned itself, from the ultimate itself, and that it is knowledge that looks outward to the objects of sense, to the conditioned. Since the Enlightenment our Western culture has become accustomed to supposing that all that may be known can be known only as objects, as external entities, sense-perceptions from which “knowledge” may be inferred empirically. We have become accustomed to supposing that knowledge is abstracted from perceptions, and that all such knowledge is subject to continuous revision. But prior to the Enlightenment the great philosophers and theologians understood the knowing act of the mind quite differently. They understood that it was knowledge that formed mind and brought mind into being, and that the Intellectual world and the Soul exist prior to the objects of sense, as their cause. Thus the essences of things are in mind, universal mind, not in the materiality of objects, and essence knows essence without mediation. Non-essence cannot know essence. This means that essence cannot be inferred from empirical investigation of objects. This is a very important principle which is found in every high philosophical tradition or religion. It is the essence of mind that knows the essence of things. Thus Plato, for example, says that before its descent into the body – into the material world – the soul knew the essences of all things directly without mediation, not as entities outside itself but through union with them. Likewise Parmenides says that thought and being are the same, and at the close of the Middle Ages Aquinas says that the first thought of the mind is Being. Union is the essential meaning of our word “knowledge” or the Greek “gnosis”.

Because such knowledge is of the nature of mind itself, the ground of all thought, it cannot be thought as mediated knowledge, as an object of knowledge distinct from the mind, such as psychological and material objects can be. Mind is knowledge present to itself as itself. It is knowledge that forms the mind, not mind that grasps knowledge. This is the highest level of the mind, of course. It was the realm of knowledge proper to the intellect, which knows from unity, as distinct from the reason, which infers from the senses and experiences. It is what Aquinas called Angelic Mind, or what Meister Eckhart calls the uncreated apex of the soul. It is mind participating in God’s knowledge, and thus it is where being and knowing are identical. In Buddhist terms, it is Sunyata knowing Sunyata.

This understanding of mind was lost in the Enlightenment, and so the thought of the previous ages, from the Presocratics to the Renaissance, has become largely unintelligible to us. But it can become intelligible to us again once we understand that the natural order of the universe and of being has been turned upside-down in modern Western thinking. That is to say, that Being, Truth, Reality, Essence and Knowledge are first in the order of things, not last, and that they are immediately present to themselves, not mediated, and that mind is the immediate reflection of these upon themselves as distinct from their identity in the mind of God. In God Being, Truth and Knowledge are at rest, while in mind they are creative and in motion.

In Buddhist thought – as in Eastern thought generally – the natural order has not been turned upside-down, and so we find it taken for granted that the subtlest and most ineffable comes first in the order of things, not last, and certainly not as an arbitrary extra. Therefore the thinking moves in quite a different way, and so the problem that Nagarjuna deals with is that of mixing the unmediated knowing of the ultimate with the mediated knowing of the conditioned. It is a problem of mixing absolute knowledge with inferred knowledge. This is essentially the same problem that Plato deals with in speaking of distinguishing Reality from appearances.

What, then, are the implications of all this when considering the relation of Reality to thought. Is Reality – reality in the true sense of that which is eternal, absolute and ultimate – beyond the scope and power of thought? Is Nagarjuna pointing us beyond all thought? Is he, through showing the errors of mixing the unconditioned with the conditioned, negating all thought? The answer to this question depends on what we understand thought to be. If by thought we mean only inference from objects of sense, then the answer is yes. If by thought we mean holding concepts distinct from Reality itself, then the answer is yes again.

However, that answer is not sufficient and is too simplistic. There is a mode of thought beyond and prior to inferential and conceptual thought. This higher mode of thought is the knowing that belongs to Reality as such, a mode of thought in which Reality is present to itself with conception un-separate from itself. If we might put it this way, Reality thinks its presence, or, Reality knows itself. This is the originary knowing that brings mind into being, mind in the universal sense, and it is also the ground of every particular mind, the ground in which mind can reflect upon itself and upon everything else, both the unconditioned and the conditioned, the non-relative and the relative. This is thought in the true sense, the thought prior to and underlying all inferential or discursive thinking. It is the thought that belongs to Intellect as it was understood in the Middle Ages in the West, or thought that was once called contemplation or speculation. To contemplate or to speculate is to come to know from things themselves, to apprehend what reality of itself discloses of itself to itself. In the Christian tradition this is sometimes called “participating in God’s knowledge of all things.” In that knowledge everything is present to God without any distinction or division. In Buddhism this is Sunyata. Liberated from the confusion of the ultimate with the non-ultimate, which is the root of clinging, the mind is free to be informed directly by the knowledge that resides in all things – not in order to “have” or “get” knowledge of things, but rather to be impressed or stamped with the knowledge that speaks things themselves into being. The word “informed” means to be “formed by”. In other words, true thought is the thought which comes out of reality itself as reality itself. It is this thought which occurs in the liberated or non-clinging mind, and so mind is not separate from Reality, but Reality beholding itself, or knowledge in knowledge of itself.

This may well sound strange in the context of modern Western thinking, where epistemology has become wholly preoccupied with the problems of empirical inference, as we have already observed. But consider this: do we really believe that Reality is unknown to itself? Do we really think that Truth does not know Truth, or that the ineffable is oblivious of itself? Is Reality to be relegated to unconscious oblivion? I think these question show the absurdity of such notions by themselves. It is therefore the responsibility of our intelligence to conform itself to the intelligence of Reality itself. That, I suggest, is the point of Nagarjuna’s pulling apart of all erroneous thinking. He intends to leave the mind free to participate in the unconditioned reality of Reality itself.

 

Joseph Milne 2001

 

Economics and the Land Ethic

Joseph Milne

Talk given at the Henry George Foundation 2019

 

Let me begin with a quotation from Aldo Leopold:

  • There is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to the land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land…is still property. The land relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations. (A Sand County Almanac, OUP: 1949, p. 203)

Aldo Leopold was an early pioneer of environmental ethics, advisor to the UN before his death in 1948. He saw ethics had evolved in society first for the individual, then for the community, and now it must embrace the land. As he puts it: ‘The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land’. (p. 204)

It follows from this that, so long as we have no land ethic, the land is still property, just as slaves were once property, a mere economic resource towards which we owe nothing. At best we have laws to protect property, because it is someone’s property, not because of its natural worth. It is assumed that because something is property, an owner can dispose of it however they wish. It is quite clear, however, that our laws of property are founded on claims of privilege and not on natural justice. It is also clear that land ownership is only a legal concept, not a natural one. This was recognised by the prophets of the Old Testament and by the medieval natural law tradition. But in the Middle Ages a legal claim on land came with duties to the community. These duties were eroded in England by the Magna Carta, which established civil rights on the one hand, and private property rights on the other.

Little has changed since Aldo Leopold’s time 70 years ago. In fact, very little has been done to explore the true relation of economics and the environment. It is commonly assumed that economic interests are in conflict with care for the environment. There are indeed those who suggest that Henry George’s tax reforms, and the introduction of a land tax, would increase production and lead to further harm to the environment. This is because the ‘land question’ is seen only superficially, both on the economic side and the environmental side.

The land question is the question of the place of the human species in the biosphere. Land is the biosphere. It is not a mere economic ‘resource’. That word ‘resource’ is a distortion of what land is and of our true economic relation with it. Are one’s parents or children a ‘resource’? The word ‘location’, which often replaces the word ‘land’, also distorts our true economic relation with the land. The language we use about the world reveals how it is seen or misconceived. We may observe, for example, how economic language has moved over the last 200 years from concrete social language to abstract concepts, and eventually to mathematical and statistical language, gradually divorcing economics from the social and ethical realms, and from the natural world. In fact, economists such as Mariana Mazzucato and Michael Hudson have shown that modern ‘textbook economics’ has practically nothing to do with actual economics. It has become a fictional language. Yet the word ‘economics’ means the ‘household’ or ‘household management’. It implies wise management for mutual benefit. It directly concerns how we live, use and dwell on the land. The true laws of economics and the laws of nature cannot be in conflict with each other. If they appear to be, then economic understanding must be in error.

It is therefore of great importance to see how the present economic injustices and the destruction of the environment are linked together. Human poverty and environmental harm have the same common cause. They both spring from a wrong relationship with the land. As Aldo Leopold suggested, the social ethic and the land ethic cannot be divorced from each other, since one is an extension of the other. It is perfectly plain that if there is poverty amid abundance, as there is here in the UK, then the social ethic must be amiss. That is to say, we live in a wrong relationship with one another. If we live and a wrong relationship with one another, how can we live rightly with the land, with the earth, the biosphere? If we live out of accord with where we live, how can we live rightly as a community? And if we live out of accord with nature, how can we live in accord with human nature? Yet modern economic theory assumes that land is merely a resource, a passive store for consumption, and that economic exchange is essentially mutual exploitation. By abusing the land we degrade our own humanity.

According to Henry George, people are not naturally exploitative or competitive. On the contrary they are naturally generous and cooperative. This is the natural basis of any division of labour, whether in the family, the workplace, the nation, or humanity as a whole. The prevailing idea of ‘competitive individualism’, an offshoot of Hobbes and Social Darwinism, distorts our understanding of the natural order of society. Nature works by association and integration, not by competition. If one watches people working we see that, in practice, they cooperate, regardless of prevailing economic theories. They act for mutual advantage. But if in politics and in economics we fail to see how cooperation is natural, then we will make bad laws for governing society. We will legalise things that are unnatural and anti-social – such as usury and gambling.

Land monopoly is clearly socially divisive. I need hardly argue this point here. Yet it is also, and more fundamentally, an unnatural relation with the land. It causes slums and pollution. We have all seen pictures of the unhealthy and degrading Victorian slums. They personify land abuse, and the social abuse that follows as a consequence. But even now in the UK substandard houses are being built for land and social exploitation. Such social exploitation is environmentally harmful. It neither serves the homemaker well, nor respects the best or appropriate use of land. It is humanly and environmentally unnatural. It is driven by the desire to exploit the homemaker and the land. The desire to exploit does not use things in the manner they are best suited to. It lowers the standard of life and erodes community. It also degrades the exploiter.

But of course, if land is taken to be private property, rather than the natural dwelling place of all living beings, then that initial false relation opens the door to a host of others. Land monopoly invites land abuse and social injustice. The economic realm cannot be separated from the environmental realm, and neither realm can be separated from ethics.

So the question becomes: what is the right use of land? This is at once an economic, social and ecological question. It is almost to ask the Socratic question: How ought we to live?

To begin to answer this question we need to step outside the mechanistic framework of current thinking about the world, and even about the universe. If we consider for a moment the ancient understanding of the land we find it expressed in the symbol of Mother Earth, or as the Great Nurse of all living beings. Plato, in the Laws, says that we should honour the earth as our mother. And further he lays down a law that no household may sell their land. And in Aristotle’s Politics we read that the land provides precisely sufficient for all our needs, and that to take more than this, or to trade things solely for profit, will corrupt the society. And earlier we read in Hesiod of the Golden Age where all lived in peace and:

  • all good things
    Were theirs; ungrudgingly, the fertile land
    Gave up her fruits unasked.

And Virgil, also writing of the Golden Age, says:

  • No tenants mastered holdings,
    Even to mark the land with private bounds
    Was wrong: men worked for the common store, and earth
    herself, unbidden, yielded more fully. (Georgics I/126-29)

The Roman poet Ovid writes of how this was lost:

  • The earth itself, which before had been, like air and sunshine,
    A treasure for all to share, was now crisscrossed with lines
    Men measured and marked with boundary posts and fences. (Metamorphosis I/134-36)

The Stoic philosopher Seneca also wrote of the Golden Age:

  • The social virtues had remained pure and inviolate before covetousness distracted society and introduced poverty, for men ceased to possess all things when they began to call anything their own. . . . How happy was the primitive age when the bounties of nature lay in common and were used freely; nor had avarice and luxury disunited mortals and made them prey upon one another. They enjoyed all nature in common, which thus gave them secure possession of public wealth. Why should I not think them the richest of all people, among whom was not to be found one poor man? (The Epistles)

The ancient poets and philosophers spoke in a symbolic language which perceived, so to speak, an eternal reality behind the disorders humanity had brought upon itself and upon the earth. That symbolic eternal reality pointed the human imagination to how we ought to live, and how we might live, if we adopted the pure social virtues and live without avarice. The ‘vices’ cause us to misperceive the world and our place in Nature: ‘for men ceased to possess all things when they began to call anything their own’.

This ancient view of things reflected a natural harmony between society and Nature. And when the philosophers of Classical Greece and China considered what was expressed in poetic symbols and myths, they discerned a lawful order than ran through all things. We might say that Nature was itself Law. It manifested itself as Law – not as laws governing Nature, but as its very essence or being. And human nature likewise was seen to be lawful, having its own essence. And this essence of human nature corresponded with the great laws of Nature. The human person was like a small cosmos reflecting and reflecting upon the greater cosmos. For the ancient poets and philosophers, it is this correspondence with the greater cosmos that aligns the human senses and faculties with Nature and enables perception and thought. The word ‘consider’ means to observe the stars and the order of Nature. Yet our modern sciences take no note of the fact that Nature gives us our senses and faculties, and even less that these are given for a purpose within the great order of things.

From this holistic understanding of Nature arose the tradition of Natural Law. This is too vast a subject to go into here, so I will simply show how it appears on different levels. At the highest level it is simply the Good, or what later was called the Eternal Law. Out of the Good springs Justice. Out of Justice springs the regulation of Nature and society. Out of regulation springs jurisprudence or ‘legal’ law. From legal law springs custom. The descent from the Good to custom is like a ray of light shining from the Good and informing each level with its own luminosity. This means that the ‘rightness’ or ‘fitness’ of each level may be measured by reference to the next level above it. And so the Stoic and medieval philosophers say that any ‘legal’ or ‘positive’ law enacted which contradicts the Eternal Law cannot be called a law. An example of the kind of law which fails to meet this criterion is a law which is advantageous to one party at the expense of another. A law is truly a law only when it serves the universal good. It follows from this that any ‘legal’ law that advantages the ‘economy’ over Nature or the environment cannot be called a law.

This larger picture of law and ‘lawfulness’ helps us to discern things we would otherwise miss. For example, Aristotle and Plato both note that the person who keeps the legal law because it is legal is ‘just’ only in a limited way. A person is just in the full sense only when they keep the legal law because it is rooted in justice itself, and through love of justice itself. Then keeping the law is virtuous. This is a central theme of Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice.

Now we might well examine which laws in our time measure up to this criteria. Earlier I gave the examples of legalised usury and gambling. These things are clearly advantageous to one party but harmful to another, and harmful to society as a whole. They are unjust laws and, very strictly speaking, not laws at all – one might want to say ‘fake laws’. A real law aligns Nature and justice.

This principle can easily be applied to economic activity. We can ask if any particular activity is true to the economic law of just exchange, and we can ask if it is beneficial to one party while harmful to another, and we can ask if it is universally beneficial to all creatures and to the biosphere. Is it just and good in all these respects? It is perfectly clear that many present economic enterprises fail on each of these criteria. They contravene the Law of Nature, the cosmic law of the ancient poets and philosophers. And we can see that they contravene both the social ethic and the land ethic.

It seems quite clear that we need to replace bad laws with good laws. We are perfectly aware that there are vested interests in bad laws, laws which allow harm to society or to the land upon which all life depends. It may well be that the crisis of global warming is awakening a deeper sense of natural justice then the last several hundred years of industrialisation have done. It may well be that our age will be compelled through fear to adjust our relationship with nature as well as our understanding of society.

But I believe there can be a more noble response than that. Fear provokes irrational response. What is really needed is a reconsideration, in the light of Natural Justice and the Good, of the very nature of human work. It has long been taken for granted that the aim of the economy is to keep increasing wealth, while it is that notion that has driven us to neglect the laws of Nature and treat the land as a mere resource, rather than as the living biosphere and our home. The drive to create ever more wealth has led to social exploitation, massive consumer debt, while only very few get richer. For many people work is a drudge they are compelled to do just to keep the wolf from the door. Much of this work is unnatural and does not fulfil human potential.

A fortunate few perform work that is meaningful and fulfilling, but most do not. George observed that the working people of the Middle Ages could provide sufficient for their needs with three days’ work a week. This would be perfectly feasible now if we were not held in debt bondage through land speculation. If that were so, George suggests that the free time would naturally be given to social and cultural pursuits. Even in George’s younger days masters and apprentices would often gather to talk and drink together in working hours. It is clear that work was as much a social activity as an economic one – before the big corporations and monopolies with their absentee shareholders came along. But even now there are craftsmen and women, artists, musicians, scholars, doctors, farmers and many others who work out of love for their work and service to the community. We regard them as very fortunate, and indeed they are, but this is because they have found their vocations. They have found the work through which they may fulfil their talents and make a substantial contribution to society. And these callings may best be performed in accord with Nature, neither exploiting anyone nor harming anything.

Surely true work, work in accord with human nature, would make a net contribution to society, and diminish nothing which the land freely provides. There is an ancient principle that if one does something solely for private gain, one is alienated from oneself and from nature. The talents of each individual fit them for association and cooperation. Each human beings’ natural capacities are essentially social and life-enhancing. In that most fundamental sense they are ‘ecological’ and part of Nature as a whole.

Our problem is that, through land monopoly and the ever-expanding abuse of credit, human capacity has been limited, and social life has been diminished. And so what was once ‘natural’ now strikes us as utopian. Land abuse has blinded us to the natural order of things and diminished our vision of human nature and society. The ancient philosophers traced all political ills to one common cause: the wrong use of things. This is what practical reason is meant to discern, the right use of things. And this principle goes deeper than the question of property or ownership. Property, according the Thomas Aquinas, is justified only so long as it is used for the common good. This was the real basis of the Medieval ‘just price’ theory and the prohibition against usury. All things and all human activities have right uses, and private gain was not considered one of them. Acquisition is not an end in itself. Money-making is not the proper end of the economy. On the contrary, it deforms it. But fear of want drives people to seek acquisitions as a form of security, and so distorts the real meaning of work. As Plato observes in the Republic (Book VIII), the quest for money-making ultimately leads to oligarchy, where the city become two cities, one for the rich and one for the poor. The economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that we are heading in that direction.

There is no economic reason for intelligence and virtue to be opposed to one another. In meaningful work they are not, while in exploitation they are. Yet neo-classical economics divorces ethics from economics, and imagines the economy as a kind of autonomous, self-regulating machine, as though society itself were a machine. It is this, amoral, mechanistic notion of economics that divorces wealth creating, or meaningful work, from the environment. It sanctions the wrong use of things, and the wrong use of human labour.

It is clear, however, that an adequate response to the present crisis of global warming demands a marriage of intelligence and virtue. Great ingenuity is needed to reform farming methods and non-toxic production of energy. These need to be brought into harmony with the natural order, and intelligence guided by that aim can be enormously creative. We need pioneers as capable as the great inventors of the Victorian era, a new industrial revolution, but no longer based on the exploitation of nature or labour, with injustice hidden under the cloak of social Darwinism.

We should note, however, that ‘investors’, hedge funds, creditors, insurance brokers and banks, and the whole money-market, cannot bring about such a change. They only take from wealth-creation and contribute nothing towards it. In this regard, as currently constituted, they are no different to land speculation. They merely extract from the economy, from the actual production of wealth. They have no engineers, inventors or discoverers. And like land speculators, they inhibit economic diversity and small-scale enterprise. They inhibit addressing environmental abuse and climate change.

It is here that we also need to consider the proper role of government. It is obvious that global warming and environmental destruction require global cooperation, and this can only be secured through governments working with a common aim. In a sense, this great challenge creates an opportunity for peaceful international cooperation. There is no need in the nature of things for nations to be opponents of each other. But we need to confront the myth that the economy works independently of the state and is self-regulating. That is a misrepresentation of Adam Smith and leads to oligarchy, not liberty. It is only at the level of government and national institutions that the safety and good of the whole can be secured. And it is only vested interests that demand deregulation of finance and exchange of goods. But also – and some Georgists need to learn this – it is the idea that the economy operates independently or autonomously that divorces it from distributive justice. That is what Herbert Spencer and his followers wished to secure and which Henry George so vigorously opposed. Their slogan was ‘freedom of contract’, meaning that neither law nor government should interfere in whatever contacts were made between employers and employees, or between landlords or tenants. Such contracts involved no societal obligations. They fiercely resisted all the social reforms of Gladstone, arguing that indolence was the cause of poverty.

Here is where the different orders of law I mentioned earlier come in. There is the Eternal Law or the Good, from which springs Justice, and from Justice springs the common regulation of Nature and society. Out of regulation springs jurisprudence, the realm of positive or written law, and from this legal realm springs custom. In this ancient conception of law, found in one form or another in any great civilisation, law descends from the universal to the particular. The good of society as a whole, where it is in harmony with itself and with Nature, belongs to universal Justice. A perfectly good people could live by that law alone, without any need for positive or written law. But that is like saying every human being can be perfectly healthy. That is the most desirable thing, and what the art of medicine aims at, yet is never fully attainable. And so Justice needs to be reflected upon and articulated according to circumstance, and this is jurisprudence, the realm of ‘legal’ law, of legislation. Law at this level, if it accords with Justice, ‘guards’ all citizens from social and economic abuses. It ought to guard against land monopoly and usury which destroy society. Scholars trace that function back to ancient Babylonia, Syria, Egypt, Israel, Greece and Rome. (Michael Hudson, And Forgive Them Their Debts, p. 44) With the decline of Rome it was gradually lost until revived again in the Middle Ages. Its last great English expression, preserving the medieval legacy, is in Richard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity in the sixteenth century.

Good regulation of the economy comes under jurisprudence, ensuring that self-interests do not override the common good. Good laws here would not need to be plentiful, and where they were abided by government would operate with a light touch. It would not need to redistribute wealth. Such intervention is necessary only where injustice prevails, or where bad laws are made. And where laws protect the interests of the few, then poverty arises and eventually environmental harm inevitably occurs. Only a virtuous society can be truly prosperous and live in harmony with the land and with Nature as a whole. Good laws encourage virtue. And where people are generally virtuous they have good conventions. Good conventions hold community together in everyday affairs. These are conditions conducive of advantageous cooperation. Such cooperation leads to liberty.

My point in all this is that if there is social injustice, there will be economic injustice, and if there is economic injustice there will be violation of nature and abuse of the land. Society is part of the biosphere. The Land Ethic of Aldo Leopold shows us that we cannot divorce society from nature, and that if we do – and as we currently do – our society itself will be unjust, and the economy will be reduced to mutual exploitation rather than mutual cooperation. Let me draw to a close with another quotation from Aldo Leopold:

  • It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than the mere economic value: I mean value in the philosophical sense.
  • Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our educational and economic system is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of land. Your true modern man is separated from the land by many middlemen, and by innumerable physical gadgets. He has no vital relation to it: to him it is the space between cities on which crops grow. (p. 223-4)

 

Natural Law Quotations

A Collection from the Classical Tradition

The welfare of the people is the ultimate law (Cicero)

Aristotle

Now it appears to be an impossible thing that the state which is governed not by the best citizens but by the worst should be well-governed, and equally impossible that the state which is ill-governed should be governed by the best. But we must remember that good laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good government. Hence there are two parts of good government; one is the actual obedience of citizens to the laws, the other part is the goodness of the laws which they obey; they may obey bad laws as well as good. And there may be a further subdivision; they may obey either the best laws which are attainable to them, or the best absolutely. (Aristotle Politics 1294a 3-8)

Now he who exercises his reason and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which was best and most akin to them (i.e., reason) and that they should reward those who love and honour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the philosopher is manifest. He, therefore, is the dearest to the gods. And he who is that will presumably be also the happiest; so that in this way too the philosopher will more than any other be happy. (Nicomachean Ethics X 8 29)

He that acts by intelligence and cultivates understanding, is likely to be best disposed and dearest to God. For if, as is thought, there is any care of human things on the part of the heavenly powers, we may reasonably expect them to delight in that which is best and most akin to themselves, that is, in intelligence, and to make a return of good to such as supremely love and honour intelligence, as cultivating the thing dearest to Heaven, and so behaving rightly and well. Such. plainly, is the behaviour of the wise. The wise man therefore is the dearest to God. (Aristotle)

 

Plato

For in everything that grows the initial sprouting, if nobly directed, has a sovereign influence in bringing about the perfection in virtue that befits the thing’s own nature. This holds for the other growing things, and for animals-tame, wild, and human. The human being, we assert, is tame; nevertheless, though when it happens (766a) upon a correct education and lucky nature, it is wont to become the most divine and tamest animal, still, when its upbringing is inadequate or ignoble, it is the most savage of the things that the earth makes grow. This is why the lawgiver must not allow the upbringing of children to become something secondary or incidental, and since the one who is going to supervise them should begin by being chosen in a fine way, the lawgiver should do all he possibly can to insure that he provides them with a supervisor to direct them who is the best person in the city, in every respect. (Laws 765-766)

 

Cicero

“There exists one true law, one right reason – comfortable to nature, universal, immutable, eternal – whose commands enjoin virtue, and whose prohibitions banish evil. Whatever she orders, whatever she forbids, her words are neither impotent among good men, nor are they potent among the wicked. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law properly so called, nor be violated in any part, nor be abrogated altogether. Neither the senate nor the people can deliver from obedience to this law. She has no need of interpreters, or new instruments. She is not one thing at Rome, another at Athens – she is not one thing today, and another tomorrow; but in all nations, and in all times, this law must reign always self-consistent, immortal, and imperishable. The Sovereign of the Universe, the King of all creatures, God himself, has given birth, sanction, and publicity to this illimitable law, which man cannot transgress without being a fugitive from himself and rebelling against his own nature; and by this alone, without subjecting himself to the severest expiations, can always avoid the usual misfortunes of the present life.” (Cicero, Republic, Book 3)

“Now if nature hath given us law, she has also given us justice – for as she has bestowed reason on all, she has equally bestowed the sense of justice on all. And therefore did Socrates deservedly execrate the man who first drew a distinction between the law of nature and the law of morals, for he justly conceived that this error is the source of most human vices.

Law (lex) is the highest reason implanted in nature, which commands what is to be done and forbids the opposite. When this same reason has been strengthened and brought to completion in the human mind, it is law (lex), and so they suppose that law is intelligence whose force (vis) it is to command right action and forbid wrongdoing … It is a force of nature; it is the mind and reason of the wise man; it is the rule (regula) for justice and injustice. (Cicero Leg. 1.18-19)

[27] The person who is accustomed neither to think nor to name as ”goods” lands and buildings and cattle and huge weights of silver and gold, because the enjoyment of them seems to him slight, the use minimal, and the ownership uncertain, and because the vilest men often have unlimited possessions – how fortunate should we think such a man! He alone can truly claim all things as his own, not under the law of the Roman people but under the law of the philosophers; not by civil ownership but by the common law of nature, which forbids anything to belong to anyone except someone who knows how to employ and use it. (Cicero. On the Commonwealth, Book 1, 27 trans. James E G Zetzel (CUP)

There is nothing so consonant with the justice and structure of nature – and when I say that, I want you to understand that I am speaking of the law – as the power of command, without which no home or state or nation or the whole race of mankind can survive, nor can nature or the world itself. The world obeys god, and land and sea obey the world, and human life follows the commands of the supreme law. And to come to things closer and more familiar to us: all early peoples once obeyed kings. This type of power was first offered to the most just and wise men (and that was true of our own commonwealth, so long as monarchic power was in charge), and then it was handed on in turn to their descendants, a custom which remains true among contemporary monarchies. (Cicero Laws iii. 3-4 trans. James E G Zetzel (CUP)

The better and more noble, therefore, the character with which a man is endowed, the more does he prefer the life of service to the life of pleasure. Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to nature, cannot do harm to his fellow-man. (On Duties Book III: 25. Gutenberg version)

And further, if nature ordains that one man shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And if this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of nature; and if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by nature’s law to wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the conclusion is likewise true. On Duties Book II: 27)

But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles of fellowship and society that nature has established among men. The first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human race; and [55] that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may have courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that they have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with reason or speech. (On Duties Book 1: 50-51)

 

Clement of Alexandria

Again, God has created us naturally social and just; whence justice must not be said to take its rise from implantation alone. But the good imparted by creation is to be conceived of as excited by the commandment; the soul being trained to be willing to select what is noblest.

We now therefore understand that we are instructed in piety, and in liberality, and in justice, and in humanity by the law. For does it not command the land to be left fallow in the seventh year, and bids the poor fearlessly use the fruits that grow by divine agency, nature cultivating the ground for behoof of all and sundry? How, then, can it be maintained that the law is not humane, and the teacher of righteousness?

And now the wisdom which we possess announces the four virtues in such a way as to show that the sources of them were communicated by the Hebrews to the Greeks. This may be learned from the following: “And if one loves justice, its toils are virtues. For temperance and prudence teach justice and fortitude; and than these there is nothing more useful in life to men.”

Above all, this ought to be known, that by nature we are adapted for virtue; not so as to be possessed of it from our birth, but so as to be adapted for acquiring it. ( Stromata Quotations)

 

Origen

Now there are two kinds of law for our consideration. The one is the ultimate law of nature, which is probably derived from God, and the other the written code of cities. Where the written law does not contradict the law of God it is good that the citizens should not be troubled by the introduction of strange laws. But where the law of nature, that is of God, enjoins precepts contradictory to the written laws, consider whether reason does not compel a man to dismiss the written code and the intention of the lawgivers far from his mind, and to devote himself to the divine Lawgiver and to choose to live according to His word, even if in doing this he must endure dangers and countless troubles and deaths and shame. Moreover, if the actions which please God are different from those demanded by some of the laws in cities, and if it is impossible to please both God and those who enforce laws of this kind, it is unreasonable to despise actions by means of which one may find favour with the Creator of the universe, and to choose those as a result of which one would be displeasing to God, though one may find favour with the laws that are not laws, and with those who like them. (Contra Celsum Book V Chapter 37)

 

Tertullian

These testimonies of the soul are as true as they are straightforward, as straightforward as they are widespread, as widespread as they are universal, as universal as they are natural, and as natural as they are divine. I do not believe anyone would find it frivolous, if he reflects on the majesty of nature (naturae maiestatem), which is regarded as the wellspring of the soul. As much as you attribute to the teacher, so much you will concede to the pupil. The teacher is nature and the pupil is the soul (Magistra natura, anima discipula). Whatever the teacher has conveyed or the pupil has learned has been communicated by God, who is the teacher of nature. Whatever the soul can surmise about its original teacher, this power resides in you that you may reflect upon that which is in you. Be aware of that which has given you awareness. (Quoted in Quincy Howe, Tertullian of Africa: The Rhetoric of a New Age. iUnivere, Bloomington, 2011)

 

Thomas Aquinas

I answer that: It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man’s work is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as “right.” Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.

Reply to Objection 1. It is usual for words to be distorted from their original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word “medicine” was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is done. On like manner the word “jus” [right] was first of all used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to appear “in jure” [In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the office of exercising justice, administers the jus even if his sentence be unjust. (ST II-II: 57)

I answer that: As stated above (I-II:90:1 ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (Article 1); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm 4:6): “Offer up the sacrifice of justice,” as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: “Many say, Who showeth us good things?” in answer to which question he says: “The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”: thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law. (ST II-II. q. 91)

 

Bacon
The second part of metaphysics, is the inquiry of final causes, which we note not as wanting, but as ill-placed; these causes being usually sought in physics, not in metaphysics, to the great prejudice of philosophy; for the treating of final causes in physics has driven out the inquiry of physical ones, and made men rest in specious and shadowy causes, without ever searching in earnest after such as are real and truly physical. And this was not only done by Plato, who constantly anchors upon this shore; but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, who frequently introduce such causes as these: “The hairs of the eyelids are for a fence to the sight.26 The bones for pillars whereon to build the bodies of animals. The leaves of trees are to defend the fruit from the sun and wind. The clouds are designed for watering the earth,” etc. All which are properly alleged in metaphysics; but in physics are impertinent, and as remoras to the ship, that hinder the sciences from holding on their course of improvement, and introducing a neglect of searching after physical causes. And therefore the natural philosophies of Democritus and others, who allow no God or mind in the frame of things, but attribute the structure of the universe to infinite essays and trials of nature, or what they call fate or fortune, and assigned the causes of particular things to the necessity of matter without [166] any intermixture of final causes, seem, so far as we can judge from the remains of their philosophy, much more solid, and to have gone deeper into nature, with regard to physical causes, than the philosophy of Aristotle or Plato; and this only because they never meddled with final causes, which the others were perpetually inculcating. Though in this respect Aristotle is more culpable than Plato, as banishing God,27 the fountain of final causes, and substituting [167] nature in his stead; and, at the same time, receiving final causes through his affection to logic, not theology. (Bacon Advancement of Learning, Book II, Chapter IV)

 

The Heavenly Order and the Lawful Society

Joseph Milne

  • Just as the primary purpose of human law is to cause friendship between men, so the purpose of the divine law is to establish friendship between men and God. Thomas Aquinas
  • Nothing is due to anyone except in virtue of something that has been given to him gratuitously by God. Thomas Aquinas

 

We find in all ancient cultures an understanding of a heavenly order that holds all things in their proper place and guides them to their proper ends. The earth and the heavens are bound together, with man dwelling in the earth and under the heavens. Thus man is seen as part of a greater whole, a participant within a cosmic order he is called upon to contemplate. Through this contemplation arises insight into the way of life proper to man, into the nature of society and into the laws and customs that enable society to flourish within the wider order of the earth and the heavens.

From this understanding of a heavenly order arise religious veneration, poetry, architecture and the crafts, agriculture, philosophy and jurisprudence. These are all rooted in the understanding of the heavenly order, and so the heavenly order is woven into that natural life of society.

This ancient view is grounded in an understanding that the universe is supremely intelligent. For example Cicero writes in The Nature of the Gods:

  • Now we see that in parts of the universe (for there is nothing in the entire universe which is not a part of the whole), sensation and reason exist. These qualities must therefore exist, and exist more vividly and to a greater extent, in that part in which the ruling principle of the universe resides. Consequently the universe must be intelligent, and the element which holds all things in its embrace must excel in perfection of reason; the universe, therefore, must be divine, and so must the element by which the whole strength of the universe is held together. (The Nature of the Gods, Book 2, XI)[1]

Following Plato and the Stoics, Cicero goes further and says that the universe is also virtuous:

  • As there is nothing more perfect than the universe, and nothing more excellent than virtue, it follows that virtue is an attribute of the universe. Human nature is not indeed perfect, yet virtue is attained in man, so how much more easily in the universe! Virtue, then, does exist in the universe, which is therefore wise, and consequently divine. (The Nature of the Gods, Book 2, XIV)

Is this so different from what the Psalmist says in Psalm 8? ‘O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! who hast set thy glory above the heavens,’? In The Third Ennead Plotinus personifies the cosmos speaking of its own nature in this way:

  • I am made by a God: from that God I came perfect above all forms of life, adequate to my function, self-sufficing, lacking nothing: for I am the container of all, that is, of every plant and every animal, of all the Kinds of created things, and many Gods and nations of Spirit-Beings and lofty souls and men happy in their goodness.
  • And do not think that, while earth is ornate with all its growths and with living things of every race, and while the very sea has answered to the power of Soul, do not think that the great air and the ether and the far-spread heavens remain void of it: there it is that all good Souls dwell, infusing life into the stars and into that orderly eternal circuit of the heavens which in its conscious movement ever about the one Centre, seeking nothing beyond, is a faithful copy of the divine Mind. And all that is within me strives towards the Good; and each, to the measure of its faculty, attains. For from that Good all the heavens depend, with all my own Soul and the Gods that dwell in my every part, and all that lives and grows, and even all in me that you may judge inanimate. (Plotinus The Third Ennead).[2]

We could cite many examples from other ancient cultures and traditions that express in different ways this vision of the cosmos as divinely ordered or as manifesting the divine mystery beyond itself, or as infused with providential intelligence, and ordered toward the divine and the good. Eliade, for example in his famous study The Sacred and the Profane, traces a history through religious symbols of how man naturally lives in a sacred cosmos. He writes:

  • Every world is the work of the gods, for it was either created directly by the gods or was consecrated, hence cosmicized, by men ritually reactualizing the paradigmatic act of Creation. This is a s much as to say that religious man can live only in a sacred world, because it is only in such a world that he participates in being, that he has real existence. This religious need expresses an unquenchable ontological thirst. Religious man thirsts for being. (The Sacred and the Profane p. 64)[3]

This consecrated world, this world made cosmos, Eliade contrasts with the ‘profane’ world which has no order and exists in mere empty space where no place has meaning or offers a home for man. The profane world, which is equivalent to the modern ‘secular world’, is a world without purpose or direction, of homogenous space and time as two dimensions of emptiness where all objects and beings exist indifferently and arbitrarily. The secular or profane world is where man must strive to render meaning to things that have no meaning in themselves, or a moral order where no natural good belongs to anything in itself, or a rational order where things have no reason or intelligence in themselves.  Thus Eliade says, the world becomes apprehensible as world, as cosmos, in the measure in which it reveals itself as a sacred world. (p. 64)

This is a remarkable assertion of Eliade. Since it is the sacred that gives order to the world, order will be seen only insofar as the sacred is perceived. Such perception Eliade calls ‘religious perception’. It is not a theory about things, but a way of abiding with things. As Cicero says, the universe must be divine and ordered by a divine intelligence. Once this is grasped, then the question of how man ought to live may be raised. It is only when the human race is seen as part of the whole universe that the real nature of society can be explored and reflected upon. This is because the question of the nature of society is part of the wider question of the truth of all things, and because the right order of society is accomplished when man lives in harmony with Nature as a whole. It is from this perspective that the questions of ethics and law arise. Thus we find in Plato and Aristotle that the question of the truth of things and the question of virtue arise together, since to seek the truth of things is also to seek the good. Really the love of truth and the love of the good cannot be separated, and if they are they both give birth to distortions. For the Greek philosophers the beautiful may be added to the true and the good. Thus if we reflect on human culture widely we can see that the true, the good and the beautiful are the real ground of scholarship, of the arts or the crafts, and the law.

From that perspective we can begin to see that all scholarship is ordered towards finding and articulating the sacred order of things. Likewise all the crafts which support human life, beginning obviously with agriculture, are ordered toward living in accord with the life of Nature, of nurturing the earth. And again with the creative arts of the imagination, which study and bring to visibility the underlying order and beauty that infuses all things, or which act as a mirror to the interior order of nature. That the study of law and ethics might also belong the study of the sacred order is perhaps the most difficult for our secular age to grasp. We have become so used to the understanding of law in terms of positive law, of mere legal obligation, and as historically conditional, or as the arbitrary dictates of governments, that its roots in the sacred are greatly obscured. Even the divine law in the great religions has now generally been reduced to mere rules and obligations, or moral platitudes, what in theology is known as the decline into juridicalism.

Yet for the ancients the study of law was the study of the relation of the sacred to reason. The sacred order addresses all parts of human nature – the physical, the rational and the spiritual. It is when these realms of our being become separated or isolated from one another that the study of law becomes confused. To quote Cicero again, he says:

  • Now if nature hath given us law, she hath also given us justice,—for as she has bestowed reason on all, she has equally bestowed the sense of justice on all. And therefore did Socrates deservedly execrate the man who first drew a distinction between the law of nature and the law of morals, for he justly conceived that this error is the source of most human vices. (Cicero, Treatise on The Laws, Book I)[4]

For the classical Greek and Roman thinkers the perception of the order of Nature is always connected with the perception of justice. Indeed, one of the meanings of the Greek word kosmos is ‘justice’, and so the enquiry into the natural order of things is at once the enquiry into the ethical order of Nature. With Plato and Aristotle the enquiry into the order of Nature leads inevitably to enquiry into human nature and the into the nature of the polis or the state, the proper study of politics.

It is interesting that justice is at once given by nature and is a human virtue. That is to say, the law of Nature is the natural law of all things, while the human virtue of justice is the knowledge of right action in accordance with the truth of nature. Thus everyone has the sense of justice, the sense that there is a proper way of life in harmony with the cosmos or universal justice. Cicero sums this up very beautifully by quoting the Stoics as collected in Diogenes’s Lives of Eminent Philosophers:

  • For our individual natures are parts of the whole cosmos. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or in other words, according to our own human nature as well as that of the cosmos, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. (Lives, 7. 87-88)

Here we notice not only ‘the law common to all things’ but also ‘the right reason that pervades all things’ which is ‘identical with Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is’. The reason that pervades all things is the cosmic dimension of the reason the belongs to human nature. This view of reason is not the modern view, which restricts reason to representative conceptions of things. The ancient view of reason is that of the intelligence that pervades all things, and that human reason may participate in this universal reason. Thus the knowledge of things comes about through the mind being receptive to the nature that belongs to all things. The human mind receives the forms of things, and it is this receptivity that is unique to the human race. From this receptivity is born the capacity to reflect on the truth of things. From this reflection is born the philosopher and the contemplative life of the monk.

It is on the basis of this reflective capacity that Aristotle in his Politics, for example, understands the meaning of citizenship. The citizen is one who has the ‘foresight’ necessary to make laws aimed at the common good. Thus the art of lawmaking originates in the capacity to see the ‘law common to all things’ and to judge the consequences of lawmaking. Plato likens this capacity to that of the physician knowing the effects of prescribing medicines. It is a very apt analogy, for while the physician cares for the health of the body, the lawmaker cares for the health of the city or the state. Both are grounded in the knowledge that ‘health’ is the natural condition. The natural health of the body lies in right diet and exercise, while the natural health of the city lies in right reason and the practice of virtue. Thus for Plato the whole object of lawmaking is to establish virtue, since only the virtuous society can live in peace and friendship. Strictly speaking, only the virtuous society is actually a community of citizens. So the person who seeks only their own advantage in a society is not really a citizen.

It is worth noting that our modern notion of the industrial society, in which each seeks a share in the material exploitation of Nature, would not be regarded as a society at all by Plato or Aristotle, but a form of political degeneration. Or, to put that more gently, it would be regarded as a kind of social order, but not citizenship. A genuine society actively seeks the common good through reflection and virtue, just as the physician seeks health through proper exercise and diet.

Yet it is also clear that for the ancient philosophers the virtuous society must be rooted in the sacred. We recall what Eliade said: “the world becomes apprehensible as world, as cosmos, in the measure in which it reveals itself as a sacred world”. This is true for all the great religious and philosophical traditions. Thomas Traherne speaks of this in his beautiful Centuries of Meditations:

  • You never enjoy the world aright, till you see how a sand exhibiteth the wisdom and power of God: And prize in everything the service which they do you, by manifesting His glory and goodness to your Soul, far more than the visible beauty on their surface, or the material services they can do your body. Wine by its moisture quencheth my thirst, whether I consider it or no: but to see it flowing from His love who gave it unto man, quencheth the thirst even of the Holy Angels. To consider it, is to drink it spiritually. To rejoice in its diffusion is to be of a public mind. And to take pleasure in all the benefits it doth to all is Heavenly, for so they do in Heaven. To do so, is to be divine and good, and to imitate our Infinite and Eternal Father. (Centuries of Meditations, First Century)

Traherne presents here a remarkable correspondence between the ‘mystical’ perception of nature and true citizenship. To see the wine that quenches the thirst as flowing from God’s love is to ‘drink spiritually’ and to ‘rejoice in its diffusion is to be of a public mind’. And ‘to take pleasure in all the benefits it doth to all is Heavenly, for so they do in Heaven’. This heavenly pleasure is the happiness that comes with virtue and ‘is to be divine and good’. For Traherne the mystical vision is not in any way a private experience. It is to participate in the universal good, or the heavenly order, that manifests in all things when they are seen as they truly are in the mind of God.

This understanding of citizenship wholly transcends the prevailing secular notion of society in which each seeks their own good out of self-interest. A society is not yet a society if each member does not seek the common good. As Thomas Aquinas puts it ‘Man cannot possibly be good unless he stands in the right relation to the common good’. The only way in which this may be practically established is through each citizen understanding their work as a contribution to the common good. Josef Pieper asks about the nature of distributive justice and of the meaning of the ancient definition of justice: to render to each their due. He says:

  • It means: to make sure that the individual members of the population are given the opportunity to add their contribution to the realization of the common good (bonum commune) that is neither specifically nor comprehensively defined. This participation according to each person’s dignitas or capacity and ability—this is precisely each person’s rightful “due”.[5]

He suggests that there is no need to define the ideal society in detail since the common good emerges spontaneously from the free association of citizens in the realization of their natural talents and vocations. In other words, given the foundation of law and justice in the natural citizenship of man, the common good emerges spontaneously as the proper end or flowering of society or the state. This natural flowering of society or the state is at once in accord with human nature and with the whole of Nature.

In the different ways that Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, or Traherne approach the question of law one thing is common to them all: the understanding of man as a participant in the greater whole and the greater good. Man is called beyond himself in order to be himself. Man is lost if he does not find his home in the unfolding meaning of the cosmos, as Eliade brings to light so clearly.

This understanding of man as participant in the greater order of things is the key to the ancient approach to education. In Plato’s Republic, and more specifically in his Laws, the concern for the cultivation of the virtues through gymnastics and music is in order to bring about the individuals’ capacity to respond wisely and courageously to the trials of life and to serve the common good. All the true benefits of society arise through virtue and may be enjoyed only by the virtuous – friendship, honour, trust, peace, constancy, wisdom. For Plato the poor man is one without these things, and without these things the individual capacities or talents are stifled.

This understanding of education may be traced right through the Middle Ages. The aim was to integrate the individual into greater and greater spheres of society, so that the functions engaged wider and wider scope and responsibility. This ideal of education is what Paul Tillich calls ‘inductive’. It aims to induct children into the family, with its traditions and symbols, and gradually into ‘the group, the life and spirit of the community’, the ‘tribe, town, nation, church’. (Tillich Theology of Culture, p. 147). One can see how this extends to the transmission of a people’s history, in honouring the ancestors, and in laying down the foundations of the future.

This has even deeper significance in Christian monasticism, where the individual becomes part of the community of prayer and contemplation, and ultimately of mystical union with God. This was precisely the purpose of the study of Scripture and scholastic learning in the Middle Ages. Nature, mathematics, grammar, music and so on are studied in order to refine the soul so that it can participate in the essence of all created things, and so come to know them in the mind of God as God knows them. Once one sees how the medieval scholars were concerned to ascend to God through meditation on the created order, and thus to experience the cosmos spiritually, the differences between what they regarded as the knowledge of things and our modern secular or materialistic notion of knowledge becomes perfectly explicable. For example in his Journey of the Mind into God Bonaventure says:

  • We may behold God in the mirror of visible creation, not only by considering creatures as vestiges of God, but also by seeing Him in them; for He is present in them by His essence, His power, and His presence. And because this is a higher way of considering than the preceding one, it follows as the second level of contemplation, on which we ought to be led to the contemplation of God in every creature that enters our mind through the bodily senses. (Journey of the Mind into God Chapter 2)[6]

For Bonaventure, as for the great Maximus the Confessor before him, the creation, or Nature, in a special way manifests God. Contrary to the widespread view that regards the medieval Christians as ‘world-negating’, for the medieval scholar or mystic the cosmos makes the invisible visible. Nature is theophanic. In seeing God through Nature the mystic sanctifies the world and returns it to its true meaning in the Creator. Aquinas puts this in a more philosophical way, saying, ‘All things, in so far as they have being, are like to God, who is being in the first and highest manner’ (Summa contra Gentiles I, 80). And elsewhere he says:

  • All creatures participate in the divine goodness, with the result that they pour forth to others the goodness that they themselves possess. For it belongs to the nature of goodness to communicate itself to others (Summa Theologica I, 106, 4).

In these Christian mystics we see how the cosmos has its order from participating in its divine origin, and thus how each created thing, by virtue of the goodness of its origin, goes out of itself for the good of all others. In this sense the cosmos strives to be like God. We might call this the first law of nature. In a similar way the human mind naturally goes out of itself embracing all things. The virtue of the human soul, paradoxically, lies in its receptivity to God’s creativity. Thus Aquinas, taking the insight of Aristotle further, sees the human soul as ‘potentially all things’. This receptivity of the soul, however, is as much for the sake of the things as it is for the soul itself. Through receiving the truth of things the soul sanctifies them, or grants to them their true dignity as divine manifestations, and through this granting the soul attains its own true dignity and proper end, which is the contemplation of truth.

From all that we have said it is clear that the ancient philosophers and the medieval scholastics understood that there was a relationship between the laws of nature and divine law. Yet these two orders of law are not identical. The law of nature is observed through reason and justice, while the divine law is known through grace. From these two orders of law human law is derived. By human law is meant the codes of law communities or nations make for themselves. These are distinct orders of law, even though ultimately they serve the final end of law, which is the common good or perfection of all things. Aquinas, drawing upon the philosophical tradition, medieval jurisprudence and divine revelation sums up the ends of the two orders of law this way:

  • Just as the primary purpose of human law is to cause friendship between men, so the purpose of the divine law is to establish friendship between men and God. (Summa Theologica I-II, 90).

I think it is very important to observe here that law is not rules or commands that a society ought to submit to in order to avert chaos or curb selfishness – the Hobbesian idea of law – but rather law exists to bring about friendship. Its aim is to foster amity between citizens, since only through amity can the real potential of society be realised – that is to say, only through mutual goodness can a society actually become a society in reality and not only in name. Plato says the same in his Laws. In enquiring into how legislators should go about their task he says:

  • They should have considered something like the following: that a city should be free and prudent and a friend to itself, and that the lawgiver should give his laws with a view to these things.
  • By the way, let’s not be surprised to find that we have often before laid down goals which we’ve asserted the lawgiver should look to when he lays down his laws, but the goals don’t appear to be the same for us each time. One should reason as follows: when we asserted one should look toward moderation, or toward prudence, or friendship, these goals are not different but the same. (Laws 693b)[7]

For Plato the virtues and friendship cannot be separated, and so when law aims to make citizens moderate or prudent or peaceful or harmonious or good, these all amount to the same thing. Friendship is the natural relation of good citizens, and therefore the condition for the flourishing of the proper human life.

This concern for the true end of law is a most important thing, and Plato returns to it again and again in the Laws. Where the proper end of law is overlooked or neglected, it not only degenerates, it becomes tyrannous. The same insight is to be found in the Bible. This is what Jesus accuses the Scribe and Pharisees of doing when he says “Man was not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man”. Where law is made into bondage it is no longer law, but the opposite of law. This holds for both human law and divine law. When spiritual law becomes oppressive it is no longer spiritual law.

It is at this point that we come to the most challenging aspect of the study of law and human society. Although the divine law and the natural law spring from the natural order and telos of all things, causing each to seek its natural end within the universe as a whole, for man this is possible only through reflection and understanding. That is to say, while for the realm of nature and for living creatures generally the law acts spontaneously through them, so that all follow the law of their own being, for man this does not happen spontaneously. Man, or society, may attain their natural end only through reflecting on the truth of things and bringing that knowledge to articulation through culture – through the arts, religion and the institutions of society. This is because the natural goal of the human person is the contemplation of truth, and action born out of that contemplation. This, we might say, is the burden of man being the thinking being – his life will not go well if lived thoughtlessly. Yet, if man would be free, then he takes on the burden of responsibility for his thoughts and actions. The question of freedom lies at the heart of Plato’s concern for the way to establish a just and peaceful society. Freedom is possible only through wisdom or prudence, which is knowledge of the true and the good at once. Such wisdom comes about only through the exercise of intelligence and justice, just as bodily strength comes about only through physical discipline. Remarking on this Aquinas says:

  • God moves all things in their own manner. Hence some things participate in the divine movement in a necessary way, but the rational creature is moved freely. (Questiones quodlibetales I, ad 2)

In the realm of livings things, each moves by necessity according to its nature, the nature created by God. But for rational creatures, that is the human race, the intelligence is free to move or not to move, even though its natural end is the apprehension of truth. Again, Aquinas draws this distinction between man and the other creatures clearly:

  • God’ providence cares for all things in their own manner. . . .  Voluntary action, and mastery over that action, are peculiar to man and to spiritual creatures. To this compulsion is opposed. Hence God does not compel man to act rightly. (Summa contra Gentiles 3, 148)

Thus human freedom may be experienced either as a gift or a burden. This is a theme we often find in the novels of Dostoyevsky. The most famous example is in The Brothers Karamazov where Ivan says to the Christ that the people want bread, not freedom.

The question of the nature of natural and divine law is difficult because for man it arises with the question of the nature of freedom, and the question of the nature of freedom arises with the question of responsibility. Because man is free to act according to his own decisions, he is therefore responsible for his actions, and this means he falls under the lawful consequences of his actions. It is for this reason that Aristotle says lawmaking involves foresight, a capacity only of rational creatures.

Man’s freedom lies in the capacity to reflect and act according to the nature of things. In this way ‘right action’ is a free and skilful conformation to truth. Freedom arises only through knowledge. This is not so strange. The farmer sows according to the season and gains a delicate sense of nature’s ways. It is the same in developing any skill. It comes only with intelligent observation and practice. Seen in this way the mechanisation of industry and farming, which came with the Industrial Revolution, removes man from his natural place in nature and takes away the freedom of his intelligence. It places man under lower laws and diminishes the opportunity to live the contemplative life. Man becomes there mere sentinel of the machine.

Unlike other beings, man is not compelled to fulfil his natural vocation, yet he is drawn towards it by the attraction of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. That is how the classical philosophers saw it. Thus he stands at the threshold of his natural habitation, but must take the step over that threshold by himself. This is what Eliade means by the sacred, where man discovers his natural home in the sacred order of nature. In the Christian tradition this step is into the realm of Grace – which means to see how Nature is infused by Grace. That is where the law begins, and it descends through grace to the natural realm as justice. Justice is Grace given form. In essence it is mercy, as Shakespeare shows us.

At the beginning I said that from an understanding of the heavenly order comes not only the knowledge of the nature of society, but of religion and all the arts. In her essay The Underlying Order: Nature and the Imagination, Kathleen Raine writes:

  • It is the part of the poet to present to us that total view and experience of reality which includes all aspects of our humanity in the context of every age. Or that situates every age, rather, in the context of the everlasting. (The Underlying Order and other Essays p. 51)[8]

Her phrase ‘in the context of the everlasting’ sums up the way in which man is called to see himself and the world. It is a glimpse of the ‘everlasting’ that truly defines poetry, and all the arts, and what Kathleen Raine and Blake call the Imagination. But the arts also embody the human response to the everlasting, and in this sense they are the natural fruit of man’s contemplation of the truth of things.

Plato asks, what is the knowledge that is key to all other kinds of knowledge? In reply he points to an art that contemplates the unity that enfolds all things, and from which all branches of knowledge spring. What becomes visible from this unity may be the eternal numbers that give form and beauty to nature, or to architecture or music or the motions of the heavens. The artist unites the temporal materials of his craft with the eternal numbers of the heavens. This work is what Eliade called ‘consecrating’ the world, re-establishing it in its heavenly origin. Or it is what Aquinas calls returning creatures to God through human knowledge. Such work is the work proper to man. It is the natural human vocation, and it is the only work that truly inspires and which brings delight and nourishment to society as a whole.

 

[1] Translated by Francis Brooks (London: Methuen, 1896)

[2] Plotinus The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna (Faber, 1969)

[3] Mircea Eliade The Sacred and the Profane (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969)

[4] Cicero Treatise on The Laws, translated by Francis Barham (London: Edmund Spettigue, 1841)

[5] Josef Pieper, An Anthology, (Ignatius Press, 1989)

[6] Bonaventure, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, translated by Philotheus Boehner (Franciscan Institute, 1956)

[7] Plato, The Laws of Plato translated by Thomas Pangle (Basic Books, 1980)

[8] Kathleen Raine The Underlying Order and other Essays (Temenos Academy, 2008)

Medieval Mystical Allegory

Joseph Milne

 

  • Abstract
    An exploration of Patristic and Medieval allegorical hermeneutics, drawing a distinction between a revelatory approach to the created order, where created things are understood as disclosing God, and the veiling approach to the created order, where created things are seen as concealing God. Although these two approaches appear to contradict one another, it is argued that both are mystically legitimate, and that work needs to be done to recover the allegorical reading of Scripture.

***

In his sermons Meister Eckhart calls us time and again to abandon all images, all conceptions, and withdraw entirely from all created things and abide in ‘nothing’ where alone God may enter the soul. The allegorical tradition, on the other hand, calls us to observe and marvel at the infinite wonders of the Creation, and to contemplate the inexhaustible multiplicity of meanings in the Scriptures. At first glance these two approaches, both deeply rooted in the early Church and sustained throughout the Middle Ages, appear wholly opposite and contrary to one another.

At the heart of the difference between them lie two different stances towards whatever is manifest, whether in Creation or in Scripture, and how the manifest is to be received. On the one side, all that is manifest veils or conceals the divine mystery, or the ineffable, that lies beyond all that is visible or can be manifest. Here the manifest ‘hides’ the unmanifest. On the other side, all that is manifest reveals or discloses the divine mystery, so that the infinite brightly shines in everything finite. Here the manifest is ‘theophanic’. In this second sense, the Creation, like Scripture, is ‘revelatory’, not merely by analogy or likeness, but in divine presence. The world is God’s wisdom disclosed in its infinite fullness, presenting to the human soul divine nourishment and a way home to God. It is the ‘glory’ of God, as spoken of in the Psalms and the Lord’s Prayer.[1]

Having stated their obvious opposition, may these two stances be reconciled? Or may one be subsumed into the other? For a number of reasons I believe we must hesitate from any reconciliation. One reason is that either approach involves its own spiritual disposition towards truth. For example, one is predominantly intellectual, and the other predominantly devotional – one seeks the transcendent truth of God, the other the manifest wisdom, glory and love of God. Eckhart, for example, invokes detachment and points the soul to participate in God’s own self-knowledge, wholly beyond all created things. St Bernard, on the other hand, teaches that all forms of love, including carnal love and self-love, are grounded or rooted in the love of God, and that love as such is ultimately nothing else than the love of God. The ‘metaphysical’ way and the ‘affective’ way, as we might distinguish them, each incline to God in completely distinct ways. And this is not the same as the distinction between the ‘apophatic’ and ‘kataphatic’ ways, since both culminate in mystical union.

Another reason for hesitating in reconciling them – and in a way the more important reason – is that our age has in general lost the allegorical way of seeing and of knowing. So when we read of the medieval scheme of four senses of Scripture it does not resonate with our culture and seems to be an arbitrary way of forcing words to signify things they cannot signify. It has been argued that the allegorical way of reading Scripture was motivated by a wish to overcome its crude or base meanings, or else to reconcile it with empirical branches of knowledge. At the same time there has always been a struggle between those who see Scripture as having many senses, and those who hold they must have only a single sense that all Christians can agree on.

But also, even within the allegorical tradition itself, there have been struggles between those who follow the tradition of allegorical reading and those who invent new senses – between those who ‘see’ the various meanings, and those who through pride of intellect wish to be originators of some subtle new meaning.

The allegorical tradition of ‘unveiling’ is no more straightforward than the metaphysical tradition of ‘transcending’ that runs alongside it. Nevertheless, until the thirteenth century, and within the monastic life, the allegorical reading of Scripture and of Creation was the principle approach to their study. The created world teemed with meaning. Every creature signified something sacred. Indeed, the world itself is seen as sacred, for it is God’s work. This is the ‘religious’ way of knowing the world in the Middle Ages. But this approach to Scripture, as Henri de Lubac observes, is gradually replaced by dialectical ‘questions’ addressed to Scripture, and by ‘summas’ gathering theology into systems. This movement began as early as the mid twelfth century with works such as The Sentences of Peter Lombard.[2]

The shift towards dialectical questions produced its own great riches – in Thomas Aquinas for example. With the discovery of the works of Aristotle, this also involved a shift towards ‘metaphysics’, or the attempt to reconcile revelation with philosophy or metaphysics. This manner of thinking gives no fertile ground for allegorical reading of Creation or Scripture. The four senses of Scripture tend to be merely repeated as formulas and meanings rattled off superficially. Beneath this, however, one senses a shift in the very idea of the meaning of allegory itself. Instead of it being a disclosure of a deeper meaning than the outer appearance, allegory is now conceived as a sign standing for something else. This is evident, for example, in the rise of the secular romances, such as the Romance of the Rose in about 1230. Although presented as a spiritual journey of love, in courtly fashion, the allegorical sense is not conveyed through literal things, but rather literal things are presented as standing for other things, especially psychological states of the lover and beloved. Natural phenomena is likewise presented as representing or signifying other things. In short, allegory has gradually transformed or declined into simile. There is no longer any real connection between ‘things’ and their innate meaning. Rather, meanings are attributed to things merely by convention.

This new tradition of allegory, rich and beautiful as it is, indicates a break with the ancient tradition which did not see allegory as ‘one thing standing for another’ but rather as the ‘inner sense’ embodied in and revealed through the visible sense. Or, to use the expression of Dionysius, the visible was a ‘veil’ through which the invisible could be discerned. The words of Scripture radiated with infinite meaning, depth upon depth, even as Creation itself did, which was also the Book of God, or a ‘second Scripture’. The allegorical tradition is grounded in the understanding that all things are full of meaning and that there is an art in searching out this meaning, an art which involves a spiritual transformation of the soul. It was this understanding of allegory – and therefore of the world – that receded in the late Middle Ages, and which, as Paul Ricoeur has shown in his Thinking Biblically and his hermeneutics in general, is lost in our age. The symbolic sense is no longer part of modern culture, and so the great stories of Scripture, or the myths of ancient Greece, no longer communicate with us. We have lost what Ricoeur calls the ‘first naivety’ of understanding which directly grasps the symbolic and the theophanic. Our modern critical and empirical engagement with reality has overwhelmed our original grasp of the symbolic narrative that once held Western culture together.

More than this, anything but the literal meaning of words has been banished from our thinking, as we read in John Locke. The very idea of ‘multiple’ levels of meaning in the Creation has been relegated either to ‘subjectivity’ or else to superstition. Our relation to the world is no longer as participants in its meaning or purpose. Rather it has become a mere object, knowable only through theoretical explanation. The Cartesian self, locked in its solitary self-knowing, cannot be part of the sacred unfolding of the universe. This situation accounts not only for the loss of the allegorical meaning of things, but also for the metaphysical. Our range of speech is narrowed to the propositional, and the modes of speech belonging to taking vows, of performing rituals, or offering prayer, so profuse in Shakespeare, have become strange to us. Our culture no longer speaks with the universe or has any real dialogue with reality. We now merely talk ‘about things’, not with them or to them or in response to them.

My point is not to censure our times, but rather to explain how our enquiry into mystical allegory is obscured by our contemporary comportment towards reality which passes over any meaning it expresses. Meaning has become something the human being attributes to or projects upon things which are held to have no inherent meaning in themselves. So this is as much a problem for scholars of literature as it is for theologians. Nevertheless, I would suggest that our ‘symbolic sense’, even our ‘sacred sense’, of reality is primordially grounded in consciousness and is open to realms of meaning that our analytical or critical faculties cannot penetrate. That is to say, human consciousness is ordered toward reality in a manner that first apprehends its presence symbolically and as a totality, and this in turn leads us to grant that human nature is essentially ‘religious’, insofar as we are compelled to call that apprehension ‘sacred’. In more philosophical terms it is what Aristotle describes in the opening of his Metaphysics as the initial orientation of the mind towards truth, because truth attracts the consciousness. The ancient understanding of ‘mind’, or the soul, is that it is already grounded in an apprehension of things that draws it towards deeper understanding. There is no isolated cogito closed in on itself. Mind is essentially open. And rather than Anthropos being the questioning master over things, it is sacred reality itself that calls for piety and for each soul to give account of itself before the truth of things. Religiously speaking, it is truth that reaches out to humankind. Thus its quality is revelatory or disclosive and comes as a gift, even as being itself is a gift.

To put that another way, the early Christian contemplation of Scripture begins in ‘piety’, in a reverence awakened by truth itself. Without piety, so Origen and St Augustine tell us repeatedly, the doors of the Scriptures will not open to us. Only the pure and pious soul can approach the threshold of Scripture.[3] This is the first sense in which its meaning is ‘veiled’. This initial veiling is its protection. In the Phaedrus Socrates says that any true writing, written with knowledge of the nature of the soul, will defend itself even though it is fixed and one cannot debate with it. We should not be astonished that this view should have been adopted by the Church Fathers with the Scriptures.

An initial step, then, into understanding the ancient meaning of allegorical apprehension is to grant to things their own disclosive power. This precedes Scripture and applies to Creation. All natural phenomena may then be seen as hierophanic. As Ricoeur says in his essay ‘Manifestation and Proclamation’:

  • That a stone or a tree may manifest the sacred means that this profane reality becomes something other than itself while still remaining itself. It is transformed into something supernatural.[4]

And later he writes:

  • In the sacred universe there are not a few living beings here and there, but life is a total and diffuse sacrality that may be seen in the cosmic rhythms, in the return of vegetation, and in the alternation of life and death. The symbol of the tree of life – or of knowledge, or immortality, or youth – in this respect is the highest figure of this fundamental sacrality of life.[5]

It is out of this sacred vision of the cosmos that the ancient myths are born, revealing an order and drama of existence that the ‘profane’ vision of reality veils. It is only when the cosmos, the sun, moon and stars, the animals and plants, the rivers and mountains, become hierophanies that the divine order of truth becomes visible. This hierophanic vision of reality runs through Greek philosophy and Stoicism like a golden thread. The universe is a living intelligence. When that vison is lost, Plato argues in Book X of the Laws, and inert matter is claimed to be the cause and origin of things, then the city, which is to say ‘society’, will fall through impiety.

Just as the cosmos is a living intelligence, so likewise, Origen argues, are the Scriptures:

  • Since, therefore, Scripture itself consists, as it were, of a body that is perceived, of a soul which is understood and conceived to be in the body, and of a spirit according to the shadow of the heavenly things, come, then, let us invoke him who made the body, soul, and spirit of Scripture, a body for those who have preceded us, a soul for us, and a spirit for those who are destined to possess eternal life in a future age and to arrive at the heavenly truth of the law. At this time, let us investigate the soul, not the letter. If we can do this much, let us make our ascent to the spirit, in the manner of the sacrifices that we have just been reading about.[6]

Here Scripture is taken not only as a living being, with body, soul, and spirit, but this threefold hierarchy of being also indicates the threefold meaning of Scripture. It is clear that this threefold sense is derived from the ‘letter’, which is the body, the ‘meaning’, which is the soul, and the mystical or moral sense, which is the ‘spirit’. Origen likens this threefold order to that of the human being, consisting of body, soul, and spirit. That later in the Middle Ages the Scriptures were given a fourfold sense – the literal, allegorical, moral, and mystical – is slightly anomalous because the ‘allegorical’ sense originally meant all the meanings beyond the literal sense.[7] The important point here is that Scripture is regarded as a living being corresponding with human nature. And Origen is bold enough to imply that Scripture is Christ incarnate. That is to say, the Scripture corresponds in every respect with the Incarnation of Christ, and that those who contemplate Scripture reverently receive from Christ the wisdom, consolation or instruction suited to their spiritual need. Christ works through the Scriptures according to the spiritual condition of each individual soul. This ‘work’ is performed by God, and so the disposition of piety in the reader mentioned earlier is essential for the soul’s receptivity to this divine transformative work.

Here it is helpful to recall that there are different orders of language, and that the mode of speech in Scripture belongs to a primordial language where nature speaks in her own vocabulary, in which ‘objects’ are themselves ‘words’. In his The Great Code Northrop Frye argues that there are three orders of language, or historical phases of language. The most ancient is the ‘poetic’, where no strong distinction exists between subject and object, and where physical things express divine things or inner states directly. The second mode of language Frye calls ‘hieratic’, meaning religious or priestly language, which is mainly allegorical. The third mode of language he calls ‘demotic’, meaning simply descriptive or factual language, such as the language of historians or of science. Frye observes that, beginning with Francis Bacon and consolidated by John Locke, demotic language forces out all metaphor and allegory. Indeed, Locke would have metaphor banished, and every word be confined to a single literal sense. According to Frye, it is owing to the fall into demotic language that the language of the Scriptures has become obscure, or is simply dismissed as mythological superstition. Paul Ricoeur likewise sees the purely descriptive mode of speech as presenting the greatest barrier to understanding symbol and metaphor in ancient literature, and therefore especially the Bible. Thus the poetry of Homer, from the standpoint of demotic language, has no ‘truth’ to tell, even though Aristotle argues that drama or poetry tells universal truths which purely descriptive history cannot. The second mode of language, hieratic, the language of ancient ritual and prophecy, can be discounted not merely as fiction, as Homer can, but as plain superstition. This mode of language includes oratorical speech or exhortation, yet without abstraction of logical argument. Its degenerate form is ‘propaganda’, which Josef Pieper associates with sophistry. We forget the kinds of language at our peril.

Having distinguished these three modes of language, Northrop Frye argues that the Bible does not quite correspond with any of them. He writes:

  • The linguistic idiom of the Bible does not really coincide with any of our three phases of language, important as those phases have been in the history of its influence. It is not metaphorical like poetry, though it is full of metaphor, and is as poetic as it can well be without actually being a work of literature. It does not use the transcendental language of abstraction and analogy, and its use of objective and descriptive language is incidental throughout. It is really a fourth form of expression, for which I adopt the now well-established term kerygma, proclamation. In general usage this term is largely restricted to the Gospels, but there is not enough difference between the Gospels and the rest of the Bible in the use of language to avoid extending it to the entire book.[8]

Frye’s insights into the three modes of language are valuable because they alert us to the different manners in which language may be heard – for it is clear that Origen and the medieval monks following him listened and attended to the Scriptures in a manner that opened the soul to the work of grace through the Word. Many times they invoke us to read Scripture prayerfully. In our modern concern for objectivity, it is easy to forget that language, of itself does and conveys nothing. It is active and at work only when listened to and engaged with, and according to how it is listened to. And we may also suggest that the manner in which a culture comports itself towards language corresponds with its comportment towards the cosmos and reality as a whole. The two books of ‘revelation’, Scripture and Creation, call to be brought into concord with one another, which is to say, to be seen as manifestations of the sacred – the hierophanic world Ricoeur reminds us of. This correlation between sacred Scripture and sacred cosmos runs through the Christianity of the middle ages, and is what is all too often unwittingly taken for ‘pre-scientific’ ignorance of the cosmos. The demotic language of the world, that is, purely factual descriptive language, has no religious significance, save that it is devoid of the sacred. With this in mind, here is a passage from Hugh of St Victor’s On Sacred Scripture and its Authors teaching how one ought to attend to Scripture:

“The diligent examiner of Sacred Scripture should never neglect the meanings of things. Just as our knowledge of primary things comes through words, so too through the meaning of these things we come to understand what is perceived in a spiritual way and our knowledge of these things is made complete. The philosopher, in other kinds of writings, comes to know only the meaning of words, but in Sacred Scripture the meaning of things is much more excellent than the meaning of words. The first is established by usage, but the second is dictated by nature. The first is the voice of human beings, but the second is the voice of God speaking to human beings. The meaning of words is established by human convention, but the meaning of things is determined by nature; and, by the will of the Creator, certain things are signified by other things. The meaning of things is much more manifold than the meaning of words. Few words have more than two or three meanings, but a thing can mean as many other things as it has visible or invisible properties in common with other things.”[9]

We notice straight away that it is the meaning of things that ought to be attended to, not simply the meaning of words. Hugh is understanding language in its most primary sense, as bringing before us the ‘things’ the words refer to or invoke. To dwell merely upon the words is to attend to the ‘sign’ rather than the signified. To attend to the signified is to hear the words of Scripture spiritually. It is ‘the philosopher’ who attends only to the meaning of words, not to ‘things’, and words have few meanings, and these only by convention. This is the ‘voice’ or language of human beings, while the meaning of ‘things’ is the voice or language of God addressing human beings. This meaning of things belongs to them by nature, and nature is itself a type of divine speech. But more than this, the meaning of ‘things’, according to the will of the Creator, is manifold, as things have visible and invisible properties shared in other things. By the ‘philosopher’ I take it that Hugh means the ‘natural philosopher’ who enquires into the nature of things according to human reason alone.

Nature, then, is a living vocabulary and speech addressing human beings. In Scripture this living speech or vocabulary ranges from the simple correlation of the ‘true vine’ with Christ to the vast correspondence of typology whereby the meaning of the Old Testament is revealed, or ‘unveiled’, in the New Testament. And on the eschatological level of meaning, the whole history of Israel is gathered into Christ. This typological meaning of Scripture is unique to the Bible, and this is a further reason why Northrop Frye places the Bible in an order of language on its own. It is kerygmatic, not only in the sense of the spoken word, but in the proclamation of ‘things’ themselves. The rivers and the mountains ‘declare’ the name of the Lord, as we read in the Psalms.

And the ‘manifold’ meanings of things in the Old Testament correlate with the events and meanings in the New Testament. For example, ‘stone’, ‘water’, and ‘wine’ have symbolic meanings that resonate throughout the Bible, stone signifying the ‘law’, water signifying ‘purification’, and wine the ‘living water of eternal life’. Thus stone is equated with the ‘old law’, water with baptism, and wine with the ‘new law’. This correlation of senses is evident in the first miracle of Jesus in the Gospel of John, where the six stone jars filled with water are turned into wine. The medieval reader acquainted with the typology of Scripture would instantly see this connection, and how all the references to stone, water and wine in the Old Testament are now disclosed in Jesus revealing himself in this first miracle, or first ‘sign’, as it is more strictly called in the Gospel of John. His coming into the world is what the Old Testament signified through these things. And so we might say that all visible things of Creation ultimately signify Christ, through whom they came into being. This is really the basis of the Bible concordances we used to consult years ago in our Bible studies. The correspondences between objects, places and actions across the Bible opens up the special or unique holy vocabulary of the Scriptures. Every leaf, fruit, herb, river, valley, city, is, as it were, the ‘voice of God’ addressing human beings, as Hugh of St Victor says.

With these observations in mind we may look at the commentary On The Apocalypse of John by Richard of St Victor, where he describes the “four modes of vision, two of which are internal and two external”.[10] The first mode is bodily sense, in which we perceive the external visibility of things. This mode is limited, seeing neither what is large or far off, or small and close. Because it does not penetrate things it “does not contain anything of mystic significance”, he says. For the second bodily sense Richard writes:

  • The other bodily mode occurs when an appearance or action is shown outwardly to the sense of sight, but contains within a great power of deeper, mystical meaning. Such was Moses’ vision of the burning bush, which appeared to him visibly and externally, but was filled with figurative significance. For what do we understand in the flame if not the grace of the Holy Spirit. What by the bush – a small tree that is rough, green, and flowering – if not the blessed Virgin Mary, humble in her self-contempt, rough against weakness by practicing virtues, green through her faith, and flowering in her chastity? When the Lord appeared in the bush, the flame did not damage it, and when the Son of God took on the flesh in the Virgin, when the grace of the Holy Spirit overwhelmed her, her virginal chastity remained inviolate. This second mode of vision is, therefore, by far more sublime and more excellent than the first, for the first lacked all mystery, while the second overflows with virtue and heavenly mysteries.[11]

In this passage we see what Hugh of St Victor meant when he spoke of the meaning of ‘things’, where here, for Richard, a simple, small, green and flowering tree is “filled with figurative significance” by the appearance of the flame that did not consume it. The bodily sense here grasps the ‘meaning’ of the bush, what it signified by way of a miracle. But then Richard goes further and interprets the passage typologically, seeing in it the virgin birth of Christ in the New Testament. As Richard says, “And it was indeed a great vision, which all at once presented the miracle then taking place and also denoted the Incarnation of the Word and the perpetual chastity of the Virgin Mother”.[12]  Here we may also observe that a ‘miracle’ is not a mere intrusion into the laws of nature, but a sign of a meaning embodied in the appearance of things by an act of grace.

Richard next describes the third and fourth modes of vision. His description is brief and succinct, and therefore worth quoting:

  • The third mode of vision does not concern the eyes of the flesh, but rather the eyes of the heart – when, that is, the soul, illumined by the Holy Spirit, is led to an understanding of invisible things by the formal similitudes of visible things, and by the images presented as though by figures or signs. The fourth mode of vision is when the human spirit, touched subtly and sweetly by internal inspirations, with no mediating figures or qualities of visible things, is raised spiritually to the contemplation of heavenly things.[13]

The third mode of vision is a mode of understanding of the heart, in which ‘invisible things’ are seen through the ‘formal similitudes of visible things’. These are ‘understandings’ rather than things seen. The fourth mode of vision, unaided by any ‘mediating figures or qualities’ is “raised spiritually to the contemplation of heavenly things”, which is to say, purely spiritual or mystical meditation with no ‘object’ of perception at all.

Richard supports the third and fourth modes of vision by referring to The Celestial Hierarchies of Dionysius the Areopagite. He observes that spiritual things “have been revealed to us symbolically and analogically”. He remarks that a “symbol is an assemblage of visible forms bespeaking invisible things. Analogy is the ascent or elevation of the mind to the contemplation of heavenly things”. He says that invisible things are “demonstrated by signs similar to sensible things”, which the Greeks called theophanies.[14]

Here we may observe a shift in the way Richard presents the way things disclose spiritual truth from that which we discussed earlier following Origen. With Dionysius the Areopagite comes a Platonizing influence, where reality is divided into ‘real’ and ‘less real’ ontological levels, or where the manifest, temporal realm is a mere shadow to be displaced by the truly real. This dualistic way of interpreting reality is foreign to early Christian exegesis, which does not dispose of the manifest forms of things in perceiving their meaning. As Paul Ricoeur observes, Scripture does not imply two ontological levels, but rather two historical economies – that of temporal and sacred time. Thus the ‘sacred’ meaning requires the reality of ‘temporal’, “without any reduction of it to appearance or illusion, at least if the “type” is really to function as the basis of meaning. Hence the spiritual sense is not substituted for the carnal sense”.[15]

Here we perhaps should recall that Plato’s division of reality into two distinct ontological levels is itself a symbolic way of speaking of reality and ought not to be understood literally. It stands in contrast with the biblical ‘concrete’ vocabulary and its conveyance of spiritual truth as ‘events’ and ‘signs’ rather than as ‘metaphysical orders’. It is primarily through events that the visible realm of nature and place disclose their significance, as for example with the episode of Moses and the burning bush. Meaning – here typological meaning – bursts forth from the bush, yet the fire does not destroy the bush. The spiritual does not consume the carnal. Richard of St Victor recalls that “nothing that exists is wholly deprived of participation in goodness, as Scripture attests: God saw all the things he had made, and they were very good”.[16]

From what we have said so far it follows that there is a correspondence between the ways the manifest world is seen and the kinds of language spoken of it. The reductionist perception of the world corresponds with a ‘demotic’ use of language. The kinds of language are not merely theories of language but types of orientation towards existence. It would be more correct to say that the type of language arises from the orientation towards existence than that any language is something in itself. By this I mean that our hearing and speaking are the activities where we live in language. We cannot make language an object of external investigation as though there were no listeners or speakers. This activity of ‘being in language’ is raised to the greatest intensity with biblical language, which as Northrop Frye and Ricoeur both suggest is best described as kerygmatic. It is divine speech addressed to the essence of the soul, calling it home to God. But such speech can only be heard through a corresponding openness of the soul to divine things. For Meister Eckhart this is the birth of Christ in the soul, where God speaks Himself. We should never overlook that, for all Eckhart’s insistence on noughting the Creation in the soul, ultimately his mysticism is incarnational.

Yet every word of Scripture refers to the created world and its events. But the world and its events are now presented as embodying and disclosing divine things, even uncreated things. Events now disclose a ‘sacred history’ within or illuminating the temporal history. The ultimate meaning of things is disclosed – of time, of place, of mountain, of stream and ocean. For the medieval tradition of biblical interpretation it is this ultimate meaning of things that is the allegorical sense, the ‘other’ meaning besides the plain or literal meaning. Yet the literal sense is not discarded. The eternal is manifest in the temporal, the timeless in time, and the infinite in the finite. Thus the dignity and sanctity of the created is affirmed. Seen in this way, as the Psalmist puts it, everything declares the name of God. In this sense the world is the second book of revelation. And, although this is the sacred or religious way of seeing the created world, it must surely inform the vision of the poets too.

There is an aspect of all this which we should say more. Exegesis involves a transformation in the soul of the contemplator. It is a spiritual exercise. To illustrate this, here are two passage from Origen on the threefold meaning of Scripture. The first says:

  • We have often pointed out that there is a threefold mode of understanding in the Holy Scripture: a historical, a moral and a mystical. We understand from this that there is in scripture a body, a soul and a spirit.

The first glimpse of the letter is bitter enough: it prescribes the circumcision of the flesh; it gives the laws of sacrifice and all the rest that is designated by the letter that kills (cf. 2 Cor 3:6). Cast all this aside like the bitter rind of a nut. You then, secondly, come to the protective covering of the shell in which the moral doctrine or counsel of continence is designated. These are of course necessary to protect what is contained inside, but they too are doubtless to be smashed and broken through. We would say, for example, that abstinence from food and chastisement of the body is necessary as long as we are in this body, corruptible as it is and susceptible to passion. But when it is broken and dissolved and, in the time of its resurrection, gone over from corruption into incorruption and from animal to spiritual, then it will be dominated no longer by the labor of affliction or the punishment of abstinence, but rather by its own quality and not by any bodily corruption. This is why abstinence seems necessary now and afterwards will have no point. Thirdly you will find hidden and concealed in these the sense of the mysteries of the wisdom and knowledge of God (cf. Col 2:3) in which the souls of the saints are nourished and fed not only in the present life but also in the future. This then is that priestly fruit about which the promise is given to those “who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied” (Mt 5:6). In this way, therefore, the gradation of this threefold mystery runs through all the scripture.[17]

The second passage says:

  • Therefore just as “the seen and the unseen” (cf. 2 Cor 4:18), earth and heaven, soul and flesh, body and spirit are related to each other, and this world is made up of these relationships, so too must it be believed that holy scripture is made up of seen and unseen things. It consists of a body, namely, the visible letter, and of a soul which is the meaning found within it, and of a spirit by which it also has something of the heavenly in it, as the Apostle says: “They serve as a copy and shadow of the heavenly sanctuary” (Heb 8:5). Since this is so, calling upon God who made the soul and the body and the spirit of scripture — the body for those who came before us, the soul for us, and the spirit for those who “in the age to come will receive the inheritance of eternal life” (Lk 18:18, 31) by which they will come to the heavenly things and the truth of the law —let us seek out not the letter but the soul. . . . If we can do this, we will also ascend to the spirit.[18]

Can we recover something of this way of reading Scripture? That is certainly the question de Lubac raises in his seminal study Medieval Exegesis. Yet if something of this is to be restored, it must involve a restoration of the religious or mystical way of seeing the world. In this regard perhaps modern theologians are seeking a way forward. So I close with a passage seeking this end from David Bentley Hart’s The Beauty of the Infinite:

  • This also means that the things of the senses cannot of themselves distract from God. All things of the earth, in being very good, declare God. And it is only by the mediation of their boundless display that the declaration of God may be heard and seen. In themselves they have no essence apart from the divine delight that crafts them: they are an array or proportions, and ordering or felicitous parataxis of semeia, and so have nothing in themselves by which they might divert attention from the God who gives them, no specific gravity, no weight apart from the weight of glory. Only a corrupt desire that longs to possess the things of the world as inert property, for violent or egoistic ends, so disorders the sensible world as to draw it away from God that sensible reality properly declares; such a desire has not fallen prey to a lesser or impure beauty, but has rather lost sight of corporeal, material, and temporal beauty as beauty, and so placed it in bondage.[19]

 

Bibliography

Boersma, Hans. Scripture as Real Presence. Baker Academic, 2017

Bentley Hart, David. The Beauty of the Infinite. William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004

De Lubac, Henri. Medieval Exegesis. William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000

Frye, Northrop. The Great Code. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983

Interpretation of Scripture, edited and translated by Franklin Harkins and Frans van Lier. New City Press, New York, 2013

Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, edited by Hans Urs von Balthasar. Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1984

Ricoeur, Paul. Figuring the Sacred. Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1955

Ricoeur, Paul, and LaCocque, André. Thinking Biblically. The University of Chicago Press, 1998

Schnabel, Eckhard J. Law and Wisdom. Wipf and Stock Publishers, Oregon, 1985

 

Notes

[1] See for example Eckhard J. Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, p. 16 – 20

[2] See Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis Volume 2.

[3] For an excellent discussion of the place of piety and virtue in Patristic hermeneutic theory see Hans Boersma, Scripture as Real Presence.

[4] Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, p. 49

[5] Ibid. p. 52

[6] Quoted from Origen by Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, Volume. 1. p. 143

[7] For a full discussion of the three or fourfold senses of Scripture see De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis Vol. 1, p. 90 ff.

[8] Northrop Frye, The Great Code (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983) p. 29

[9] Interpretation of Scripture, edited and translated by Franklin Harkins and Frans van Lier, p. 225

[10] Ibid. p. 344

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid. 345

[15] Paul Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically, p. 283

[16] Interpretation of Scripture, edited and translated by Franklin Harkins and Frans van Lier, p. 346

[17] Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, edited by Hans Urs von Balthasar, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1984, p. 103

[18] Ibid. p. 105

[19] David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite (William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004) p. 255

Aquinas and Providence

 Joseph Milne

 

Thomas Aquinas and the Providential Order of Nature
For Thomas Aquinas everything in the creation is ordered toward the Good as its proper end. This means that each created being has its own natural perfection which in some way embodies God’s goodness or perfection. This natural perfection of created beings is governed by Divine Providence. The perfection of each created being is also part of the perfection of the universe as a whole which is united through Divine Providence. Human nature, through practical reason, has a share in providential intelligence in its capacity to guide action towards the Good, both for itself and for all other created beings. Human life in the universe has a part to play in bringing all beings to their natural perfection in God.

Thomas’s vision has deep roots in ancient philosophy and in the Christian understanding that all things ultimately seek to unite with God. There is at once a perfection of the created universe within itself, and a perfection beyond it in mystical union with God. This natural order is sustained by Divine Providence.

In this talk we shall try to recover something of Thomas’s understanding of Providence and how it might enable human society to live in accord with the true order of nature.

****

I would like to begin with the suggestion that we have a natural sense of providence, a sense that there is something that guides the order of all things. This sense is completely distinct from the notions of determinism or necessity. It belongs to human nature to have this sense of providence, just as we have an ethical sense and a sense of justice. We also have what the philosophers call a “narrative sense”, the sense of the lawful unfolding of events. This narrative sense is also the sense of “story”, the sense in which we follow the evolution of actions through time towards a definite end or conclusion. It is what the ancient Greeks called “mythos”, especially myths of the gods and their deeds, or the myths of the different ages following from the Golden Age.

Whether we speak of providence, ethics, justice or story, underlying each of these is a sense of “order”. But not just an eternal or fixed order but also an unfolding order. We experience the world and existence as in one way constant and in another way in motion. Things move lawfully. Or if they move unlawfully they need to be returned to their lawful motion.

All that I have just described belongs to yet another sense: the sense of “the whole”. Our fundamental sense of existence is embraced by a sense of being part of the whole, of all that is. Human consciousness does not grasp things upwards from the least particle, but rather from the totality of everything – a totality that includes all that is, that ever was and that ever may be. It is through this sense of participating in the greater whole that we experience ourselves as “situated” or “placed” in the universe and in our particular circumstances. We are part of everything and in some way participate in everything.

It is easy to overlook these primordial aspects of our experience of existence. Yet they are the ground of all ancient myths and stories of how things came into being. We can see it in the myths and legends of primitive peoples, in the Genesis story of creation, in the cosmology of the Upanishads of India, or in the Theogony of Hesiod. Every story must begin with “Once upon a time there was…” Our sense of the beginning of all things has something divine or sacred about it, as though a mystery is being made visible through the manifestation of the universe. And yet, beyond that beginning of all things there is something wholly transcendent. The transcendental realm can be spoken of only symbolically. It is the ground of the “religious sense”, the sense in which we are aligned in some way with that which is wholly beyond all manifestation. The religious sense springs from an intuition that everything begins and ends in the divine. This beginning and ending of all things in the divine is the completion of our sense of the whole, though it always remains a mystery. It is remarkable that the most ancient cosmological myths include the divine within the cosmic order. For example, even Zeus in the Greek pantheon dwells within the cosmos. The divine order is part of the cosmic order. Only later, both in the East and the West, does a distinction emerge between the temporal and the transcendental realms. The contemplation of the order of things brings to light distinctions, and then the insight that there is that which lies wholly beyond all distinctions but which is the source of the manifold.

These are ideas we need to recognise before we explore what Aquinas has to say about the providential order of nature. Since the fifteenth century the providential order of nature has been superseded by a mechanical approach to nature which seeks to explain everything without recourse to any divine or purposeful order. The material world is taken to be explicable within itself, so that neither a metaphysical nor a sacred understanding need be consulted. So there was a complete break with the medieval vision of the universe as well as the ancient Greek vision of Plato and Aristotle. The most decisive feature of this break is that the universe is no longer conceived as having an intelligent essence. It is no longer seen as a “living being” as in Plato’s Timaeus for example. It is taken to be without soul. So when we approach the question of providence we are obliged to consider a cosmology and a vision of nature wholly at variance with modern materialism.

This is why I began by saying that we have a natural sense of providence. Like the ethical sense or the narrative sense, or the sense of the whole, it is innate to our human intelligence. But it is out of tune with our modern conception of the universe or nature. Having broken nature off from any divine or sacred order, we have abandoned a natural part of human intelligence. To give an obvious example, the ancient conception of the universe as ruled by justice has become unintelligible to modern thought. Yet the perception of justice as key to the order of the cosmos is the beginning of Greek philosophy in Heraclitus, as it is also of the biblical representation of the creation. If our age no longer understands that the universe is ruled by justice, then understanding providence becomes very challenging.

Thomas Aquinas’s main work on providence is given in his Summa Contra Gentiles, his challenge to non-Christian beliefs. As typical for Aquinas, he begins with what is evident in nature and ascends to the metaphysical and ultimately to the divine. The first thing to observe is that everything in nature has a purpose and seeks its proper end. He is following Aristotle here, who observes that all things are inclined towards the fullest completion of their particular being. In an obvious sense, everything grows and matures. But this inclination towards maturity is not a blind reaching out for mere survival, but an inherent direction towards a particular form and function. This inherent direction in things is what Plato and Aristotle called their telos, meaning the natural end they seek. It is what Aristotle calls the “final cause” of anything, the end or purpose for which it has come into being. But the concept of “final causality” was discounted in the rise of early modern science, which sought to account only for efficient causality. For example, the seed is the efficient cause of the plant, or the carpenter is the efficient cause of the table. The purpose of the plant or the table are not accounted for. We might say that modern enquiry seeks to understand how things come to exist but not why they come to exist. The concept of “purpose” has been confined to human ends that we decide upon, while nature is regarded as having no purpose. Descartes says we can never know the purpose of things while Bacon says the concept of teleology hinders our understanding of the natural world.

But to deny purpose to nature is to miss a central principle of its ordering. Modern ecology, for example, has come to see nature acting both as a total system and as establishing a specific integrated order. Or one form of the modern anthropic principle observes that for the human species to have come into being the whole universe had to take the form that it has taken. The human species, with its reflective consciousness, can exist only in the universe that has come into being. So to argue that nature does not seek specific ends is no longer really tenable, at least according to the anthropic principle.

It is at this point that Aquinas becomes illuminating. If we grant that each thing seeks its natural end, then the question can be raised about the completeness or perfection it seeks. This means we have to regard the “being” of things. Natural things are not simply taking shape or form but they strive towards the fullness of their being. The further we move up the hierarchy of nature, the more evident this becomes. A stone has a very limited mode of being, while living creatures have a higher mode of being, and living rational beings a higher mode still. As we ascend the natural scale we observe an increase in autonomy or self-direction. There are stages of increase of being. At this point we move to the metaphysical. If each of these modes of being move in the direction of higher and more self-determining modes of being, the question then arises about the nature of being itself towards which all things tend in their distinct ways.

It is at this point that Aquinas makes the most important observation that every being loves its own being, and that beings of the same kind love their equal in being. Hence there is mutual attraction between similar kinds of being throughout nature. Yet, he observes, that the love of each beings own being and the love of its equal is founded beyond itself in the love of Being Itself. He goes yet further, saying that every being loves Being Itself more than its own particular being, and that each loves its own particular being because it participates to some degree in Being Itself. It is this Being Itself that each ultimately strives towards.

There is another way of saying the same thing. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says “the good is what all desire” (SCG 3. 11. Nicomachean Ethics 1094a 1). Aquinas quotes this passage. We know from both Plato and Aristotle that “the Good” is the highest perfection beyond which there is no higher good to be sought. All other goods are only means to further goods, while the Good Itself is the final end of all desiring. This Good, the Good, is both the original cause of all things and the final end they seek fulfilment in. Aquinas says that the terms “good” and “being” are interchangeable. Thus the fuller the being, the greater the goodness. Likewise, evil is the diminishment or negation of being and therefore of goodness. Once again, we find the same in Plato and further developed by St Augustine in the doctrine of the privatio boni. All things resist the negation of being. This is the true ground of the instinct of self-preservation, which itself is grounded in the love of Being in itself.

Aquinas takes all this a step further, going beyond the metaphysical to the theological. The good or the perfection of being that everything desires is God. He says, everything loves God more than itself. God is perfect goodness. It is this love of everything beyond its own being, and beyond created being, that orients nature towards perfection. Every created thing desires to be as like God that it is possible for it to be as a created being. This for Aquinas is a primary ordering principle of nature, of the entire creation. But it also means that every created being in some way resembles or has a likeness of God. In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas describes how nature is ordered to the likeness of God in two ways. He says:

  • For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. (ST 1a q. 103 a 4)

Not only do all things seek to become good like God, they also seek to act like God “by moving others to be good”. Thus a mutual goodness is sought among all creatures in one way or another. We will return to this principle later when we look at human society.

That all things have a likeness to God is a key to medieval biblical interpretation. The created world is regarded as a manifestation of the wisdom of God. For Hugh of St Victor, in the twelfth century, this meant that each created thing presented in the Scriptures was itself a “word of God”. Human words, Hugh says, may have several meanings, but the words of God expressed in the creatures have very many meanings. Nature is a vocabulary of God, and Scripture reflects that vocabulary. Thus “nature”, just like the Scriptures, has a literal sense, an allegorical sense, and a mystical sense. There is the sacred or theological way of understanding nature as well as the Scriptures.

So all created things in some sense ‘manifest’ something of God and at the same time seek God as their end. This is the work of providence. Divine providence, Aquinas says, “orders all things to the divine goodness” as their end (SCG 97. 1), so that they may be as like the divine goodness as possible. But this, of course, adds nothing to God through created things since God is the Good Itself. It does show, however, that God’s goodness is unlimited and infinity communicable, shining out of itself. But since the substance of created beings must fall short of the perfect unity of divine goodness, Aquinas says:

  • [in or that]…the likeness of divine goodness might be more perfectly communicated to things, it was necessary for there to be a diversity of things, so that what could not be perfectly represented by one thing might be, in a more perfect fashion, represented by a variety of things in different ways. (SCG 97. 2).

This, Aquinas says, is because “the perfect goodness which is present in God in a unified and simple manner cannot be in creatures except in a diversified way and through the plurality of things”. This necessary diversity of things, which together form a unity in plurality, comes about through the diversity of forms. Each particular thing has a form that distinguishes it’s kind of being. It is through its form that each created being bears a likeness to God. Also the form of each being determines its particular operation in the created order, thus establishing a hierarchy or gradation of different species. The greater the resemblance to God the higher the species. Nevertheless, every kind of being bears a likeness to God in some way and has a meaning and purpose within the created order.

Each particular created being has an end in itself, an end through its operation in the natural order, and a final end in God. These ends are bound together. Each being fulfils its own being through performing its part within the natural order. Nothing exists in isolation. Everything subsists through contributing to nature as a whole. The natural order fulfils its end in the unity of the creation, while the unity of the creation ultimately fulfils its end in knowing God. This is another way of seeing how all things seek the good or the perfection of being. They seek it individually and universally. The hierarchical created order culminates in rational beings, at the highest level the angels, and just below them human beings or mankind. The proper end of each individual person lies in seeking the goodness, fullness of being, and knowledge of God. Providence orders the whole of nature so that man may fulfil that end.

Thus the creation is not merely a multiplicity of forms and beings but is ordered to manifest a likeness of God. But this likeness also has an end. It is manifest in order to be known, and through being known returned to God. It is here that humanity has its special purpose within the created world. God created man last on the sixth day of creation in order that his rational consciousness should be a terminus of created things. In other words, through man the created universe becomes conscious of itself. As Aquinas says, just as all things desire the good, so all things also desire to be known. In the most perfect sense they desire to be known by God. Their journey towards this is through human rational consciousness. Man’s natural desire for knowledge of things is at the same time a response to the call of all things to become known. Knowledge of things serves not only man but also the things known. As a medieval theologian says, God does not manifest Himself in the creation without intending to be seen. Our human desire to know things springs from the intention of God to be known, and in their likeness to God each created being also desires to be known. Like the divine goodness, knowledge also seeks to be communicated. To put that in a different way, every being desires to be received into every other being so that the universe seeks to bring about a mutual knowing. Modern theories of knowledge forget that knowing is intended to be reciprocal, for the good of the things known as well as for the knower. As the early church father Tertullian says “it is nature who gives us our awareness”. Knowing things is meant to serve them. For example, the physician serves the patient through his knowledge.

That our rational consciousness may see order in things indicates that it is reason that orders them, and so human reason and the reason in things have a natural correspondence. Thus Plato in the Timaeus portrays the cosmos as living rational being, and this conception of the cosmos was very influential throughout the Middle Ages. For example, John of Salisbury sees a city as a living being, with its various institutions and vocations acting together like a single body with head, hands and feet.

Aquinas’s approach to the providential order of creation shows the proper purpose of studying the natural world. There had been a period before his time when any concern for the created world had been dismissed in the name of seeking spiritual knowledge alone. But that position sets up a conflict between God’s desire in creating the world and the call to spiritual knowledge or redemption. Yet it has always been foundational to Christianity to see the created universe as itself a divine work, a revelation of the divine wisdom and goodness and therefore a teacher and guide to the human soul.

Aquinas says “the primary measure of the essence and nature of each thing is God; just as He is the first being, which is the cause of being in all things.” (SCG 100: 5) In his view the nature of the created world cannot be understood without reference to God since it derives its essence and its being from God. Most important of all, it has come into being from the essence of the providential goodness. From the providential goodness it has received both its order and its aim. While coming forth from God into being, it seeks its way back to God in its completion. As St Paul says in Romans 8:22, the cosmos groans as though in childbirth for God. So, while it is God’s providence that creates and guides nature, nature has a motion grounded in its own being that tends upwards towards God. It is this double aspect of the created order that redeems it from any conception of blind chance or mere necessity. Creation and redemption are part of a single act. The proliferation into multiplicity as at once the journey towards unity.

We have already seen how man has a special place in nature as the rational being, as the being who desires to know and understand. Aquinas says that there is a special providence in man, given from the divine providence, whereby each individual may govern themselves. While the other created beings are directed by providence implanted in their essence, with human nature providence provides for each to govern their own intentions and actions. Each is a free agent. This means two things. First that the human species must provide for itself from the providential gifts of nature. Each must be clothed, housed, fed. With other creatures providence gives these things appropriately to each, while the human species has to master certain skills in order to provide for its needs. Second, it also means that the human species must learn to act together since no individual is self-sufficient. Providence has given a natural distribution of talents whereby what one lacks another provides. Thus community is natural to the human species. The higher ends of society are possible only through collective work, knowledge, and exchange. Aquinas takes this a step further:

  • Because they are ordered to their species, they possess a further ordination to intellectual nature. For [temporal things] are not ordered to man for the sake of one individual man only, but for the sake of the whole human species. (SCG 112: 9)

So there is a remarkable correspondence between individual autonomy on the one hand, and participation in the work of the entire human species on the other. Only self-ruling persons can consciously participate in the work and proper end of the entire species in the created order. Aquinas insists, however, that this does not mean each individual exists only for the sake of the species. He says: “only rational creatures receive direction from God in their acts, not only for the species, but for the individual.” (SCG 113: 1) Thus, while other species act for the self-preservation of their species and purpose within the natural order, directed by external providence, the human individual is able to act consciously for their own fulfilment as well as the fulfilment of the human species. The two fulfilments are mutual. Since each individual has autonomy they are able to act responsibly for the good of the whole. Autonomy is a capacity to act beyond simple self-interest. Thus the human species builds its own society over which it is called to govern for the common good. The common good is the end that society by nature seeks, and this common good is itself an image of the unity of God’s goodness. Only the person who can act for the common good has real freedom of action.

Yet all this remains under providence. Aquinas explains this in the following way:

  • … the rational creature is subject to divine providence in such a way that he is not only governed thereby, but is also able to know the rational plan of providence in some way. Hence, it is appropriate for him to exercise providence and government over other things. This is not the case with other creatures, for they participate in providence only to the extent of being subordinated to it. Through this possession of the capacity to exercise providence one may also direct and govern his own acts. So, the rational creature participates in divine providence, not only by being governed passively, but also by governing actively, for he governs himself in his personal acts, and even others. Now, all lower types of providence are subordinated, as it were, to divine providence. Therefore, the governing of the acts of a rational creature, in so far as they are personal acts, pertains to divine providence. (SCG 113:5)

Perhaps the important point here is that man is “able know the rational plan of providence in some way” and so order his actions in accord with the plan of divine providence. Aquinas calls this ability to discern providence “prudence”, which is a capacity to judge past and future and to have “foresight” in performing actions. All the most important human actions are possible through foresight. There is a further special gift here. Man is the being who is able to reflect on providence, both in individual actions and actions in accord with the whole. Providence gives a guide to the unity of action. It is the ground of human goodness and freedom.

This applies especially to actions belonging to society. In society reflection on the order of nature is brought about through speech or discourse, which is the nature of politics. Society flourishes through agreement on what is true, good, and just. Justice itself, which belongs to the essence of things, is a direct manifestation of providential order. Society flourishes so far as it apprehends and elects to honour and follow justice. A just society establishes its laws in accordance with the providential order of nature. What is most significant here is that justice and making just laws is possible only through the rational free choice of will. That is to say, justice and just laws are established only through free assent, and so justice and freedom belong together. Law and freedom belong together. Freedom through justice is a natural end human society seeks. But this is possible only through rational understanding and through the virtue of prudence. For Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas the human intelligence is understood as by nature ordered towards truth and goodness. Intelligence or reason has a telos. Human free will is grounded in an orientation towards truth and goodness. The reason loves truth, while the will loves goodness.

According to Aquinas, the principles of truth and goodness are implanted in the human soul. The principles of truth guide what is called the “theoretical reason”, while the principles of goodness guide what is called the “practical reason”. This distinction of the operations of the mind is taken from Aristotle, but is also evident in Plato. The human soul by nature loves truth and goodness. It is this that makes it a soul. According to Aristotle it is the love of truth that makes us desire to live. The proper end of human intelligence is truth and goodness. Aquinas takes this principle further than Aristotle and says that the dignity of the human soul lies in its resemblance to God, who is Truth and Goodness. And so it follows that the final end the soul seeks is God, who is truth and goodness itself. Because it seeks the truth and goodness of God as its final end, the soul is able to discern truth and goodness in the order of nature which, as we have seen, also resembles the divine truth and goodness. The truth and goodness of the order of nature is simply recognised, just as the eye recognises light. All this is part of the work of divine providence.

We began our talk by saying that everyone has an innate sense of providence. Yet what Aquinas says seems strange to modern thinking. I would suggest there are two reason for this. First, in the fourteenth century the understanding of “final causes” or purpose in the order of nature suffered with the rise of nominalism – the idea that “universals” exist only in abstract thought but not in nature itself. For example, the “human species” is only an abstract classification, while in reality only separate individuals exist. Thus the understanding of “nature” as an integrated whole was replaced by the notion that each thing was created and existed independently. Second, the understanding that the intellect had principles of truth or goodness implanted within it, or any kind of pre-knowledge, was gradually rejected. So, for example, in the seventeenth century John Locke proposed that the human mind was a tabula rasa, a clean slate, devoid of any innate ideas or any predetermined inclinations or goals. He also asserted that words have no inherent meaning but only such meanings that we attribute to them. Thus the denial of any actual universals and the conception of the mind as an empty slate upon which anything might be written, renders the traditional understanding of providence inconceivable. With the disappearance of providence from the philosophical enquiry into nature the universe is rendered purposeless.

But, as I suggested at the outset, our minds naturally apprehend order in nature and in life and we have a sense that providence ultimately guides all things. We have this sense of providence just as we have a sense of justice or a sense of truth. We may not quite grasp these things, but we know they are there to be known and acknowledged. It is the sense of order and providence that situates us within the great cosmic order, giving us the sense of living in a “world” and not floating in mere emptiness. Divine providence shows us that we are part of the great drama of creation which has a sacred meaning communicating itself throughout nature and informing all our thoughts and actions. But also that our true end is mystical union with God, and that our work within the created order is to bring created things through knowing them to their fulfilment. Our human consciousness is meant to receive all it is conscious of in order that things may be brought back to God. It is this final end of all things that providence continually seeks to attain. It is really God’s presence everywhere.

 

 

Talk given to Fintry Trust 2024

Law and the Harmonious City

Joseph Milne

 

A distinguishing feature of ancient myth is the sense of a divinely ordered cosmos. Unlike our modern mechanistic conception of the universe, for the ancients the whole world was a living being, peopled with divinities who watched over all the works of nature, and also over the life and deeds of mankind. And if anyone acted in a way that offended the divinities or the natural harmony of nature, retribution would fall upon them. Man is intended to live in accord with the laws of nature, and insofar as he does so the human race flourishes and is happy. One can see these themes in ancient myths and folk tales from all parts of the world. They are present in the epics of Homer, the Greek tragedies, the heroic Norse sagas, the myths and legends of the American Indians, as well as in ancient sacred Creation stories.

And still, for children, and for the storyteller, ‘nature’ is a living being with strange and magical powers. There is no good story without a world full of mysterious powers. The stars, the rivers and the forests are all living beings who watch over human events. Nothing in nature is unseen and without witness. This is the way the imagination apprehends the world, even in our own age where such things are supposed to belong to the previous ages of superstition.

But it is not only imagination that apprehends the world in this way. Our human reason also apprehends an order to the world, and somehow grasps it as a single whole – as a ‘cosmos’ and not mere random entities and events. Reason sees justice in nature, as well as a purposeful order between all living things. Modern ecology is built on this primary rational intuition of order throughout the natural world. It is one branch of science that seeks to escape from the mechanistic vision of the seventeenth century that has limited our understanding of nature’s wisdom and intelligence for so long. Yet it remains difficult now to see nature as itself rational and intelligent because we have banished intelligence from nature. Nevertheless, seeing nature as rational and intelligent was always how she was seen until our age. Insofar as we still acknowledge order in nature, we have limited its ‘lawfulness’ to a mechanistic or mathematical level. Even the ecologists try to do this, perhaps against their better instinct, in order to stay scientifically legitimate.

We find in the ancient world various words for the great order the universe. In ancient Egypt Maat ruled the entire universe with providential wisdom and justice, and this extended down to the order of society and even to the smallest human deed. Whatever one did, it was to be guided and enlightened with Maat. While Maat is the Goddess and symbol for cosmic order, for truth, for harmony and moral conduct, she is in essence the symbol for Egyptian civilisation itself. She is incarnate in the Pharaoh and through him immediately present everywhere and in each citizen. Citizenship is experienced as living in harmony with truth, duty and justice.

In the ancient Hindu writings the great order and harmony of the universe is represented by the word Ṛta. It is Ṛta that governs cosmic order and the lawful unfolding of things divine and human. In China the equivalent word is Tao of the Dao which keeps the heavens and the earth in balance and harmony. In ancient Persian it is Arta. In classical Greece it the words Nomos and Harmonia. Nomos is Greek for ‘law’, while Harmonia is the just proportion of all things. For the Romans it is Lex or Right, signifying the just law governing the whole universe as well as human affairs. Each of these words signify an intelligence inherent in the universe, guiding everything to its appointed end. They are not powers outside nature, imposed on things from outside. On the contrary, they are the most intimately present realities shining everywhere out of their essences. The law is at once universal, yet it also belongs to the nature of each particular thing, relating each to the order of the whole.

As the Greek philosophers began to explore nature in a more abstract or rational way, they found that what was expressed in myth and primordial symbols could be seen in more direct ways. For example, in early medicine the order of the body was still connected with the cosmic order. The word physis – the Greek word for nature – referred to the ‘coming to birth’ of things and their growth into completion. So the word physis meant ‘essence’ and ‘coming to be’, and our own word ‘nature’, from the Latin ‘natura’ once meant the same. This ‘coming to be’ of things brought them to their maturity and their proper place within the greater order. Thus everything in nature seeks to come to full maturity. Even the Sophists who opposed physis with nomos or law, understood nature as prescriptive, as indicating what we ought to do, as we see in Plato’s Gorgias.[1]

This principle of everything seeking its maturity or completion is crucial for understanding Greek thought and philosophy. The technical name for this principle is the telos of things, and it is also called the ‘final cause’ of each thing. For example, dwelling is the final cause of building a house, or cutting is the final cause of a knife. The final cause is really the end for which things come to be, and therefore the reason they come to be. It is through knowing the final cause of things that we really know their nature. Aristotle says that we know human nature from the fully grown and mature human being, which includes the person living a virtuous life. We cannot know the nature of something when it is incomplete.

With the birth of modern science this telos of things was swept aside, and teleology relegated to a superstition of the past. But early modern science was not concerned with the proper ends of things but with gaining mastery over them, of subjecting nature to human will. This break with the teleological understanding of nature wiped out a way of enquiring not only into the natural ends of things, but also investigation into the right use of things. Here is an example. According to Plato and Aristotle the right use of a house is dwelling, or the right use of a shoe is wearing it on one’s foot. But these things get put to a wrong use when used for money-making, for selling at a profit. In other words, the commercialising of things is putting them to wrong uses and replacing their proper end with a false or unjust end. The classic example is usury which is still illegal in some systems of law.

According to Plato and Aristotle, nature of herself provides exactly the right amount of things for man to live on. For example, the right amount of food from the land. But if the farmer seeks to make a profit rather than supply for his city, then the balance of nature will be upset and some will have more than they need while others will have insufficient. In other words, the wrong use of nature produces both poverty and excessive riches, and these in turn divide a society against itself. The art of the right use of things was what was meant by the Greek word oikonomia, the origin of our word ‘economy’. It was the art of knowing the just relation between ends and means. The proper ends and means of things kept them in harmony with nature as a whole. Thus the ‘wrong use’ of anything involves breaking away from the order of nature as a whole. It is significant that only the Catholic Church still teaches the principle of the right use of things in its social teaching on economics. Modern economics ignores it, or at best will mention it as only an ancient theory.

These ideas about ‘nature’ and about ‘telos’ have universal application. They are keys to understanding the question of natural law and the natural order of a society. For Plato and Aristotle, the city or polis are the natural habitat of the human species. As the social and political species, every community naturally tends towards a self-sufficient city. The constitutions may vary, but the telos is towards a balanced self-sufficiency where each citizen has a clearly defined role or vocation. This idea re-emerges in the twelfth century in John of Salisbury who likens human society to a living organism with its different organs and limbs. Every individual, from the farmer to the scholar to the Prince has a ‘status’ of honour within the whole, where each has reciprocal duties. The craftsmen formed guilds to assure their communal welfare and prevent illegal practices. For a brief moment such cities came into being in France but where eventually overwhelmed by the rise of commerce and trade for money instead of for goods. The demise of the organic city is the beginning of the modern marketised society.

If a society has a natural order, and its natural order forms a part of wider nature and of the universe, then it must also have a natural hierarchy. The proper meaning of ‘hierarchy’ is that mind or divine intelligence descends through the structure of things. The word ‘hierarchy’ literally means ‘divine principle’. It is a further part of the telos of things, guided by the most universal principle of ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ permeating all things. This natural hierarchical order of things is laid out very clearly many times in Thomas Aquinas. For example in his Summa Contra Gentiles he says:

  • …it is evident that all parts are ordered to the perfection of the whole, since a whole does not exist for the sake of its parts, but, rather, the parts are for the whole. Now, intellectual natures have a closer relationship to a whole than do other natures; indeed, each intellectual substance is, in a way, all things. For it may comprehend the entirety of being through its intellect; on the other hand, every other substance has only a particular share in being. Therefore, other substances may fittingly be providentially cared for by God for the sake of intellectual substances. (SCG 3 Chapter 112: 5)

As always with Aquinas, he is at once very clear but very compact. So it is worth drawing out what he says here. The first part – that everything is ordered to the perfection of the whole – we have already covered. We can see this simply in the organs of human anatomy. But when Aquinas says that “intellectual natures have a closer relationship to a whole than do other natures” we have to pause a moment. What he means here is that ‘mind’ is more universal than other substances, and so mind embraces everything, can take in the whole. The universe is already embraced and held in being by the mind of God. But the human mind, being made in the image of God, can ‘comprehend’ the universe and ‘participate’ in the divine intelligence embracing and sustaining it. That is to say, the truly universal principle of the universe is ‘mind’, and that all things exist by virtue of God knowing them into being. It also means that ‘intellectual substance’ is itself the most unified substance in itself. It is the rational principle of unity in all things. By contrast, every other substances, such as matter or the elements, have a ‘particular share in being’ and therefore providentially serve ‘intellectual substances’ or mind.

This means, of course, that in the order of nature the lower species serve the higher species. We can clearly observe this in nature. The bee pollinates the fruit tree in gathering its honey, the fruit tree nourishes the birds and a host of other creatures, including the human species. The human species returns to the earth the chore and seed from the fruit. Thus nature forms a virtuous circle. That is the natural hierarchy of nature clearly manifest to observation. Yet human society has a higher function. Its place is to manifest the understanding of the great order of things through living in accord with the law than runs through the whole. That means to live virtuously and, ultimately, to contemplate the Divine Goodness itself that has brought all beings into being and to which they naturally aspire to return through their part in the harmony of the universe. Thus the ‘contemplative’ life is the completion of the ‘practical’ life. The contemplative and the active mutually support and sustain each other. They are not merely ‘alternative life styles’ as we say in modern parlance!

From this it follows that each individual citizen has a part to play within the whole, and through making their contribution they bring benefit to all and at the same time fulfil their own nature. It is only through this participation in society that each individual may fulfil their natural talents or vocations. There is nowhere else to fulfil them. It is obvious that if each individual were to live only for themselves they would neither receive any benefit from, nor contribute any benefit to society. In this way we see that society has an underlying fundamental lawful order, and the more closely it holds to that underlying order, the better it will attain its end. Through caring for the whole, each individual is cared for and fulfilled. In that sense, each individual is also an end in themselves. Serving the whole does not mean being subsumed to the whole.

We find this fundamental principle of participation in the whole expressed in Plato’s reflections of the proper ends that the lawmaker must bear in mind. For example, in the Republic when it is suggested that the law should enable one class to live better than others, Socrates says:

“You have again forgotten, my friend, that the law does not ask itself how some one class in a state is to live extraordinarily well. On the contrary, it tries to bring about this result in the entire state; for which purpose it links the citizens together by persuasion and by constraint, makes them share with one another the benefit which each individual can contribute to the common weal, and does actually create men of this exalted character in the state, not with the intention of letting them go each on his own way, but with the intention of turning them to account in its plans for the consolidation of the state.” (Sourcebook of Ancient Philosophy, edited by Charles M. Bakewell) Plato’s Republic, Book VII. p. 519e)

Notice the expression “law does not ask itself”. Plato speaks from the essence of law as such and the ends it naturally secures. It is from an understanding of the essence of law and its ends that any good lawmaking can proceed. Laws that spring from the essence of law will not only assure the good of all, they will also “create men of exalted character”, which is to say it will create just citizens, citizens who love justice and delight in acting justly. Citizens who thus live justly will create a city of friendship. For Plato and Aristotle ‘friendship’ is the true end or fruit of law and justice. A city founded in friendship will aim at the higher arts of music and poetry and philosophy, and will be friends with the gods.

Lawmaking must be guided by seeking perfect justice, while bad law is law that favours one part of the city to the disadvantage of another. Lawmaking ought to be guided by divine intelligence rather than by human desire. Aristotle is very clear on this point, saying:

  • He therefore that recommends that the law shall govern seems to recommend that God and reason alone shall govern, but he that would have man govern adds a wild animal also; for appetite is like a wild animal, and also passion warps the rule even of the best men. Therefore the law is wisdom without desire. (Aristotle Politics 11. 3 – 4)

A just society is therefore governed by law and not by human passion. Law itself is the natural ruler, not man. But this requires an understanding of law as ‘reason’. When Plato and Aristotle speak of reason they have two kinds of reason in mind: theoretical reason and practical reason. These two aspect of reason have been lost in modern notions of reason. The theoretical reason is grounded in a knowledge of universals, or universal principles. For example it knows ‘being’ as a universal in which all beings participate. The theoretical reason therefore goes to the ‘truth’ of things. The practical reason, on the other hand, is grounded in the principles of action, or knowledge of right action. These principles come to light when specific proper actions are called for, so that, for example, justice can be applied to a specific situation. The practical reason therefore goes to the ‘good’ of things. It is the practical reason that knows the natural law. The natural law is known in the immediate demand to act, showing what ought to be done and what is not to be done. Cicero often writes of the practical reason in this sense, for example he says:

  • Law (lex) is the highest reason implanted in nature, which commands what is to be done and forbids the opposite. When this same reason has been strengthened and brought to completion in the human mind, it is law (lex), and so [the Stoics] they suppose that law is intelligence whose force (vis) it is to command right action and forbid wrongdoing … It is a force of nature; it is the mind and reason of the wise man; it is the rule (regula) for justice and injustice. (Cicero De Legibus, On the Laws 1.18–19)

When Cicero says ‘law is the highest reason implanted in nature’ he means that Nature Herself is imbued with reason and intelligence. The human intelligence shares in this same reason, and when it is perfected in the human mind, it is then the law in human reason. Acting from that law in human reason corresponds with the universal reason of nature, and so right action becomes action according to nature. This is what justice amounts to, acting in harmony with the intelligence of nature.

Notice a connection here with what Aquinas said: that intellectual substances are universal and that in a certain sense the human mind is all things, at least insofar as it has the capacity to receive into itself the intelligence and reason guiding the universe. We find this same understanding expressed is a different way in the third century by the biographer Diogenes Laertius who says:

  • For our individual natures are all parts of universal nature; on which account the chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to nature, and that means corresponding to one’s own nature and to universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding, and that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. (From Diogenes Laertius, Yonge’s translation, p. 290. Sourcebook of Ancient Philosophy, p. 274)

That ‘reason’ is a principle shared in all rational beings in common with nature is beautifully expressed in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.

The intellectual part is the same to all rationals, and therefore that reason also, whence we are called rational, is common to all. If so, then that commanding power, which shows what should be done or not done, is common. If so, we have all a common law. If so, we are all fellow-citizens: and if so, we have a common city. The universe, then, must be that city; for of what other common city are all men citizens? (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, translated by Francis Hutcheson, Liberty Fund)

The idea that we are all ‘citizens of the universe’ is a distinguishing mark of the Stoic philosophy. Each individual is in a sense a ‘little city’, and the built city each dwells in bears a likeness to the ‘cosmic city’ that all mankind inhabits. What unites the three cities is the one law common to all. But the sense of living in the cosmos, what is called the ‘cosmic sense’, belongs to the human sense of existence as such and may be traced back to the earliest religious and mythic records of human thought, as we observed earlier. Yet with the rise of philosophical reflection the original ‘symbolic’ or ‘poet’ sense of existence shows itself to belong also to the rational sense. This appears most evidently in the sense of the ‘lawfulness’ of things, the fundamental intuition that reality is coherent.

The sense of belonging to the cosmos calls into being the highest human faculties. From this follows a natural hierarchy of things to be most honoured. For Plato the ‘soul’ of man is to be honoured first, bodily health and grace second, and material wealth third. This threefold hierarchy belongs to the individual citizen as well as to the structure of the city or polis. Thus statesmanship consists first in tending the soul, second in the health of the body, and third in the right use of wealth. A city loses its unity and harmony if this hierarchy is changed, especially if it is inverted and wealth becomes more honoured than bodily health or the harmony of the soul. Plato says clearly in the Laws:

  • The noblest and best thing of all for every city is that the truth be told about wealth, namely, that it is for the sake of the body, and the body is for the sake of the soul. (Plato Laws 870b)

Here we see how wealth has a natural telos or proper end in nurturing the body, while the body has a proper end in serving the soul. The soul is the proper ruler of the body and wealth, and this is the same with the soul of the individual and the soul of the city. When this natural order of honours is established, then the soul is open to the order of the cosmos and the realm of the gods. When this natural order is maintained, the city shapes itself accordingly, with the temple in the centre, the civic life surrounding it, and the cultivation of the land forming the outer circle. We see this natural form in the medieval cathedral cities. It is a form that unfolds spontaneously if the life of the soul and the divine order is placed first in honour. It is exactly what Aquinas means when he says “intellectual natures have a closer relationship to a whole than do other natures”. The soul has an affinity with the cosmic order, the intelligence of the universe personified in the powers of the gods and the providential goodness that guides everything to its appointed perfection.

Although this lawful order of things is natural and spontaneous, nevertheless it belongs to man to respond to it and to enquire into it. Unlike the other creatures, man has an innate sense of duty to educate and develop himself. The seed of this sense of duty is the inborne love of truth and goodness. There is a beautiful passage in Cicero’s De Finibus which describes the progressive development that follows from this sense of duty in the soul:

  • The primary duty is that the creature should maintain itself in its natural constitution; next, that it should cleave to all that is in harmony with nature and spurn all that is not; and when once this principle of choice and rejection has been arrived at, the next stage is choice, conditioned by inchoate duty; next such a choice is exercised continuously; finally, it is rendered unwavering and in thorough agreement with nature; and at that stage the conception of what good really is begins to dawn within us and be understood. Man’s earliest attraction is to those things which are conformable to nature, but as soon as he has laid hold of general ideas or notions and has seen the regular order and harmony of conduct, he then values that harmony far higher than all the objects for which he felt the earliest affection and he is led to the reasoned conclusion that herein consists the supreme human good. In this harmony consists the good, which is the standard of action; from which it follows that all moral action, nay morality itself, which alone is good, though of later origin in time, has the inherent value and worth to make it the sole object of choice, for none of the objects to which earlier impulses are directed is choiceworthy in and of itself. (De Finibus, III, 20-21)

Let me draw to a close with some brief thoughts on the virtues. When Cicero says ‘morality itself, which alone is good’, he means the virtues, not our modern idea of moral ‘values’. Plato and Aristotle likewise say that the virtuous life is the one good that alone is an end in itself, even though it must be cultivated. The four cardinal virtues of Prudence, Justice, Courage and Temperance are for the ancients the ground of ethics. Each of these virtues is a skill practiced in following the natural law.

Prudence, the Greek virtue of phronesis, is really the virtue of right discernment, of seeing without illusion, with good judgement. It is a part of the practical reason we spoke of earlier. It discerns what ought to be done. A good translation of the Greek phronesis is ‘practical wisdom’, as distinct from ‘theoretical reason’.

Justice is the power to act in harmony with the true or natural order of nature. It is at once a kind of outward action and an inner condition of the soul. The just soul is a soul in harmony with itself.

Courage is part of what Plato calls the ‘spirited’ aspect of the soul, the part roused to take action in defence or in opposition. It must be guided by prudence and justice, the rational part of the soul, otherwise it becomes either rash or cowardly.

Lastly Temperance is the virtue of self-knowledge and self-command. In Greek it is Sophrosyne. This virtue is prized by Plato above all other virtues. For a man may be just, prudent and courageous yet lack self-governance. Temperance is the condition and skill of the soul with self-knowledge in command of itself and therefore immune to all the vices. Sophrosyne is distinguished from the other virtues in that it runs through the rational, the spirited and the appetitive parts of the soul. Later philosophers tended to associate it only with the appetitive part, and so its original meaning was last. According the Plato, only the temperate man is fit to be a statesman or a ruler of a city. Likewise, a city where the virtue of sophrosyne is established in its citizens will live in justice, peace and friendship with itself, and also with its neighbours. Sophrosyne is the natural law fully embodied in citizenship.

It is clear from all we have said that the ancient understanding of natural law has been lost in our age along with the primordial ‘cosmic sense’ in which the universe is experienced as intelligent and divinely ordered. Owing to this loss, the ancient virtues have also lost their ground since they are the actions of the practical reason that bring human life into accord with the cosmic order. Thus only a virtuous people living in harmony with the cosmic harmony can create a ‘natural society’ and so flourish as nature originally intends.

 

[1] See G. B. Kerferd, The Sophist Movement (Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 112.